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Rule of law is an important European Union (EU) principle. The EU aspires to promote it 
externally, particularly in the context of EU enlargement. In new Member States such as 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, problems with rule of law ‘backsliding’ indicate that 
the rule of law was poorly embedded during previous accessions. Consequently, the EU’s ‘new 
approach’ has made rule of law reform central to the accession processes of Candidate States 
in the Western Balkans. Despite this policy shift, it remains unclear whether this new 
approach supports the construction of both formal rule of law institutions and corresponding 
norms and practices, or whether formal compliance is decoupled from a change in practice. 
This thesis analyses the EU’s new approach and its capacity to enact change by focusing on 
rule of law reforms in the Candidate State of Serbia. This thesis addresses two research 
questions:  
• What are the key logics, imaginaries and interactions driving the delivery of rule of law 
reforms in Serbia?  
• How effective is the EU’s approach for ensuring the institutionalisation of the rule of 
law in practice?  
To answer these questions, this thesis adopts a Cultural Political Economy approach. It 
analyses how key actors interact, understand, interpret and construct rule of law reforms. 
This analysis demonstrates the multiple understandings of rule of law that emerge and draws 
attention to the different political visions these understandings represent. The central 
argument of the thesis is that while the EU’s new approach increasingly draws actors’ 
attention to rule of law issues, it remains driven by a strategic logic. This reinforces the 
reproduction as opposed to contextualisation of its rule of law criteria, generates 
 
 
contestation and reinforces existing power relations. This leads to the partial 
institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice, while simultaneously creating contestation 
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Chapter 1: Setting the stage 
1.1 Rule of law reform in EU enlargement 
This thesis provides a fresh perspective on the European Union’s (EU) promotion of rule of 
law reforms through EU enlargement policy. It does so by examining rule of law reforms in a 
current Candidate State, Serbia. In addition to generating new empirical insight on rule of law 
reforms in Serbia, the application of a Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach 
demonstrates the crucial role that interpretive processes of sensemaking play in shaping 
politics and policy more generally. The thesis’ central argument is that rule of law reform 
processes in Serbia result in limited change. To reach this conclusion, this thesis first 
demonstrates how rule of law reforms are promoted in line with a strategic logic and 
delivered through dominant social relations. It subsequently shows how promoted reforms 
support conceptually narrow understandings of key rule of law issues, which prevents rule of 
law reforms from resonating more widely and addressing the legitimate contestations raised 
by dissident actors. This results in the partial institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice. 
A focus on EU-led rule of law reforms in Serbia provides insight into contemporary European 
politics. Rule of law is a key EU value, enshrined in Article 2 of the European Treaty (EUR-Lex, 
2012). It is central to the EU’s normative identity and shapes its determination to project 
liberal values as a global actor (Manners, 2002). In external contexts, the rule of law helps 
support liberal state-building (Chandler, 2007). However, contemporary challenges to the EU 




Within the EU, increased apathy for further enlargement is exacerbated by the growing 
schism between old and new Member States (Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp.918-937). Evidence 
of rule of law backsliding in Poland and Hungary suggests that liberal democracy is a contested 
venture within the EU. In Hungary, the government has targeted fundamental freedoms of 
expression and press freedom (European Commission, 2017b). In Poland, the Law and Justice 
Party (PiS) has made a concerted effort to exert political control over the judiciary (Council of 
the European Union, 2017). In both cases, illiberal regimes have positioned themselves as 
populist challengers to the ‘liberal elites’ of Brussels and in doing so, directly challenged the 
EU’s rule of law regime (Kelemen, 2017).  Questions about the promotion of the rule of law 
and its capacity to endure in an enlarged EU are increasingly vital for understanding whether 
the European project will survive and thrive, at least as a liberal democratic polity.  
In more recent accession cases, evidence suggests that the rule of law was poorly embedded. 
For example, in Bulgaria and Romania, which both joined the EU on 1 January 2007, 
corruption and organised crime has remained a persistent problem. In both countries, the 
continued application of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism has raised questions 
about whether the EU accession process can initiate fundamental change (Toneva-Metodieva, 
2014).  In the case of Croatia, which was subject to the EU’s expanded rule of law criteria 
during its accession process and achieved membership on 1 July 2013, the rule of law remains 
fragile and illiberal forces continue to play a powerful role in shaping Croatian politics (Rupnik, 
2016, pp. 79–80).  
Externally, the ‘migration crisis’ has further divided Member States. The Visegrád Group have 
rejected proposed asylum quotas and new forms of border control violate previously 
established human rights norms (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The resurgent assertiveness of 
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Russia as a global actor in the EU’s neighbourhood has created new spaces of competition 
between rival geopolitical actors. After the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ended, many 
saw the region’s integration into the EU as inevitable. A credible membership prospect for 
the region was offered as a way of securing the post-conflict peace and completing the 
process of European integration (European Commission, 2003). However, allegations of 
Russian interference in the region and its capacity to turn regional elites away from the 
process of EU enlargement, demonstrates that EU-led rule of law reforms are not the only 
game in town and that alternatives exist to EU accession (Rankin, 2017; Radio Free Europe/ 
Radio Liberty, 2017). 
Between these internal and external challenges, there remains significant problems within 
the Western Balkans region that undermine the enlargement process and rule of law reforms. 
Unlike in established liberal democracies, rule of law has a short history in the Western 
Balkans. Violence and conflict accompanied the collapse of socialism. In the post-conflict 
period, clandestine networks of political elites have helped shape the region’s polities 
(Kostovicova & Bojicic´-Dželilovic´, 2006, pp.230–232). In the Western Balkans, there is a 
greater need to ensure that state-building is not detached from the substance of 
democratisation (Bieber, 2011).  Consequently, the EU has promoted a more intensive rule of 
law agenda in the hope of more effectively exporting liberal democratic norms and the rule 
of law. However, there is an absence of scholarship examining to what extent the EU’s 




1.1.2 The EU’s rule of law criteria 
Against the backdrop of these internal and external challenges, the EU has emphasised a ‘new 
approach’ to enlargement, with rule of law reforms placed firmly at the centre of the 
accession process. This means that Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU Acquis Communautaire 
should be the first chapters opened and the last chapters closed during accession negotiations 
(Nozar, 2012). Chapter 23 covers the Judiciary and fundamental rights, whereas Chapter 24 
covers justice, freedom and security (European Commission, 2015b). By focussing on these 
chapters from the very beginning of the accession process and ensuring they remain a feature 
throughout accession negotiations, it is hoped that the problematic post-accession 
backsliding and the poor internalisation of the EU’s rule of law standards experienced in 
previous accessions will be avoided. 
The EU’s promotion of the rule of law doesn’t just require the formal alignment of countries 
with the EU’s rule of law acquis. It also requires the transfer of more informal rule of law 
norms. Problematically, the existing European Studies literature remains fixated on 
ascertaining and measuring the formal aspect EU rule transfer (Vachudova, 2014). By applying 
a novel methodological approach that goes beyond an analysis of formal rule transfer to 
ascertain how the rule of law is understood and subsequently enacted, this thesis moves 
beyond a study of formal compliance to see what rule of law reforms might achieve in practice. 
1.2 Case selection: Analysing rule of law reforms through Serbia’s accession process 
Analysing rule of law reforms in Serbia has heuristic value and the insights from this case can 
help build a more general theory of EU rule of law promotion and the role of interpretive 
processes therein (George & Bennett, 2005, pp.74–76). This thesis covers the period from 
2000 onwards, when Serbia begun making significant pro-EU overtures. However, explicit 
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focus is placed on the period from 2014 to 2017. 2014 was an important moment as it marked 
the formal start of accession negotiations and Serbia’s exposure to the EU’s new approach. 
This thesis ascertains whether, during this period, formal institution building has been 
coupled with significant changes and convergences in understanding among target actors. 
Primary data is generated through extensive fieldwork conducted in Belgrade, Novi Sad, 
Brussels, Paris and Strasbourg. There are several reasons for analysing rule of law reforms in 
Serbia and why analysing rule of law reforms as on-going interventions in a current Candidate 
State has significant advantages. 
First, it helps develop a fresh in-depth understanding of rule of law reforms and their 
associated reform processes. Unlike comparative analyses, which compare outcomes across 
multiple cases, the primary objective of this thesis is to examine a complex and multi-
relational process.  This necessitates focussing on how rule of law reforms are understood 
and articulated by different actors, how actors interact, whether reforms resonate with actors, 
and how the acceptance or contestation of reforms shapes possible outcomes.  Focusing in-
depth on rule of law reforms in Serbia allows the role of different institutions, actors and 
mechanisms to be discerned. This enables a robust analysis of different processes and the 
role they play in shaping interpretations and actions. Furthermore, by focussing on the 
delivery of rule of law reforms, the importance of socialisation for explaining how reform 
processes unfold is elucidated. 
Up until the early 2000s, Serbia had been under the thumb of Milošević’s authoritarian 
government and before that, Tito’s Yugoslav socialism. In Serbia, the rule of law has a short 
history and the country’s political tradition remains largely incompatible with liberal 
democracy. It is characterised by poor levels of social inclusion, corruption, and restrictions 
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on press freedom (Clark, 2008).  This suggests that rule of law reforms may be difficult to 
achieve.  Serbia provides a tough test for the EU, yet many of its post-conflict and post-
socialist features are shared by other countries in the region. Lessons can be learned from 
this case and related to broader regional developments. Moreover, by focussing on rule of 
law reforms in Serbia, this thesis analyses the role played by different actors at different levels 
of government. Rule of law reforms occur within a policy network that involves both 
transnational and national actors and is not geographically confined to the polity of Serbia 
itself. In sum, analysing rule of law reforms in Serbia can also provide new insight into the 
dynamics of policy reforms more generally. 
1.3 Hypothesis and research questions 
A single hypothesis informs this research. It is anticipated that the effective 
institutionalisation of the rule of law requires not only the formal construction of rule of law 
institutions. It also requires the construction of shared understandings which underpin rule 
of law reforms. Shared understandings are important because understandings inform 
practice (Zimmermann, 2017). Rule of law understandings must resonate with domestic rule 
of law issues. Different actors must be able to contextualise them in a range of organisational 
settings and raise legitimate concerns, which are then addressed through dialogue between 
actors. If this is not possible, rule of law reforms are likely to take on a narrow focus and will 
not filter down and enact change more widely within Serbia. In such cases, reforms are 
expected to be promoted in a minimalistic manner through cooperation with government 
elites and at the expense of wider society’s inclusion. They are also expected to be driven by 
perceived interests and not a normative commitment to the rule of law.  This is expected to 
result in the poor internalisation of rule of law norms and result in a superficial process of 
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reform, which does little to embed the rule of law in practice, or foster consultation and 
dialogue between actors about what the rule of law is and how it can be constructed. This 
focus on how rule of law issues are understood and the proposition that understandings 
inform action, justifies the application of a CPE approach, which facilitates the analysis of 
interpretive processes in politics and policy.  
This hypothesis emphasises the socially constructed nature of rule of law reforms. It 
emphasises that the construction of shared understandings among a wide range of actors 
through inclusive processes of socialisation is vital for accompanying formal institutional 
change with informal change. In contrast, rule of law reforms that do not try to construct 
shared rule of law understandings will be ineffective. These reforms are likely to be driven by 
perceived interests, be focussed on processes of top-down institution building and lack 
inclusivity. In this regard, institutionalisation is understood in the broadest sense. It is not just 
about whether change is observed on the surface but also about how actors understand key 
rule of law issues. This means that the effectiveness of the EU’s approach is judged on 
whether it produces a convergence in understandings between a range of political actors. 
Poor institutionalisation is expected to be indicated by a divergence of understandings, 
contestation and the absence of shared rule of law understandings among different actors.  
Having identified the research problem central to this thesis and stated a hypothesis, two 
research questions are formulated to probe the research problem and test the proposed 
hypothesis. These research questions then generate sub-research questions, which help 
address each research question. The first research question concerns the delivery of the EU’s 
new approach. This question aims to identify and understand the key drivers of the EU’s 
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approach. Central to this question is the way the EU understands the Western Balkans region 
and the influence this has on the EU’s rule of law delivery strategy:  
RQ1: What are the key logics, imaginaries and interactions driving the delivery of rule of law 
reforms in Serbia?  
Two sub-research questions help answer this question. The first sub-research question 
identifies the logics driving the EU’s regional engagement and the imaginaries of the region 
which help shape the EU’s regional engagement: 
SQ1: What are the key logics and imaginaries driving the EU’s regional engagement?  
The second sub-research question analyses the key interactions underpinning the delivery of 
the EU’s rule of law reforms. This is important for illuminating the social relations 
underpinning the delivery of reforms within the relevant policy network. A focus on social 
relations between actors is also important for understanding the role relationships of power 
play in constructing rule of law understandings:  
SQ2: Who are the key actors involved in the delivery of rule of law reforms in Serbia and how 
do they interact? 
The second research question addresses the effectiveness of the EU’s new approach. It 
focuses on the capacity of the EU’s new approach to shape understandings among key rule of 
law actors within Serbia and beyond. Central to this question is the relationship between 
formal institutional change, changes in understanding and practical outcomes.  




To understand the extent to which the rule of law is institutionalised in practice, different 
understandings among key actors are identified, compared and related to the European 
integration context. This helps uncover the substance of reforms, the imaginaries that inform 
understandings, the political projects different understandings reinforce, the similarities and 
differences between understandings, and the iterative way rule of law reforms unfold. The 
degree of convergence between different actors’ understandings is taken as a measure of 
effectiveness. The more shared understandings that emerge between a broad cross-section 
of actors and not just particular types of actors, the greater the degree of shared 
understanding and thus institutionalisation. In answering this question, the aim is not to 
quantify the EU’s effectiveness. Rather, by applying qualitative methods to explore the ways 
in which rule of law reforms are understood and different rule of law concepts enacted, this 
thesis will give an indication of whether the EU’s new approach does place rule of law reforms 
at the centre of the accession process in Candidate States. Consequently, it will also 
determine whether differentiated understandings and the prioritisation of other issues 
indicate a lack of shared understanding and subsequently, institutionalisation in practice.  
The third sub-research question support this by looking at what role semiosis — a mode of 
sensemaking — plays in shaping understandings and informing action. By taking actors as the 
entry point to understand how a range of social structures shape their understandings, this 
thesis shows how semiosis shapes rule of law reform processes: 
SQ3: How do actors construct an understanding of rule of law reforms through semiosis and 
what informs these understandings? 
The extent to which constructed understandings are shared or contested is taken as an 
indicator of how widely institutionalised a rule of law concept is. The more convergence, the 
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more amicable and institutionalised a rule of law concept. The more contestation and 
divergence, the less institutionalised:  
SQ4: To what extent do we find convergence, divergence and contestation between different 
understandings and why? 
The final sub-research question ascertains what these different understandings tell us about 
the state of European integration in Serbia. By relating micropolitical insights to the much 
larger process of European integration, the different political projects understandings reflect 
is deduced. From this, it is possible to generate inferences about what different 
understandings tell us about the process of European integration in Serbia.  
SQ5: What do the different understandings of actors tell us about rule of law reforms in Serbia 
and European integration more generally?  
1.4 Contribution 
This thesis contributes to the field of European Studies and within this field, to the literature 
on enlargement and Europeanisation. It makes distinct conceptual, empirical and 
methodological contributions.  
 Conceptually, this thesis provides a new way of theorising EU enlargement. It moves beyond 
existing paradigms by charting a middle path between institutionalist approaches and new 
forms of interpretivist thinking in political science. It does so by conceptualising institutions 
more broadly as the social contexts in which actors are situated. It further highlights the 
important role that sensemaking in these contexts plays in determining action. This 
conceptual elaboration is important for understanding what role culture, broadly conceived, 
plays in shaping politics. CPE complements and expands the constructivist tradition within 
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European Studies and International Relations (IR). The concept of sensemaking is often 
alluded to but poorly elaborated in existing constructivist accounts, which tend to focus on 
how actors are socialised into the EU’s rule and norms. Instead, this thesis focuses on how 
relations between actors at different levels — which run in multiple directions — shape the 
formulation of understandings. It further highlights how internal processes of reasoning 
inform practice and consequently, influence reform outcomes.  
Empirically, by focussing on rule of law reforms in Serbia and relating this case to the broader 
context of European integration and enlargement, this thesis contributes to an understanding 
of contemporary politics in South East Europe and the EU. An analysis of rule of law reforms 
illuminates important policy changes that support democratisation in Serbia. More broadly, 
it also tells us about the contemporary drivers of EU external action. Qualitative fieldwork 
conducted at the domestic level and supranational level will demonstrate how the EU’s 
engagement with Serbia is influenced by its internal politics. By uncovering the dynamics that 
drive rule of law reforms and the EU’s engagement with Serbia, this thesis advances our 
understanding of European integration.  
The methodology underpinning this thesis allows it to push the boundaries of contemporary 
European Studies. The application of a CPE approach to the chosen topic provides a set of 
methodological tools to analyse accession related reforms that occur in Candidate States. This 
is important for moving beyond orthodox methodological approaches, which favour 
monocausal explanations of change and focus primarily on formal institutions. Instead, a CPE 
approach takes actors as the key entry point for understanding reforms. It opens the ‘black 
box’ of Europeanisation and shows how socially constructed understandings of an issue can 
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differentially shape action, depending on the social relations which sustain and communicate 
understandings.  
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
The central argument of this thesis was elaborated in section 1.1. This argument holds that 
while the EU’s new approach increasingly draws actors’ attention to rule of law issues, it 
remains driven by a socially constructed strategic logic. This reinforces the reproduction as 
opposed to contextualisation of its rule of law criteria around a narrow set of understandings. 
This leads to the partial institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice, while simultaneously 
creating contestation and resistance to reforms. In addition to this central argument, several 
other findings are presented throughout the thesis. The overall structure of the thesis follows.  
Chapter 2 locates the thesis’ research within the broader literature. This chapter explores the 
relevant rule of law literature, EU enlargement literature and interpretivist policy studies 
literature, before locating CPE alongside these literatures. This literature review identifies a 
gap in the way in which existing accounts overlook the relationship between formal 
institutional change and the way in which policy reforms are interpreted. This chapter argues 
that by incorporating insights from the interpretivist turn in political studies, a CPE approach 
is well-placed to analyse how rule of law reforms are interpreted and the importance of these 
interpretations for shaping how rule of law reforms are institutionalised.  
Chapter 3 outlines in detail the theoretical framework of CPE and operationalises it to analyse 
rule of law reforms in Serbia. It outlines a novel research design. First, it discusses the 
importance of structuration and semiosis for understanding and analysing processes of social 
construction. It justifies the use of semi-structured interviews to gain insight into these 
processes. Following this, the chapter outlines how the interview material will be analysed in 
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a way that allows actors’ understandings to be deduced. The use of social network analysis is 
also outlined as an appropriate method for determining what role socialisation plays in 
disseminating rule of law reforms in Serbia. This network analysis is important for helping 
answer RQ1 and SQ2.  Following this discussion of methods, the underlying philosophy of CPE 
is outlined. This section outlines how the thesis’ approach follows a critical realist philosophy 
and adheres to its stratified ontology and epistemic pluralism. This chapter concludes by 
reflecting on the value added by applying a CPE approach.  
Chapter 4 provides important context on rule of law reforms in Serbia. In doing so, it also 
introduces original empirical material, which helps identify some of the key challenges faced 
by rule of law reformers in Serbia. Taking the post-Milošević period as a distinct turning point 
in Serbian politics, this chapter looks at the way Serbia has engaged with the EU from 2000 to 
2017. It highlights the key political projects that have been articulated in Serbia during this 
period and how political reforms have often been enacted in a piecemeal manner. It suggests 
that because of extensive compromise between domestic actors and the EU, a strategic 
process of Europeanisation has occurred.  It argues that the EU’s reliance on the application 
of conditionality has prioritised relations with governmental actors. This has resulted in the 
delivery of reforms in a top-down manner. This has achieved some change but has left 
relatively untouched the structures of key domestic institutions and has done little to 
encourage normative change within institutions. It is shown how various EU instruments 
reinforce these strategic and top-down reform dynamics. This chapter further shows how top-
down reforms have generated significant contestation that has exacerbated existing divisions 
between government and civil society. The entrenched nature of the Serbian public 
administration and the difficulty of achieving reform is further illuminated by drawing on 
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interview material. This chapter concludes by reflecting on the challenging context in which 
rule of law reforms take place in Serbia and what this means for the EU’s new approach.  
Chapter 5 engages with RQ1 and SQ1. It outlines the way in which EU actors understand and 
construct a political imaginary of the Western Balkans region and Serbia within this region. 
This chapter shows how political issues not directly related to rule of law criteria shape the 
EU’s external engagement and create an imaginary centred upon the concepts of risk and 
instability. It demonstrates how this imaginary is constructed in contemporary 
intergovernmental forums and in relation to recent experiences of enlargement. This focus 
on risk and instability leads to the prioritisation of an approach that addresses three perceived 
instances of instability: economic, geopolitical and migration. This chapter shows how rule of 
law reforms are understood as important for addressing these issues and improving stability. 
It further shows how perceived interests drive the EU’s regional engagement. This chapter 
concludes by reflecting on how interests are socially constructed and related to political 
imaginaries. It reiterates that a strategic logic drives EU enlargement. However, the outlined 
evidence suggests that contemporary concerns and historical experiences shape this strategic 
logic. Consequently, it is socially constructed and not the outcome of predetermined 
preferences. 
Chapter 6 engages with RQ1 and SQ2. It uses social network analysis to ascertain the role that 
social relations between actors play in the policy network surrounding rule of law reforms in 
Serbia. This chapter outlines the possibility for both substantive normative socialisation and 
more instrumental socialisation that is likely to reproduce power relations, hierarchies and 
narrow interpretations. It outlines how a strategic process of instrumental socialisation 
informs the way in which key actors engage with one another in the rule of law field.  It is 
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demonstrated that while there is extensive interaction between governmental actors and 
international organisations, socialisation between these actors and NGOs has been limited 
and superficial. This results in a perception that the role of civil society is tokenistic and 
designed to legitimise rule of law reforms. This chapter concludes by reflecting on the 
procedural and intergovernmental nature of socialisation, which follows a strategic logic. This 
suggests that the EU’s new approach needs to better encourage a process of reflection and 
deliberation among a range of actors to ensure the construction of shared rule of law 
understandings.  
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 explore three rule of law topics within the context of Serbia’s EU accession. 
These are: judicial reform, anti-corruption and fundamental rights. These chapters look at the 
process of semiosis among key actors to analyse how discursive variations are selected and 
retained by key actors in a way that leads to the construction of understandings. Each of these 
chapters engage with RQ2, SQ3, SQ4 and SQ5. Regarding judicial reform, chapter 7 outlines 
how a dominant understanding emerges that is centred on the idea of judicial reform and 
efficiency. It shows how this understanding is transferred from external actors to key 
governmental actors. Following this, it outlines a range of contesting understandings. The first 
of these understandings emphasises the importance of an independent judiciary. The 
organisational context and experience actors have of political interference in Serbia’s recent 
history shape this understanding. Another contesting understanding emphasises the need for 
increased ownership of reforms. This contesting understanding is informed by the experience 
of actors and their interaction with external actors who are perceived to drive reforms. 
Regarding what these understandings tell us about European integration, this chapter raises 
three points. First, the emergence of differentiated understandings is argued to demonstrate 
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the contested nature of accession reforms and the difficulty of promoting a single reform 
agenda. Second, the divergence between different understandings demonstrates the EU’s 
attempt to create a reform strategy that brings all actors together has shortcomings. A greater 
emphasis on dialogue between actors is suggested as a possible remedy for this. Third, 
despite contestation, different understandings are not mutually exclusive. However, actors 
struggle to reconcile different understandings within the reform process. This chapter 
concludes that rule of law reforms intersect with domestic and supranational politics and 
cannot be understood as a purely apolitical technical process. 
Chapter 8 looks at anti-corruption policy. It demonstrates the emergence of a dominant 
understanding that reflects an interpretation of corruption as poor administrative culture. 
The proposed corrective of good governance is argued to reflect a neoliberal imaginary. 
Several contesting imaginaries are shown to emerge in response. The first of these reflects 
the view that a good governance focus neglects the systemic causes of corruption due to its 
focus on individual behaviours. A second contesting perspective suggests that some actors 
believe good governance underestimates the challenge of corruption and its deep-rooted and 
multi-causal character. A third contesting understanding reflects a view that the dominant 
reform paradigm does not focus enough on high-level political corruption. In terms of what 
these understandings tell us about European integration, the presence of significant 
contestation demonstrates the partial failure of the EU’s new approach to create a coherent 
policy regime. This chapter further suggests that different understandings are the product of 
organisational context, past experiences and current lived experiences. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that actors find it difficult to reconcile multiple reform narratives. This is shown to 
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be indicative of the difficulty the EU faces in constructing a cohesive reform narrative that 
allows for the widespread institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice.  
Chapter 9 examines fundamental rights. The first understanding of fundamental rights 
emphasises that fundamental rights is an everyday issue relevant for all citizens. This 
understanding stresses the importance of social inclusion and the empowerment of citizens 
vis-à-vis the state. In contrast to this perspective, a first divergent perspective suggests that 
the current reform narrative lacks a clear definition of fundamental rights. Contesting actors 
argue that the abstract use of the term fundamental rights diminishes the meaningfulness of 
reforms. The second contesting perspective emphasises how current reforms and associated 
discourse simulate change, without meaningfully engaging with key fundamental rights issues. 
Organisational context is once more shown to be key in shaping the construction of reforms. 
In terms of what these understandings tell us about European integration, this chapter 
emphasises that while a neoliberal or economistic discourse does structure the emergence of 
a dominant understanding, this is less prevalent than in the field of judicial reform and anti-
corruption reform. This chapter also highlights how the ‘functional’ use of fundamental rights 
discourse reinforces a superficial and strategic process of accession, because dominant 
reform understandings lack a clear normative commitment to fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, it is shown that the eclectic framing of fundamental rights makes it difficult for 
external actors to monitor the policy area effectively. 
This thesis concludes by reflecting on the thesis’ key findings and summarising its findings to 
each research question. Chapter 10 discusses the contribution made, the limits of the 






































Chapter 2: Literature Review and theoretical developments 
 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on EU enlargement and accession-related rule of 
law reforms. In doing so, it outlines the distinct contribution this thesis can make to the 
existing literature both empirically and theoretically.  This chapter is comprised of four parts. 
First, the empirical literature on rule of law reform in the Western Balkans is examined.  The 
rule of law is broken down into composite policy areas: judicial reform, anti-corruption policy 
and fundamental rights.  This section outlines what is already known about rule of law reforms 
in the Western Balkans region and the importance of rule of law reforms for enabling 
European integration.  
Second, a range of existing theories for understanding how the rule of law is promoted 
towards Candidate States is examined. These theories are institutionalist in nature and 
correspond with rational, constructivist and discursive approaches respectively. Rational 
approaches are argued to display an inherent reductionism. A focus on preferences is argued 
to overlook the complex way in which different actors determine their course of action. 
Despite the promise of constructivist accounts for explaining how rule of law reforms 
resonate in Candidate States, orthodox constructivist accounts are argued to lack a thorough 
account of the role power plays in explaining why rule of law reforms are instigated or 
contested. Discursive approaches emphasise the role different types of argumentation play 
in aiding the institutionalisation of the rule of law. However, these approaches have often 
been narrowly defined in the European Studies literature and have not frequently been 
applied. Having reviewed these different strands of literature, it is suggested that the 
European Studies literature would benefit from new insights in political science, which 
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emphasise the importance of interpretation for exampling how and why rule of law reforms 
might be accepted or contested.  
Third, interpretivism is outlined as a new approach in political science that can add much 
needed nuance to the approaches prevalent in European Studies. Interpretivism builds on 
developments in Constructivist Institutionalism and puts forward an actor-centred approach. 
Its fundamental philosophy rejects the perceived structuralism of institutionalist approaches. 
Adherents of interpretivism advocate the important role that culture and interpretation play 
in shaping policy reforms. Despite offering a fresh perspective and analytical focus for scholars 
interested in institutional and policy analysis, many interpretivist accounts do not offer an 
explicit analytical framework. In addition, while sensemaking is identified as important for 
explaining policy reforms and political transformation, it is not embedded in a formal 
analytical framework. Finally, while interpretivist accounts tend to avoid determinism and 
structuralism, the emphasis placed on agency inadvertently neglects the role that social 
structures play in informing action and shaping sensemaking.  
Fourth, this chapter presents Cultural Political Economy (CPE) as a concrete analytical 
framework. Theoretically, CPE emphasises the importance of actor sensemaking within 
institutional settings. These sensemaking processes and the social construction of imaginaries 
are argued to shape action. The central focus placed on how relationships between structures 
and agents shape sensemaking processes enables CPE to offer fresh insight into the role 
context, hierarchy and power relations play in shaping rule of law reforms. Furthermore, this 
approach is novel given its complete absence of application to the issue of EU enlargement 
and rule of law reforms more generally. For these reasons, CPE is advanced as the chosen 
analytical framework. Furthermore, CPE also provides a theory of change. Its emphasis on the 
21 
  
relationship between actors and context — which builds on and advances the concept of 
situated agency outlined by scholars of interpretivist governance (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010) — 
as well as its focus on how material and ideational factors shape interpretive processes, 
suggests that the EU’s efforts to promote the rule of law will only be successful if it correctly 
identifies and ensures that reforms resonate with existing discourses, symbols and meanings, 
which help actors make sense of the world.  
Having outlined the relevant gaps in the literature both empirically and theoretically, this 
chapter concludes. It reflects on the need to move beyond the methodological rigidity of the 
EU enlargement literature and to embrace new theories. This is important for advancing our 
understanding of accession-related rule of law reforms and for appreciating the potentially 
overlooked role sensemaking and interpretation plays in explaining how rule of law reforms 
are institutionalised in practice.  
2.1 Rule of Law Reform in the Western Balkans  
In the context of enlargement, rule of law acts as a vehicle to promote and support the EU’s 
Copenhagen Criteria and liberal democracy (Börzel et al., 2017, p.162; Lacey & Bauböck, 2017). 
Rule of law covers a broad range of policy areas and is often considered to form the ‘substance’ 
of liberal democracies (Bugaric, 2008, pp. 197–198). The concept has often fallen victim to 
conceptual stretching and can be taken to cover everything from the EU’s basic values to the 
practice of democratic politics (Magen, 2016, pp. 1051–1052). In recent years, the European 
Commission has more strictly defined its rule of law concepts, focussing the attention of 
scholars around several key principles. First, a judiciary should be independent and impartial. 
Second, government and its officials should be accountable under the law and take a clear 
stance against corruption. Third, laws must protect fundamental rights and be prepared in a 
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transparent, efficient and fair manner (European Commission 2014). As was outlined in the 
introduction, this thesis explores three of the policy areas outlined in Chapter 23 of the EU 
Aquis, which Serbia must align with: judicial reform, anti-corruption policy and fundamental 
rights. It examines these policy areas to answer the questions outlined in chapter 1.  
2.1.1 Judicial reform 
In terms of composite policy areas, judicial reform is perhaps the most crucial. Judicial reform 
in the context of enlargement concerns the independent exercise of the judiciary, which 
should also be effective and efficient (European Commission, 2015b).  Judicial independence 
is the subject of contemporary debates concerning rule of law ‘backsliding’ in Hungary, Poland 
and Romania (Blauberger & Kelemen, 2017; Kelemen, 2017; Sedelmeier, 2014). Judicial 
reform in the Western Balkans has a relatively short history that is tied directly to the post-
socialist transformation of the region and the prospect of EU Membership offered at the 
Thessaloniki summit in 2003 (European Commission, 2003). 
To date, judicial reforms in the Western Balkans have struggled to take root. While examples 
exist that demonstrate the positive role EU accession has played as a driver of rule of law 
reform more generally, change within the judicial systems of individual countries had been 
limited (Kmezic, 2016). History plays an important role in shaping the path dependent 
development of rule of law in the Western Balkans and countries such as Serbia have sought 
to undertake reforms in an environment where institutional structures are inherited from 
successive socialist and authoritarian regimes (Dallara, 2014). These historical path 
dependencies are important. However, contemporary events also shape rule of law reforms 
in powerful ways and much of the current judicial reform shortcomings have been attributed 
to the dysfunctional way reforms are advanced and administered. Some scholars have 
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criticised the EU’s conditionally approach for failing to encourage a suitable change in 
mentality among target judicial institutions and actors (Dallara, 2014; Kochenov, 2008; 
Mendelski, 2013, 2016). Others have highlighted how Western Balkans elites continue to 
obstruct judicial reforms to preserve their own vested interests by blocking organised 
advocacy groups and preventing the construction of autonomous institutions (Elbasani, 2013; 
Elbasani & Šabić, 2017).  
While existing accounts have been useful for identifying the relationship between actors, 
institutions and policy change (or lack of), they have focussed less on why reforms might be 
contested or rejected. There are also relatively few studies examining the potential 
contradictions inherent within the EU’s approach, and how this might produce unintended 
reform outcomes (Fagan et al., 2015). The default explanation for resistance is that reforms 
run against the existing interests of elites and the power structures which sustain them 
(Noutcheva, 2009; Vachudova, 2014). Such an understanding assumes that interests are 
formed ex ante and correspond with a rational assessment of the political situation and policy 
context. However, interests might also be constructed in administrative and cultural contexts, 
and actors might make sense of their interests in complex ways. Recent studies suggest close 
attention needs to be given to the domestic administrative contexts in which judicial reforms 
occur, if the EU is to effectively recognise and respond to new strategies of control and 
interference deployed by domestic elites (Fagan, 2016). Consequently, this thesis does not 
presuppose how actors interpret judicial and other rule of law reforms, nor how actors 
interpret their interests in relation to reforms and act upon them. Instead, it focuses on how 
actors’ understandings of key issues are constructed in different contexts and how this 




The second important policy area examined in this thesis is anti-corruption policy. Given the 
vastness of the existing literature, this review limits its scope to a discussion of corruption and 
anti-corruption policy in the context of post-socialist transition and the Western Balkans 
region.  In terms of the broader literature, it is worth highlighting the general consensus that 
a range of factors including culture, belief systems, political transition and economic 
transition, facilitate the production and reproduction of corruption (Ashforth, et al., 2008a; 
Graf Lambsdorff, 2005; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). 
In the Western Balkans, corruption is perceived to be widespread and driven by clandestine 
political structures that function on systems of patronage (Vachudova, 2009; Wallace & 
Latcheva, 2006).  State capture is considered to be deep and corruption is pervasive within 
public institutions across the region (Elbasani & Šabić, 2017). Corruption is further 
proliferated through elite actor networks (Kleibrink, 2015). Consequently, corruption 
undermines the region’s Europeanisation process because elites obstruct reforms that 
threaten their patronage networks (Noutcheva, 2009).  
Anti-corruption strategy has been outlined as a key component of Chapter 23 because 
corruption undermines political independence and accountability.  The EU’s focus on political 
and administrative corruption corresponds with its adherence to principles of good 
governance. Good governance principles include accountability, transparency and efficiency 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). EU enlargement scholars have 
largely focussed on how engagement with the EU can transfer these principles of good 
governance to Candidate States (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005; 
Pridham, 2002). A more critical body of literature has examined what good governance means 
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in practice. This literature has argued that despite promising transparency and accountability, 
good governance remains driven by a paternalistic (Chandler, 2007, 2010) or a neoliberal logic 
(Bedirhanoğlu, 2007; Demmers et al., 2004; Mikuš, 2016). This critical literature tends to 
conclude that good governance exacerbates political disengagement in the Western Balkans 
and serves the external interests of the EU and its partners. 
Empirical studies of corruption and critiques of good governance obscure debates about how 
anti-corruption strategy is understood by different actors, and how actors relate these 
understandings to different political projects. Furthermore, anti-corruption policy may have 
an ambiguous effect. This is because its promotion is reliant on existing elites, who themselves 
may be corrupt. This justifies a focus on the key actors involved in implementing anti-
corruption reforms. It is important to understand their characteristics, whether they support 
or contest anti-corruption reforms and whether they support or subvert an anti-corruption 
agenda.  
2.1.3 Fundamental rights  
Fundamental rights in the context of EU enlargement involves the transposition of the EU’s 
charter of fundamental rights into the legal framework of Candidate States (Official Journal 
of the European Communities, 2000). This includes respecting human rights and the respect 
for and inclusion of minorities. It also covers areas such as a freedom of expression and media 
freedom.  
Formally, the accession process requires Candidate States to put in place legislation that 
protects the rights of minorities and upholds social freedoms. In previous accessions however, 
this formal change has often done little to advance the minority rights of vulnerable groups, 
such as the Roma (Hughes & Sasse, 2003; O’Dwyer & Schwartz, 2010; Sasse, 2008; 
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Vermeersch, 2003, 2012).  The decoupling of formal improvement in the legal framework 
from the lived experience of minority groups is also an issue in the Western Balkans region. 
For example, LGBT communities report continued discrimination, despite some positive 
legislative changes taking place (Igrutinović et al., 2015; Selmić, 2016).  Similarly, despite 
legislative changes, the region’s Roma minority continues to live at the periphery of society 
(Kacarska, 2015; McGarry, 2017; Sardelić, 2015). 
Another area of fundamental rights that is salient in the Western Balkans is freedom of 
expression, including media freedom. Media freedom has been a persistent issue in the 
Western Balkans and journalists across the region have faced violence and intimidation for 
pursuing politically sensitive topics (Huszka, 2018; Irion & Jusic, 2014). Freedom House’s 
media freedom in the world has seen little change in the Western Balkans region and in recent 
years, has even reported significant declines in media freedom (Freedom House, 2015a, 2017).  
A brief examination of the literature demonstrates the fragile state of fundamental rights in 
the Western Balkans region. To better understand why it has been difficult to advance 
fundamental rights, it is important to understand how key policy actors understand 
fundamental rights issues and the sensemaking processes determining their support or 
rejection of fundamental rights issues.  By ascertaining the reasons why fundamental rights 
reforms are understood, accepted, contested and rejected, this thesis can complement the 
existing literature.  
2.2 Current conceptualisations of the diffusion process: How the EU elicits change in 
Candidate States 
The EU’s method for transferring important rules and norms to Candidate States during 
enlargement has typically been conceptualised as a process of Europeanisation. Put succinctly, 
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Europeanisation concerns the alignment of countries with the formal and informal rules and 
norms of the EU (Radaelli, 2002). Europeanisation approaches broadly align with an 
institutionalist paradigm. This is because they are focussed on how the EU can change 
institutions in Candidate States and promote the alignment of these domestic institutions 
with its rules and norms. As the following paragraphs will demonstrate however, within the 
Europeanisation literature, the importance of sensemaking is not adequately conceptualised 
as an important factor that shapes how the EU is perceived, how its reforms are understood 
and how action is constructed in relation to a subjective understanding of accession-related 
issues. 
Building on the Europeanisation literature, Börzel and Risse (2011) have outlined different 
mechanisms through which Europeanisation occurs. Their approach has been widely cited 
and built upon by other scholars researching various aspects of EU enlargement, as well as 
other forms of regional integration and EU foreign policy (Jetschke & Murray, 2012; 
Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012a). Analytical models of 
diffusion identify the role of three logics: consequential, appropriateness and communicative. 
The first of these logics can be considered to correspond with Rational Choice Institutionalism, 
the second Sociological Institutionalism and the third Constructivist Institutionalism. These 
logics inform various processes that result in the diffusion of EU norms and institutions (Börzel 





Table 2.1: Diffusion Mechanisms. Source:  Börzel and Risse (2011, p.6) 
Underlying logic of social action Diffusion mechanism Example instruments 
Manipulating utility calculations 
(instrumental rationality) 
Positive and negative incentives and 
capacity building 
EU conditionality, material 
resources on condition of reform 
Socialisation (normative rationality) Promote new ideas through social 
learning and creating normative 
pressure 
EU Twinning Programmes, 
interlinkage between epistemic 
communities 




Each logic of social action rests on distinct assumptions regarding actors, their motivations 
and their interactions with institutions. Börzel and Risse identify these logics as ideal types, 
accepting the application of aligned instruments rarely occurs exclusively in real life (Börzel & 
Risse, 2011, p.5).  The instruments associated with these logics are conceptualised as policy 
tools that can initiate a causal process of diffusion. Diffusion is proposed to be subject to 
scope conditions that depend on: domestic incentives for institutionalisation; the degree of 
statehood; government type; and the power asymmetries between the sender and receiver 
of rules and norms (Ibid, pp.10-14).  
Börzel and Risse’s focus on logics and mechanisms is characteristic of institutionalist thinking 
and the belief that ‘institutions are the central component of political life’ (Peters et al., 2005, 
p.122). Their approach and the approach of many other institutionalist scholars 
methodologically prioritises the institutional environment in which political actors operate 
(Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, pp.6–7). This chapter’s following sections will outline the merits 




2.3 Rational Approaches  
The first diffusion mechanism is based on the logic of consequence. This logic implies 
anticipated prior preferences and utility outcomes determine social action (March & Olsen, 
1998, p. 94). This logic corresponds with rational choice approaches. Rational choice theories 
emphasise the material and strategic nature of the social world. Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (RCI) conceptualises institutions to act as a restraint on the strategic 
preferences of actors and argues that institutions play a role in shaping preference formation 
(Dowding, 1994; Koelble, 1995, pp. 234–237). In European Studies, such approaches are 
dominant. The influence of rational choice permeates Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), 
perhaps the most dominant model for understanding European integration. LI emphasises 
how EU Member States set their preferences domestically and subsequently interact within 
the institutional structures of the EU to produce supranational outcomes (Moravcsik, 1995).  
In the case of enlargement, the decision to engage with EU Candidate States and the way in 
which EU Candidate States engage with the EU is subsequently shaped by preferences and 
national interests. From this perspective, cost-benefit calculations dominate and domestic 
actors in Candidate States are likely to engage only if there are credible ‘incentives’ offered 
by the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). 
Actors are seen to respond to the positive incentives offered by prospective membership, as 
well as the negative consequences of being denied membership. Reform processes are seen 
to be highly dependent on strategic factors and cost-benefit scenarios (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004). Compliance studies also conform to this rational paradigm because they 
generally equate the effective transposition of the EU acquis with a subsequent change in 
behaviour. This is because actors are considered rational agents and as rational agents, they 
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conform and operate according to new institutional rules constructed through 
Europeanisation (Böhmelt & Freyburg, 2013, 2017; Hille & Knill, 2016; Knill & Tosun, 2009; 
Toshkov, 2008). This process of alignment with EU rules is further conceptualised to limit the 
possibility for domestic elites to engage in corruption as their actions become constrained by 
new institutional rules (Vachudova, 2009, p.50). In other areas, it has been argued that the 
use of conditionality as a significant stick to induce reforms had ‘put the reform of sensitive 
sectors such as the judiciary and public administration on the political agenda’ (Noutcheva & 
Bechev, 2008, p.140). 
Despite retaining their dominance, rational theories, which focus on the EU’s use of 
conditionality during accession, have struggled to explain the issue of backsliding highlighted 
in chapter 1. Rational approaches fixate on the increased use of modified conditionality to 
ensure compliance (Gateva, 2013; Sedelmeier, 2017, pp. 342–343). However, conditionality 
has its limits. Increasingly, Europeanisation scholars suggest that the ability of enlargement 
policy to transform Candidate States depends on the domestic configuration of actors therein, 
and their capacity to implement reforms (Börzel et al., 2017, pp.168–170). Mitigating veto 
players and empowering reform coalitions is recognised as important for ensuring new rules 
and norms transfer successfully (Schimmelfennig, 2014). However, ensuring domestic actors 
cooperate is increasingly difficult when EU incentives are not perceived as credible by 
domestic elites in Candidate States (Huszka, 2018). Furthermore, domestic reform coalitions 
increasingly find themselves marginalised, and struggle to align their positions with the views 




A so-called ‘domestic turn’ is increasingly advocated within the EU Studies literature 
(Slootmaeckers et al., 2016). This domestic turn suggests that more focus needs to be placed 
on the domestic context in Candidate States, to better conceptualise the nuanced interplay 
between external incentives and domestic factors, which occurs during Europeanisation 
(Dimitrova & Buzogány, 2014). Parau (2009) suggests that in previous cases of successful 
transformation, conditionality alone cannot explain positive outcomes. Using the example of 
Romanian civil society empowerment, she suggests that change occurred through three 
causal pathways: the government’s desire for the country to accede to the EU; transnational 
advocacy networks; and the government’s self-identification with some elements of the 
advocacy network, reinforced by a concern for its external reputation (Parau, 2009). From 
this perspective, monocausal explanations focussed on the use of conditionality alone cannot 
explain transformation. Domestic interests, social pressure and two-way socialisation 
processes also play a crucial role.  
Looking into the domestic context, previous studies have shown that during the Eastern 
enlargement, the need to attract foreign investment sufficiently motivated domestic elites to 
seek EU integration and comply with the EU’s conditionality criteria (Parau, 2012). While 
domestic elites in the Western Balkans have similarly engaged with the EU to secure financial 
investment and other resources in the past, the rise of global powers that can offer similar 
material resources without attaching the strings of rule of law reform means that the EU is no 
longer the only game in town (Mujanović, 2018). With alternative sources of power now 
available to domestic elites, the EU’s conditionality procedure will find it increasingly difficult 
to motivate domestic actors to adopt reforms. This suggests that conditionality will 
increasingly have to be coupled with persuasive forms of socialisation.   
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 Critical accounts of EU state-building in the region further demonstrate the decreased 
attractiveness of the EU as an end-point for the Western Balkans countries (Belloni, 2016). 
Conditionality is further undermined by the fact the EU’s rule of law acquis is often vague. 
This means the effectiveness of conditionality is severely hampered by its decreasing 
credibility, the opportunity to obtain resources through other means and a lack of clear rules 
that can be communicated towards Candidate States (Bieber, 2011, p.1793). While 
conditionality might force compliance, it remains questionable whether compliance alone is 
enough to change deep-rooted practices, which in the absence of conditionality, are likely to 
reappear. This has been shown in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, where even post-
accession conditionality in the form of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, has 
struggled to prevent the re-emergence of political corruption (Ivanov, 2010). Consequently, 
recent analysis has concluded that in the Western Balkans, the rule of law cannot be 
engineered through the smart design of formal institutions alone. Successful reforms require 
the support of actors within and beyond key political institutions, who buy into rule of law 
norms and values (Strelkov, 2016). It is also important to understand the confounding role 
played by socio-economic factors and domestic legacies, which shape the way EU incentives 
are interpreted (Dolenec, 2013, pp.195–196).   
Conditionality has provided an appropriate framework that allows scholars to conceptualise 
formal alignment with EU rules. However, to appreciate the importance of social context and 
interpretation in shaping the formation of preferences, a more nuanced conceptualisation is 
necessary. This nuanced conceptualisation requires understanding actors not as utility 
maximisers but as human agents, whose understandings determine the way in which they 
engage with the EU and its reform agenda.  
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2.3.1 The challenge of moving beyond formal compliance 
Theoretical elaboration is also necessary to address the difficult issue of moving beyond 
formal compliance. Ensuring that formal compliance is matched by adherence to new rules 
and norms in practice is necessary to ensure that new institutions do not remain ‘empty shells’ 
(Dimitrova, 2010). Post-socialist countries in Eastern and South East Europe struggle to 
overcome institutional legacies. In these contexts, informal institutions remain strong. 
Despite some degree of formal compliance with the EU’s accession criteria, informal rules and 
norms continue to undermine the effectiveness of new institutions (Innes, 2004).  
Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) suggests that public participation in the design of new institutions is 
necessary for new rules to become ‘rules of the game’. Consequently, there is a strong 
relationship between the strength of democracy and effective institutionalisation of the rule 
of law; once a balance of power has been achieved between domestic constituents and 
governing elites through the strengthening of democratic institutions, the introduction of 
new rules and norms can effectively constrain major actors, preventing them from 
circumventing formal and widely legitimised institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). This implies 
that the effective promotion of the EU’s rule of law criteria needs to be coupled with wider 
support and assistance for the creation of a pluralistic and democratic society.   
Mendelski’s (2013) critique of EU rule of law promotion in the Western Balkans suggests that 
moving beyond formal compliance requires a significant recalibration of the way in which the 
EU engages with Candidate States. He argues that the activities of the EU and pro-reform 
actors have successfully promoted change in the legal framework. However, the 
uncoordinated delivery and incoherence of the EU’s reform approach has undermined 
adherence to the rule of law in practice. Consequently, significant gaps exist that allow formal 
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rule of law institutions to be circumvented by domestic elites (Mendelski, 2013). The EU’s 
focus on ensuring the adoption of formal rules, in tandem with the partisan empowerment 
of domestic change agents, is further argued to result in a biased assessment of rule of law 
reforms, whereby formal change is equated with a change in practice (Mendelski, 2016). An 
alternative argument has been made that greater alignment of EU rules and norms with 
domestic normative frameworks, coupled with the empowerment of sincere reform 
coalitions, might better result in the institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice 
(Mendelski, 2013, 2016; Webb, 2018). 
Ensuring that new rule of law institutions are coupled with new rules in practice remains a 
challenge in the Western Balkans. Political authority continues to flow through informal 
networks that operate in parallel to formal institutions. This results in the continuation of 
informal practices that subvert and capture institutions, turning them into empty shells that 
are unable to enforce new rules (Dimitrova, 2010; Kostovicova & Bojicic´-Dželilovic´, 2013). 
The more strongly externally introduced rules deviate from previously established practices, 
the more likely partial compliance and the proliferation of existing practice (Noutcheva, 2009; 
Fagan & Wunsch, 2018). If change is to be realised and a move beyond formal compliance 
achieved, it is also necessary to ensure additional resources are assigned to help domestic 
actors adopt and adapt EU rules and norms (Buzogány, 2009).  
In sum, the importance of moving beyond formal compliance is increasingly recognised in the 
literature. More and more, studies of EU enlargement appreciate the complexities of 
introducing new rules and recognise that conditionality alone will not induce a deeper change 
in the absence of appropriate domestic engagement. However, there has yet to be large-scale 
study of whether the EU’s new approach represents the type of effective change needed. 
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Furthermore, the reductionist ontology associated with rational choice approaches continues 
to dominate the field. This results in the limited application of alternative approaches that 
provide insight into how EU rules become contextualised and institutionalised in practice.  
2.3.2 Rational reductionism? 
On a theoretical level, rational choice is reductionist. By conceptualising actors as homo 
economicus, normative and social aspects that actors have are completely stripped away. The 
rational account of agency not only reifies liberal economic theory, it also reduces the 
complexity of the social world in a parsimonious manner (Archer, 2002, pp.11–12). What 
remains is a theory that does not correspond with actors’ own accounts of their behaviour in 
policy reform processes.  
In terms of how policy change occurs, policy studies literature suggests that actors are often 
not rational and that ideas and beliefs matter (Faleg, 2017; May, 1992).  The core assumptions 
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), perhaps one of the most widely cited frameworks 
for studying policy change, highlights the importance of socialisation between actors and the 
role that beliefs play in fixing policy perspectives (Weible et al., 2009, p.122). By focussing on 
the importance of different organisational contexts and actor beliefs, the ACF and other policy 
learning approaches draw our attention to the importance of cultural factors that explain rule 
of law reform (Dunlop, 2009, pp.294–295; Howorth, 2004). In contrast to rational choice, the 
policy learning literature suggests that actors are often reflexive and capable learners, whose 
actions are shaped by far more than endogenously formulated preferences (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, pp.63–64).  
In the case of rule of law reforms in Serbia, moving beyond the rationalist tendencies of the 
existing literature is also important to answer more challenging questions. How are reforms 
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meaningfully enacted as opposed to simply complied with? What role do social relations play 
in shaping agency? What social and reputational stigma might actors come under when they 
do or don’t comply with rule of law reforms? Perhaps more fundamentally, does the lived-
experience of individuals really convey a picture of rational behaviour? The methodological 
individualism evident in rational choice accounts is poorly equipped to answer such questions 
(Bulmer & Joseph, 2016, p.733; Cramer, 2002). Such accounts relegate the role of culture and 
shun a more sophisticated notion of the political in favour of a focus on preferences. Actors 
are perceived to not capably recognise the inherent appropriateness of certain values, 
responding only to reforms if their interests are enhanced or placed under threat. Such a 
parsimonious perspective does not account for the complex nature of organisational conduct.   
Several ‘sociological’ approaches further challenge rational choice theory’s conceptualisation 
of social situations. Adler-Nissen’s (2014) account of EU diplomatic practices challenges the 
rational conceptualisation of a static world, where actors occupy fixed preferences. An 
examination of EU diplomats and other ‘communities of practice’ demonstrates how 
institutions are interactively engaged with by actors, creating micro-social worlds which shape 
their behaviour (Adler-Nissen, 2016; Bicchi, 2014). Rational approaches tend to dismiss the 
role social interaction plays, conceptualising preference change to occur only instrumentally. 
Furthermore, adopting the EU’s legal framework does not necessarily mean corresponding 
norms have been internalised by actors (Wiener, 2015). This is demonstrated in 
contemporary political developments, which raise tough questions about the plausibility that 
a simple re-aggregation of preferences can induce the type of change needed to enact 
meaningful rule of law reforms. It thus becomes clear that rational choice perspectives fail to 
account for the world as it is and ignore the social dynamics of policy change. Perhaps most 
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importantly, the following section demonstrates the failure of rational choice accounts to 
reflect the empirical reality they claim to observe.  
2.3.3 The emergence of backsliding as a challenge to conditionality 
Developments within the EU in the form of post-accession backsliding justify a critical 
evaluation of political conditionality as the dominant tool for inducing Europeanisation. In 
Poland and Hungary, there has been an encroachment on the independent exercise of the 
judiciary and attempts to restrict freedom of expression (Blauberger & Kelemen, 2017; 
Kelemen, 2017). In Bulgaria and Romania, residual issues of corruption continue to undermine 
the exercise of rule of law institutions (Ivanov, 2010; Levitz & Pop-Eleches, 2010; Toneva-
Metodieva, 2014). Questions have also been raised about the contemporary effectiveness of 
the EU’s conditionality tools for enacting meaningful change in the case of Serbia. Economides 
and Ker-Lindsay (2015) argue that current compliance with accession reforms has occurred in 
response to material incentives. This has resulted in the pragmatic and superficial adoption 
of EU rules and norms. As a result, there has been an avoidance of aligning domestic practices 
with EU expectations (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015, p.4). They conclude that 
conditionality promotes a short-term interest-based policy shift, as opposed to a process of 
normative Europeanisation that alters the behaviour of actors (Ibid, p.13).  This is important 
— in our case, a change in behaviours is necessary to move beyond formal compliance and 
support the institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice.  
Contemporary developments in new Member States demonstrate that while conditionality 
might result in pre-accession compliance, it does not constitute an effective instrument for 
locking in rule of law reforms. This suggests a need to comprehend the appropriate 
circumstances for the application of conditionality, as opposed to prioritising conditionality 
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as a uniform policy.  Furthermore, conditionality is defined through discourse, interaction and 
other complex process of socialisation. As Vasilev (2016) concludes: ‘without discursively 
induced actor transformations, EU membership would not have been interpreted as a carrot 
and exclusion from EU membership would not have been interpreted as a stick’ (Vasilev, 2016, 
p.753). To comprehend whether EU conditionality can construct new rule of law 
understandings, an approach must be adopted which takes the role of discourse, ideas, 
socialisation and other cultural aspects seriously. This requires engagement with an 
alternative body of literature that focusses on processes of social construction and 
interpretation. 
To summarise, the application of conditionality can have a ‘straightjacket’ effect on Candidate 
States, using material leverage to elicit reform compliance. To what extent this leads to actors 
upholding the rule of law as ‘something worth respecting’ and the extent that conditionality 
leads to a change in practice requires further analysis. In contrast to the methodological 
individualism and reductionism espoused by rational choice, an alternative perspective of 
preference formation is adopted in this thesis, which takes preferences to be formulated ‘on 
the basis of deep seated and socially shaped sentiments, filtered through a process of 
socialisation’ (Crossley, 2008, p.95). To avoid the decoupling of actual practice from 
implemented laws, there remains a need for fundamental social change to occur during 
accession, transforming how actors come to evaluate certain preferences (Slapin, 2015). 
Conditionality can therefore be effective for inducing engagement, but it says very little about 
how deep processes of change might occur and the roles played by norms and values.   
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2.4 Constructivist perspectives 
Orthodox constructivist accounts correspond primarily with the second diffusion logic in table 
2.1. This logic of appropriateness is reflected in Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and its focus 
on ‘norm guiding behaviour’ (Börzel & Risse, 2011, p. 5).  Due to the dominance of rationalist 
approaches, Börzel and Risse (2009) note: ‘alternative [constructivist] mechanisms [to 
conditionality], such as socialization, persuasion and emulation, have received little attention 
in the literature so far’ (Börzel & Risse, 2009, p.10). This ‘thinner’ strand of constructivism 
associated with SI emphasises the causal power of ideas and the role they play in shaping 
interests (Carlsnaes et al., 2002, p.57).   
The constructivist research tradition builds on the logic of appropriateness outlined by March 
and Olsen (1998). Constructivists place analytical focus on the significance of norm guided 
and identity-based action, whereby the behaviour of actors reflects their view of the world 
and their perceived position within it. Crucially for constructivists, it is an actor’s 
interpretation of norms and other ideational factors that shapes their conduct. Situational 
cues of their social environment elicit a ‘mutually constitutive’ response to new norms, 
whereby actor interpretation reconstructs new norms and new norms reconstruct actor 
interpretation of a given situation (Sending, 2002). The EU literature has by and large been 
slow to accommodate constructivist approaches. Despite its late introduction, constructivism 
provided a ‘breath of fresh air’ when placed alongside rational analytical approaches (Checkel 
& Moravcsik, 2001, pp.219–220). 
2.4.1 Identity and socialisation as key constructivist building blocks 
Constructivist research focuses extensively on the importance of identity and socialisation. In 
terms of identity, constructivists explain change in terms of whether new norms and practices 
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resonate with existing identities and values (Fuchs, 2011).  In the case of rule of law reform, 
different outcomes are possible depending on the answer given to the question: ‘what does 
a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition)?’ (Weber et al., p.282). 
Identities themselves are not static or fixed like preferences and are malleable to change. 
Actors can thus readjust their identities and align with new norms.  
Dimitrova (2010) highlights that new institutions are only effective when they are 
underpinned by corresponding rules and norms, which are followed in practice. According to 
her framework, three outcomes of accession reforms can be theorised: First, the reversal of 
new rules; second, institutionalisation involving the alignment of formal and informal rules; 
third, ‘empty shells’ when actors ignore new rules and parallel informal rules are used (Ibid., 
p.146). Dimitrova suggests that the institutionalisation outcome requires aligning external 
rules and domestic interests. This requires identifying who the key domestic veto players are 
and using robust processes of strategic bargaining to align with domestic preferences and 
force compliance where necessary (Ibid). This perspective is informed by rational choice 
theory and its associated ontology. However, an alternative constructivist explanation 
suggests that the alignment of formal rules with informal rules and practices will be more 
effectively achieved through processes of socialisation, which focus on changing identities 
and socialising actors into both the formal and informal rules of the EU (Fagan & Wunsch, 
2018, p.14).  
Constructivists emphasise the importance of socialisation for explaining identity change and 
socialisation into new institutional norms. From this constructivist perspective, socialisation 
involves any process of social interaction with institutions and other actors (Checkel, 2005, 
pp.805–815). This strand of constructivism emphasised the importance of institutions 
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because socialisation is initiated in an institutional context, where actors are socialised into 
the EU’s ‘way of doing’. A good example of this socialisation process is visible in the EU’s 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instrument as well as the Twinning 
programmes between Member States and Candidate States. These programmes aim to foster 
understanding of the accession process and demonstrate the compatibility of the EU’s norms 
with existing practice (European Commission, 2014). 
In the case of accession reforms, socialisation is conceptualised as important for socialising 
actors into new patterns of behaviour that uphold the rule of law in practice. As Sasse (2008) 
concludes in her comparative study of minority rights in Latvia and Estonia: ‘without at least 
a degree of socialisation, the implementation of rationally adopted laws and policies from the 
accession period is bound to remain patchy’ (Sasse, 2008, p.856). While scholars identify the 
importance of socialisation for ensuring behavioural change, they have tended to relegate it 
as an explanatory factor given the salience of the rational perspective. For example, in their 
edited volume examining the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier conclude that: ‘rule adoption is primarily driven by the 
conditional external incentives of the EU’ (2005, p.211). This returns us full circle to the 
dominant view that rational self-interest drives accession reforms in Candidate States. 
Accepting this premise once more opens a difficult set of questions about the transformative 
capabilities of the EU’s enlargement agenda and the possibility for its new approach to induce 
a change in practice. 
In terms of why this change in practice is important, Kochenov (2008) draws attention to the 
failure of previous enlargements to communicate principled rule of law norms because of the 
EU’s procedural pre-accession conditionality. The procedural format of accession 
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negotiations is considered to provide limited opportunities for domestic actors to understand 
EU norms in relation to domestic circumstances. An increased focus on socialisation is 
important for encouraging reflexivity and the actual adoption of the rule of law in practice 
(Kochenov, 2008, p.93). This suggests that an approach focussed on how actors understand 
and construct rule of law reforms, as opposed to assuming that actors will unquestionably 
follow new institutional rules, can generate new insights into the transformative power of the 
EU’s rule of law approach. Other scholars concur that a process-orientated approach, which 
involves engagement between the EU and a range of domestic actors to contextualise rule of 
law reforms, could increase the legitimacy of accession related reforms in different country 
contexts (Mendelski, 2016, pp.377–278). When it comes to rule of law promotion in Serbia, a 
more process-orientated approach based on ‘partnership and mutual responsibility’ is 
believed to result in the contextual application of EU rule of law norms (Toneva-Metodieva, 
2014, pp.546–548). Conditionality is often conceptualised as the main catalyst for change, 
with socialisation serving a secondary function. Yet if an actual change in practice is to occur, 
this will occur only through socialisation. In sum, socialisation is necessary to enable a change 
in rule of law practice, as opposed to compliance. 
This perspective, that socialisation matters for enabling behavioural change among actors, is 
well supported in the policy studies literature (Dunlop, 2009; Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2017). 
Sabatier notes that in a world where actors have cognitive limits and seek to realise core 
values with limited resources, actors are provided with a strong incentive to learn more about 
problems and the consequences of policy alternatives (Sabatier, 1988, p.159). Socialisation is 
particularly important within policy networks as connections between actors form conduits 
for sharing knowledge, learning, innovation and embedding network practices (Davies, 2011). 
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In this regard, social network analysis is useful for mapping and elaborating how actors 
mobilise and interact with one another to achieve objectives and policy outcomes within 
policy networks (Lazega, 2013; J. Scott, 2012). Institutionalist scholars have also noted the 
capacity of institutions to collectively learn either through experience or lesson drawing 
(Peters, 2011, p.79; Stone, 1999). Similarly, a CPE approach emphasises that actors have the 
capacity to learn and improve their capacity to act in line with either their identities or 
interests (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.64). Insights from the policy studies literature suggest that 
the rational-normative divide is neither insurmountable nor a reflection of the world as it is. 
Interests do matter and actors are strategically orientated towards achieving objectives. Yet 
actors are also motivated by values, do follow norms and are capable of learning and changing 
their understanding of a topic. Any change in values, norms, learning and understanding are 
likely to be initiated by socialisation. For this reason, socialisation is a key aspect of this thesis’ 
research agenda. 
2.4.2 Normative Power or Normative Hegemony? 
Constructivism has also played an important role in shaping the way scholars understand the 
EU as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002). Normative Power Europe’s (NPE) five ‘core’ 
norms of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights are argued to guide the EU’s 
external action. They are proposed to be transferred to other states and international bodies 
the EU engages with through a range of interactions including procedure, diffusion or a 
cultural filter (Manners, 2002, pp.242–245). According to the NPE framework, the EU 
promotes the rule of law externally because it believes that its intrinsically good norms should 
also guide the behaviour of other countries and international organisations (Iusmen, 2014, 
pp.172–173; Sjursen, 2002). 
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While NPE reintroduces the importance of ideational factors and culture, it has been critiqued 
because it lacks a meaningful conception of power and hierarchy. The concept of hegemony 
is particularly important because it has been argued to permeate the normative power of the 
EU. Diez (2013) in his notable critique of the NPE concept outlines four problems with the 
concept, of which two fundamentally challenge the EU’s normativity. First, there is a question 
about the role that interests play in determining EU foreign policy, as indicated by the EU’s 
sporadic adherence to key norms and values in different contexts (Diez, 2013, p.197). Second, 
Diez raises the question about the EU’s effectiveness as a normative power — are the norms 
promoted by the EU capable of influencing third parties (Ibid, p.197)? This critique highlights 
the uneasy tension between interests and ideas inherent in the NPE framework. If rational 
perspectives are reductionist in their conceptualisation of individuals as utility-maximisers, 
NPE is too idealistic in its conceptualisation of how and why the EU acts in its external 
engagements. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that when it comes to promoting the 
rule of law in the Western Balkans, the normative power of the EU has been limited 
(Noutcheva, 2009). 
To address weaknesses in the NPE concept, a notion of hegemony has been amalgamated 
with the concept of normative power. This concept of hegemony is useful for understanding 
why the EU engages Candidate States in state-building processes and outlines an alternative 
explanation of why the EU acts to promote rule of law reform. The concept of hegemony 
focuses on the interplay between economic interests and ideas to explain the enduring 
structure of the international system and the relationship between different actors in the 
international system (Cox, 1983; Pijl, 1998). The concept of hegemony is also useful for 
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thinking about the struggles between different actors who seek to support or subvert 
different hegemonic projects (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016; Diez, 2013, p.201).  
The concept of normative hegemony resonates with other developments in constructivist 
theory. For example, critical constructivists emphasise the inherent contestation which 
accompanies norm promotion (Wiener, 2007; Wolff & Zimmermann, 2016). Norms cannot be 
internalised if they are forced upon recipients and most norms are contested, all be it to 
different degrees (Bueger, 2016). For norm promoters, contestation must be overcome 
through processes of dialogue which seek to contextualise new norms (Groß, 2015). 
Alternatively, more powerful actors can mobilise a range of social forces to support their norm 
promotion efforts and overcome contestation (Bridoux & Kurki, 2014). This contested 
dynamic may be reflected in the EU’s attempts to promote rule of law reforms during the 
accession process.  
In sum, the concept of normative power as hegemony is useful for: transcending the interest 
and ideas divide constructed by rationalist and constructivist perspectives; for introducing the 
concept of hegemony and reintegrating a notion of power; for highlighting the importance of 
contestation; and for reinstating the critical purpose of research in the field of European 
Studies (Diez, 2013, p.206).  
The idea of normative hegemony helps ensure that power and material interests are not 
neglected, while also recognising the importance of ideas, norms and values. Furthermore, it 
also resonates with the empirical reality of rule of law reforms in the Western Balkans. Various 
studies have highlighted the role that elite political networks play in sustaining networks of 
patronage, which ultimately subvert democracy and diminish the rule of law (Belloni & 
Strazzari, 2014; Kleibrink, 2015). Through the lens of hegemony, it becomes apparent that the 
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EU might be the hegemonic game in town, but not necessarily the only game in town. 
Alternative political projects will compete or cooperate with the EU, depending on whether 
the EU advances or undermines their political interests (Chandler, 2007, 2010; Visoka & 
Richmond, 2017). Without a critical reflection on the EU’s engagement in Serbia, problem-
solving accounts tend to overlook the power relations that permeate the accession process.  
The importance of hegemony is thus reflected in the CPE approach adopted in this thesis and 
its focus on the role that power relations and cultural structures play in the production of rule 
of law understandings.  
In sum, while the constructivist paradigm broadly conceived provides a much more realistic 
account of actors and their behaviour within organisational settings, it lacks an appropriate 
account of power and the role it plays in legitimising and delegitimising discourses, ideas, 
actions and imaginaries.  An additional criticism of the orthodox constructivist literature is 
that it lacks an account of sensemaking. While orthodox constructivism holds that the world 
is socially constructed, its account of social construction is at times overly simplistic. Identity 
cues and socialisation are important, yet the factors that determine the extraction of cues or 
direction of socialisation are not well elaborated. In contrast, a cultural perspective focuses 
on the details of meaning making to discern not only how ideas and discourses are 
constructed, but also the relationship between social constructions, power, materiality and 
context. For this reason, CPE is deemed appropriate as it provides a more nuanced account 
of how Serbian actors make sense of rule of law reforms and the power relations that 
permeate reform processes.  
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2.5 What role for discourse? 
Constructivist literature emphasises socialisation as the process through which identity is 
transformed and norm following behaviour created.  Many constructivist accounts however 
lack a facilitating mechanism that explains how actors can be persuaded to follow new norms. 
Likewise, rational choice theorists often fail to explain how actors come to change their 
preferences. The introduction of a communicative logic is proposed to help rectify this by 
providing a mechanism that demonstrates how and why actors modify their preferences, 
values and identity (Risse, 2000, p.34). Such discursive accounts represent a ‘thicker’ form of 
constructivism and are inspired by post-structuralism. The importance of discourse and 
communicative action for explaining behaviour change and successful policy reform 
outcomes have also been heavily emphasised by discursive/constructivist institutionalists 
(Hay, 2008; Schmidt, 2010). While early scholarly research emphasised the role of 
communication in actor interactions, Constructivist Institutionalism (CI) has taken the idea of 
discourse further and advanced a ‘interpretivist turn’ in politics and policy studies (Hay, 2011).  
Early research in IR highlighted the role that communicative action plays in international 
politics (Müller, 2004; Risse, 2000). This communicative action stems from a communicative 
logic. This logic is associated with the Habermasian concept of ‘communicative action’, 
defined as the use of non-verbal (gesture) and verbal (speech) communication, to achieve a 
certain end (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, pp.3–4; Schmidt, 2008). Before turning to the 
argumentation element of communicative action, the strategic use of discourse must be 
outlined. This is important because the use of discourse does not always resemble an ‘ideal 
speech situation’ and can be used to reinforce perceived strategic interests (Jessop, 2004). 
Deitelhoff and Müller (2005) identify three types of communicative action, two of which 
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correspond with the strategic use of discourse. These are briefly profiled before ascertaining 
the role discourse plays according to CI.  
2.5.1 Bargaining  
Bargaining is defined as the classical mode of strategic action. It occurs in relation to fixed 
preferences and the communication of threats and reward to coordinate action. Bargaining 
as a form of communicative act is visible in the EU accession process. During negotiations, the 
EU overcomes impasses in strategic action through the use of ‘promises and threats’, ensuring 
Candidate States take the desired course of action and comply with the EU’s accession 
requirements (Börzel, 1997; Neyer, 2003, p.692). Neyer suggests:  
The perfect setting for a bargaining procedure consists of a group of only two actors, 
of which one is strong and rich and the other one is weak... The strong and rich state 
will always be able to threaten the other state with negative consequences in the event 
that it does not agree to a proposed solution (Neyer, 2003, p.698).  
Give the fundamental power asymmetries between the EU and Serbia, it seems likely the EU 
will prioritise bargaining as its main mode of communicative act. Whether this results in the 
institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice, as opposed to nominal compliance, is more 
ambiguous. For example, it has been demonstrated that many of the EU’s key ‘breakthroughs’ 
with Serbia have been an outcome of strategic bargaining around key points of contestation 
(Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015). However, bargaining only reinforces superficial change 
(Grimm, 2015). Bargaining that occurs between the EU and Candidate State governments 
reinforces the dominance of domestic actors, supersedes dissident discourses and limits the 
opportunity for a meaningful discussion about EU accession and rule of law reforms (BiEPAG, 
2017; Mendelski, 2013). 
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2.5.2 Rhetorical action 
Rhetorical action, that is the strategic use of discourse and norm-based arguments to achieve 
strategic objectives, is a second form of strategic discourse. A good example of this discourse 
is outlined in Frank Schimmelfenning’s (2001) analysis of Eastern enlargement. During the 
Eastern expansion of the EU, certain Member States demonstrated clear opposition. 
Opponents of enlargement were forced to change their preferences due to the strategic use 
of arguments by those in favour. The argument was made that opponents of enlargement 
were contradicting their commitment to the EU’s liberal norms and the expected behaviour 
of a liberal democratic Member State. Opposition was therefore delegitimised within the 
European community and opponents of eastern enlargement were trapped by their previous 
rhetorical commitments, forcing a preference change (Schimmelfennig, 2001, pp.47-80). In 
the case of current enlargements, scholars have suggested that the EU remains rhetorically 
trapped in its commitment to the accession of the Western Balkans countries (Koinova, 2011; 
Stahl, 2011). It is important to consider the role that rhetorical arguments and articulated 
identities might play in justifying both the actions of the EU and domestic actors within Serbia.  
Rhetorical action is not about actors engaging in a cooperative search for truth, instead actors: 
‘seek to assert their own standpoint and are not prepared to change their own beliefs or be 
persuaded themselves by the better argument’ (Risse, 2000, p.8). Upholding the distinction 
in the literature between rhetorical and communicative action is important for empirically 
assessing how the EU employs discourse. Doing so helps uncover the interplay between 
persuasive processes and strategic deliberations, demonstrating the different strategies 
employed by the EU to ensure the successful application of its new rule of law approach 




 Arguing is identified as the true mode of communicative action in Habermas’ Theory of 
Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984). This form of discourse operates in relation to 
principally open preferences, which are malleable to change on the basis of better arguments 
and not strategic interest (Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005, p.170). Given communicative action in 
the true Habermasian sense is concerned with truth seeking and identity change, it is perhaps 
unsurprising it is more commonly associated with constructivist arguments (Habermas, 2003). 
Individuals adjust their behaviour because they are linguistically capable of interpreting 
knowledge and when subject to reasoned argument, adjust their preferences (Habermas, 
1984). Deliberation is necessary for constructing communicative processes. Deliberation 
allows arguments to be exchanged, the validity of facts to be assessed and a change of 
preference to occur. Argumentation gives actors the opportunity to adjust their behaviour, 
based on their evaluation of facts presented during argument (Quantin & Smith, 2013, p.267).  
 Arguing is important for conveying policy ideas. Constructivist institutionalists argue that 
discourse not only expresses actors’ strategic interests or normative values; it is also designed 
to persuade others of the necessity or appropriateness of a given action (Schmidt, 2008, 
p.312). In the case of rule of law policy, a similar argument has been made in terms of how 
the EU defines key criteria. For example, its conditionality agenda and the need to adopt 
difficult rule of law reforms in exchange for reward is communicated through argumentation, 
where so-called ‘carrots’ are defined by the EU and interpreted as positive by Candidate 
States (Vasilev, 2016, p.753).  This discourse not only communicates but constructs how 
actors understand rule of law reforms, the EU and other important aspects of political 
transformation (Nitoiu & Tomic, 2014, p.2). Actors’ ability to reflect on discourse and 
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construct new discourses highlights an important role for agency vis-à-vis institutions, which 
remains unaccounted for in the other institutionalisms and distinguishes CI from the other 
‘new institutionalisms’ (Schmidt, 2008, p.314). 
2.6 Informing an interpretivist turn 
CI has many similarities with interpretivism. Interpretivist approaches are somewhat alien to 
the field of enlargement studies, which has typically focussed on how EU rules and regulations 
are transposed (Knill & Tosun, 2009; Toshkov, 2008). Consequently, existing studies tend to 
consider formal rule change to be indicative of reform success. They do not probe whether a 
more fundamental change in understanding occurs. As was outlined in the introduction, in 
the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, formal rule change was not accompanied by a change in 
practice in key rule of law areas (Levitz & Pop-Eleches, 2010; Toneva-Metodieva, 2014). 
Consequently, EU institutions remained ‘empty shells’ — devoid of rule of law norms to guide 
actor conduct (Dimitrova, 2010). In hypothesising why this was the case, chapter 1 suggested 
that formal change was not matched with a change in understanding. However, it was argued 
that the EU’s new approach might lead to a more fundamental change in understanding. To 
test this hypothesis, it is necessary to deploy an approach which is focussed on analysing how 
actors understand and make sense of politics and policy. Interpretivism is one such approach.  
Within the interpretivist tradition, the idea of situated agency is of critical importance (Hay, 
2011, p.175). Situated agency refers to the way that actors within organisational settings 
actively construct political action through discourse and practice. The construction of 
‘governance narratives’ helps actors understand and make sense of policy reforms and 
political transformation (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006; Pollitt, 2013). The application of approaches 
that focus on the role of situated actors and sensemaking is novel in relation to the EU 
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enlargement literature. Instead of examining the outcomes of accession reforms, a notion of 
situated agency allows the researcher to step inside the black box of Europeanisation and 
uncover how actors make sense of and respond to the EU’s rule of law approach.  
In addition to narrative, practice is another important interpretivist concept. Much of the 
‘practice turn’ builds on the sociological work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990). However, it is in the 
field of organisational science that an empirical research programme originates. Wenger’s 
(1999) study first outlined the important role communities of practice played in producing 
organisational outcomes. Adler (2008) notes communities of practice serve as the carriers of 
social structures across geographic boundaries. Like-minded groups of practitioners, who are 
contextually bound by a shared interest in applying a common practice, define how 
community actors socialise, communicate and subsequently socially construct rational 
calculation (Adler, 2008, pp.196-197). This is made possible because participation in a 
community of practice constitutes a learning process, transforming the disposition of actors 
and encouraging them to behave in a particular way (ibid, p.198). This focus on socialisation 
and learning builds upon orthodox constructivist approaches. However, its emphasis on the 
dialectical interaction between actors as the catalyst of social construction is distinctive.  
The concept of practice in the field of IR and has been advanced by scholars such as  Adler 
and Pouliot (2011), Donnelly (2012) and  Brown (2012). However, a focus on practice has 
remained largely absent from the European Studies literature. Some notable examples do 
exist, largely concerning the internal dynamics of EU policy networks (Juncos & Pomorska, 
2011, pp.1096-1114) and the effect informal practices have on formal governance (Kleine, 
2013, pp.303-314). However, some accounts are more substantive. Adler-Nissen (2014) 
argues that orthodox constructivism regularly fails to connect concepts of norm transfer and 
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socialisation to the ‘lived and embodied individual experiences at the everyday level’ (Adler-
Nissen, 2014, p.50). Any argument that behaviour is the result of diffused norms becoming 
institutionalised must therefore place the ‘concept of norm following into context’ (Ibid, p.55).  
Methodologically this involves two things. First, it must be identified how norms and the roles 
actors attach to them fit into existing fields of practice. Second, if a norm does not fit, can the 
EU effectively reshape the field through its various mechanisms, creating new practice and 
ensuring the institutionalisation of its norms (Ibid, p.70)?   
The concepts of narrative and practice are important for moving beyond a narrow focus on 
rules, norms and institutions. Interpretivism’s emphasis on relational interaction, situated 
agency and interpretation are important for ascertaining the substance of rule of law reforms. 
However, despite a focus on ‘thick’ processes of social construction, a specific model of 
sensemaking is not salient within the interpretivist and practice literature.  For this reason, a 
CPE approach is favoured because its analytical framework emphasises actor sensemaking. 
2.7 A cultural approach: between interpretivism and institutionalism 
CPE aims to chart a middle path between institutionalism and interpretivism. It does so by 
analysing the role that contextual factors, institutions and social relations play in structuring 
meaning-making processes. CPE is not a codified theory or a concrete set of methodological 
imperatives. It is an approach that reintegrates important ideas of sensemaking into the study 
of politics and political economy, alongside institutions and structure (Sum & Jessop, 2013, 
p.1). Furthermore, its notion of culture is not reducible to discourse or language. It 
encompasses the ‘ensemble of social processes by which meanings are produced, circulated 
and exchanged’ (Ibid, p.viii). It has been widely applied to areas such migration (Mayblin, 
2016), change in academia (Vostal, 2016), mobilities (Paterson, 2014) and as a methodological 
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tool for studying organisations (Belfrage & Hauf, 2017). However, it has not been applied as 
an approach for studying rule of law reforms. 
CPE is an approach that emphasises sensemaking. Sensemaking approaches have been 
advanced primarily in organisational studies and have found limited application in political 
studies (K. Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, 1995). CPE is an approach to sensemaking that aims 
to understand how understandings and actions are constructed through the mediation of 
material and ideational factors in contexts of organisational culture (Jessop, 2010). It thus 
avoids the overly deterministic methodological individualism and materialism of rational 
choice approaches (Checkel, 1998), as well as some forms of constructivism that dismiss the 
importance of structure and social relations in shaping processes of interpretation (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2008). The broader sensemaking literature suggests that sensemaking occurs as 
actors attempt to grapple with complexity (Ashmos et al., 2000; Moss, 2008). As actors cannot 
grasp the social world in its entirety, they engage in sensemaking to try and simplify and 
respond to problems (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.21).  Unlike interpretivism, a CPE approach 
provides an underlying reason for why sensemaking occurs. Consequently, the more complex 
a policy area, the more intensive processes of sensemaking will be. 
Because CPE offers a middle-ground between institutionalism and interpretivism, it addresses 
several gaps identified in the previous sections. It allows us to appreciate the role that 
processes of social construction play within distinctive political contexts. Unlike interpretivism, 
which often neglects the importance of context, a CPE approach does not take agents as blank 
slates. Rather, the contexts in which actors are situated shapes their understanding of rule of 
law issues. This process of meaning making cannot be captured by institutionalism, which has 
tended to conceive of institutions in a narrow sense and has struggled to demonstrate what 
55 
  
role context more broadly plays in shaping action. At the other end of the spectrum, 
interpretivism has overlooked the importance of structure and context in explaining the 
production and reproduction of understandings and action. Overcoming these limits with a 
CPE approach is important for providing a robust analysis of how rule of law reforms are 
understood. By outlining an original theory of social construction, CPE tries to ascertain how 
several factors determine the way in which rule of law is understood. Understandings are 
important because they inform action. Determining factors which shape understandings 
include: history; experience; organised imaginaries; material and ideational interests; and 
power and social relations (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.198) 
In sum, CPE aims to provide insight into how actors make sense of the world. It acknowledges 
that understandings are socially constructed but that social constructions can be analysed 
and the factors informing them unpicked. This is novel in the case of rule of law reforms. It 
allows us to not only appreciate that complex policy reforms are contentious and 
differentially implemented. It also allows us to understand why reforms are contested. This is 
important for understanding how contestation and differences can be mitigated, as well as 
the factors informing contestation and the construction of alternative understandings. By 
identifying the factors which shape understandings and the implementation of reforms, this 
thesis can make a significant contribution to the wider literature.  
2.8 Conclusion 
A review of the existing literature has identified the existing empirical and theoretical 
research relevant to this thesis. Reviewing this literature has demonstrated how this thesis’ 
research agenda can complement and expand the literature. This chapter first appraised what 
is known about rule of law reforms in the Western Balkans. It identified the absence of 
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research that explored how actors understand key rule of law concepts and the role these 
understandings might play in shaping reforms. Following this, existing theoretical approaches 
for exploring EU enlargement and Europeanisation were reviewed. These approaches were 
institutionalist in nature. This institutionalist literature was argued to offer a limited account 
of socialisation, power and sensemaking. To rectify this, two novel approaches were outlined, 
neither of which have been applied in the context of the thesis topic. These were 
interpretivism and CPE. Interpretivist approaches highlighted the importance of narrative and 
practice. However, their accounts of sensemaking were less explicit. In contrast, it was argued 
that a CPE approach could generate new empirical insight and address existing shortcomings 
in the theoretical literature. It was also argued that CPE provides a more explicit focus on 
sensemaking than most interpretivist accounts, which justifies its application.  
The next chapter takes the theoretical tools of CPE and constructs a research design. The 
methodology underpinning this research design emphasises the role of power, social relations, 
situated agency and modes of sensemaking. It outlines both the methods associated with a 




Chapter 3: The methodology underpinning a CPE approach  
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the thesis’ methodology. It explains how it will apply a CPE approach to 
analyse rule of law reforms in Serbia, having justified the reasons for applying a CPE approach 
in the previous chapter. This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the key components 
of a CPE approach. It then outlines how a CPE approach will be applied to the topic of rule of 
law reforms in Serbia.  
The second section discusses the application of specific methods as part of this CPE approach. 
Semi-structured interviews are outlined as an appropriate tool for generating data. The 
analysis of this interview material to identify the factors informing how actors make sense of 
rule of law reforms in Serbia is shown to be an appropriate technique for identifying the 
semiotic processes reflected in interview material. Following this, social network analysis is 
introduced as a suitable method for analysing the role social relations play in (re)producing 
understandings among different actors.  
The final section outlines the critical realist philosophy underpinning CPE. The ontological and 
epistemological components of critical realism are elaborated. The important role 
philosophical considerations play in informing the thesis’ research design is outlined. This 
chapter concludes by reflecting on this thesis’ research design and the value of CPE as an 
approach for studying rule of law reforms in Serbia. 
3.1 CPE: A theory of sensemaking 
This section outlines a research design informed by a CPE approach.  It is important to note 
that CPE does not prescribe specific methods. However, six principles can help inform 
research design: (1) the grounding of the cultural turn in political economy; (2) an emphasis 
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on the role of sensemaking mechanisms in shaping social construction, political projects and 
hegemony; (3) a concern with the interdependence of semiotic and extra(non)-semiotic 
factors; (4) a relational account of individual, organisational and social learning; (5) an 
emphasis on how actors select different strategies and prioritise certain objectives; and (6) a 
critical examination of political imaginaries and  the forms of political domination they 
support (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.23). 
It is important to note that a CPE approach does not need to focus on these features in full or 
in equal measure. They are however guiding principles that should be considered by scholars 
when designing research and locating their analysis in a ‘bigger CPE picture’ (Ibid, p.23). Some 
principles are more relevant for this thesis than others. For example, a focus on sensemaking 
mechanisms is vital for ascertaining whether the EU’s new approach is effective in changing 
understandings and institutionalising the rule of law in Serbia.  In contrast, the grounding of 
the cultural turn in political economy is less relevant because this thesis is not explicitly 
focussed on the political economy of European integration in Serbia. Given the scope of the 
six features and the specificities of the chosen case, the following four unique aspects are 
developed as important principles, which shape this thesis’ research design. These four 








Table 3.1: Four aspects of the thesis’ CPE approach. Source: Author generated. 
1) Structuration — how institutions, contexts and events influence the way that situated 
actors construct political imaginaries and prioritise certain logics. 
2) The importance of socialisation, policy learning and actor networks in explaining the 
construction of understandings, and the political projects and reform paradigms they 
support. 
3) Semiosis — the importance of organisational context, actor objectives, identity and 
discourses in shaping semiosis through the variation, selection and retention of 
narratives which inform understanding and action. 
4) The importance of analysing social constructions and drawing inferences about the 
political projects being articulated through rule of law reforms in Serbia and what this 
tells us about European integration more broadly.  
 
 
These four aspects help focus this thesis’ analysis. Their relevant analytical concepts and 












Table 3.2: The relationship between research questions, analytical concepts and methods. Source: 
Author generated. 
Research questions and Sub-
research questions 
                        Analytical concepts                       Methods 
RQ1- What are the key logics, 
imaginaries and interactions 
driving the delivery of rule of 
law reforms in Serbia? 
• SQ1- What are the key 
logics and imaginaries 
driving the EU’s 
regional engagement? 
• SQ2- Who are the key 
actors involved in the 
delivery of rule of law 
reforms in Serbia and 
how do they interact? 
• The role of structuration — 
the relationship between 
social structures and actors 
— in shaping the formation 
of imaginaries and in 
prioritising certain logics. 
• Socialisation within the rule 
of law policy network as a 
key social structure shaping 
the perspective and actions 
of actors. 
• Semi-structured interviews 
and the tracing of actions to 
formative events and 
institutions to appreciate how 
social structures shape the 
formation of understandings 
and prioritisation of logics. 
• Social network analysis to 
understand how socialisation 
shapes action and 
understandings within the 
rule of law policy network. 
RQ2- How effective is the EU’s 
approach for ensuring the 
institutionalisation of the rule of 
law in practice? 




through semiosis and 
what informs these 
understandings?  
• SQ4- To what extent 







• SQ5: What do the 
different 
understandings of 
actors tell us about 
rule of law reforms in 






• The role of semiosis — an 
internal sensemaking 
process — in determining 
how diffused rule of law 
reforms are understood 
through the presence of 
discursive variation, the 
selection of discursive 
variations and the retention 
of selected discourses in 
practice to inform 
understandings.  
• The importance of 
convergence, divergence 
and contestation for 
indicating the extent to 
which new understandings 
are shared and how 
effective the EU’s approach 
is in creating shared 
understandings and 
mitigating contestation.  
• The belief that 
understandings reveal 
details about the politics of 
Serbia and European 
integration. 
• Semi-structured interviews, 
which are coded to identify 
instances of variation, 
selection and retention.  
• Categorisation of 
understandings into 
dominant and contesting 
perspectives to reveal the 
dimensions of contestation 
and ascertain how effective 
the EU’s approach is in 
mediating these 
contestations to ensure the 
effective institutionalisation 
of the rule of law in practice.   
• Mapping identified 
understandings with political 
processes and state-building 
projects to understand more 
broadly what they tell us 





The following sections provide more detail on structuration and semiosis —two modes of 
sensemaking. These two modes of sensemaking occur as actors attempt to grapple with 
complexity. According to sensemaking scholars, actors struggle to grasp the social world in its 
complexity and focus selectively on some aspects as they attempt to make sense of their 
world and participate in it (Jessop, 2010; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).  Within the CPE 
framework it is important to distinguish between the two modes of sensemaking. 
Structuration is one mechanism of sensemaking. It emphasises the importance of social 
interaction in shaping selectivity or choice (Jessop, 2010). Its primary focus is on how 
relationships between actors and their social environment (such as institutions and other 
social structures) shape the construction of social imaginaries, which inform actors’ 
preferences and actions. It focuses on the ‘structural’ aspect of sensemaking, meaning its 
focus is on how institutions, events, social relations, networks and other social structures 
shape the formation of understandings. In contrast, semiosis focusses on how concepts, 
policies, ideas and actions, are interpreted and reconstructed as policy understandings. 
Semiosis focuses on how actors extract discourses and ideas, before internalising them and 
embedding them in action. Semiosis takes place sequentially through processes of variation, 
selection and retention. This process of semiosis will be elaborated on in section 3.1.3.  
While the two modes of sensemaking are interrelated, different modes are likely to be 
dominant at different moments. For example, in highly institutionalised environments where 
material practices and institutional dynamics are more coherent, fixed and identifiable, 
structuration is more likely. In contrast, actors will need to frequently construct new 
understandings through semiosis in environments where there are multiple sites and scales 
of interaction, and where new ideas are frequently introduced (Ibid, pp.341-342).  
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For this reason, a typology is constructed to apply a CPE approach. The assumption is made 
that at the policy formation and delivery stage, the institutionalised environment within the 
EU and the relationships EU actors form with other actors, gives rise to relatively fixed 
dynamics and interactions. This justifies a primary focus on structuration and an analytical 
focus on the events and social interactions, which construct policy imaginaries. Following this, 
a focus on semiosis is used to demonstrate how actors make sense of policy reforms as they 
are diffused and how they relate these policy reforms to their existing organisational context. 
This typology distinguishes between the use of different sensemaking practices at different 
stages of the policy process.  
3.1.1 Structuration  
The first important aspect of a CPE approach is structuration. Structuration is one mode of 
complexity reduction that allows actors to ‘go on’ in the world and make sense of rule of law 
reforms (Jessop and Sum, 2013, pp.150-151). The first two empirical chapters of this thesis 
deploy methods that focus explicitly on the structuration component of CPE. These methods 
are designed to ascertain the key logics, imaginaries and interactions driving the delivery of 
rule of law reforms. Semi-structured interviews are deployed to ascertain the key logics 
driving the EU’s enlargement agenda towards Serbia. The importance of social imaginaries 
and the role they play in constructing perceptions of the Western Balkans region is 
ascertained. Social imaginaries are ‘semiotic systems that frame individual subjects’ lived 
experiences of an inordinately complex world and/or inform collective calculation about that 
world’ (Ibid, p.165). Social imaginaries are constructed through both structuration and 
semiosis. However, structuration focuses on how emergent patterns of social interaction 
between actors and their social environment, shapes action and the construction of 
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imaginaries. It further focuses on how historical patterns of interaction and experience shape 
the formation of imaginaries (Ibid, p.148-151). Structuration has parallels with frame theory 
(Payne, 2001; Surel, 2000). Frame theory identifies how the social construction of shared 
understandings emerges in the context of specific social conditions (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
It is these contexts and social conditions that ‘frame’ how problems are perceived and 
contribute to the construction of imaginaries, which inform action.  
Chapter 4 discusses the importance of social imaginaries for domestic actors in Serbia. 
However, the primary purpose of chapter 4 is to provide context. It therefore focuses on how 
imaginaries are strategically deployed, as opposed to formulated. Chapter 5 explicitly focuses 
on how EU imaginaries of the Western Balkans are formed. It focuses on the way institutions, 
events and the environments in which actors are situated, shapes the way in which actors 
construct understandings. This focus on how actors construct imaginaries in response to 
social structures, broadly defined, constitutes an application of structuration theory.  Chapter 
5 deploys documentary source analysis and interview material to trace the factors that have 
shaped the EU’s understanding of the region. It further demonstrates how constructed 
imaginaries privilege certain logics, which inform action.  
Social interactions are an important aspect of structuration and the broader CPE framework. 
Social interactions can help actors advance interests, implement strategies and achieve their 
objectives.  While social interaction is frequently cited as important by constructivist scholars 
concerned with socialisation, it is often analysed with process tracing methods that try to 
trace unidirectional identity and normative change. Such approaches overlook the relational 
manner in which actors shape and are shaped by socialisation, as well as the role power 
relations play in structuring socialisation (Flockhart, 2010). In contrast, this thesis 
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conceptualises socialisation as occurring between actors in policy networks (Davies, 2011; 
Sum & Jessop, 2013, pp.60–62).  Relations between actors contribute to structuration by 
providing conduits through which ideas, resources and knowledge is disseminated (Inkpen et 
al., 2005). These flows help inform understandings and construct imaginaries. The social 
relations between actors and the imaginaries they share create intersubjective 
interpretations, which inform action. Chapter 6 applies social network analysis (SNA) to 
ascertain the role that social interaction plays in constructing understandings and action. It 
focuses on the type of interaction between actors, how socialisation shapes understanding 
and how rule of law reforms are delivered through policy networks. 
3.1.2 Semiosis 
Semiosis involves the variation, selection and retention of discursive and material practices 
by actors. Semiosis helps actors construct meaning in a complex world and organise 
constructed meanings into distinctive political imaginaries that frame their actions. An 
analysis focussed on semiosis not only highlights how actors understand policy reforms, it 
also ascertains the emergent political projects and institutional structures that these 
understandings reflect and reinforce (Jessop, 2010, p.341). The concepts of variation, 
selection and retention are a central part of CPE’s framework of semiosis analysis.  
Variation concerns the variation in discourses and practices that actors use to describe a 
process, interpret events and engage in social action. Different variations are visible in the 
concepts and ideas that actors associate with rule of law reforms. The emergence of a 
discursive variation is shaped by the specific circumstances and organisational context in 
which reforms occur and can involve the translation and reinterpretation of existing 
discourses (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.184). The idea of variation shares much in common with 
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the ‘policy narrative’ literature, which highlights how actors construct policy narratives to 
help them make sense of policy reforms. These narratives are adopted based on the extent 
to which they resonate with an actor and their organisational culture (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006, 
p.118). This idea of resonance brings us on to the second aspect of CPE, selection. 
Selection of a specific variation occurs when a reform narrative or concept resonates in a 
personal, organisational and institutional context.  Selection of a variation is likely if actors 
consider it to help them interpret events, a variation conforms to existing beliefs, legitimises 
action, plausibly represents social phenomena and is perceived to help meet organisational 
objectives. Power relations and path-dependencies also determine whether it is possible for 
actors to select certain variations of a discourse and the likelihood of selection (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, p.185).  
Retention concerns how selected variations are enacted in organisational routines, integrated 
into institutional rules and embedded in intellectual technologies (Ibid, p.185). For example, 
a reported change in practice or the introduction of a new technology to change or improve 
practice would indicate attempts to retain a selected discursive variation. This retention is 
deduced from the ‘policy stories’ actors tell. The ways in which reforms are reported to 
change actor conduct and perspectives on the topics under discussion are taken as a key 
indication that a variation has been retained. Together, these factors of variation, selection 
and retention, shape the evolution of semiosis. This ongoing process of semiosis can provide 
important insight into how different actors understand reforms and the implications these 
understandings have for the emergence of new institutions in Serbia.   
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3.2 Putting theory into practice: fieldwork and interviews  
To generate primary data directly from key actors who devised EU rule of law policy and were 
involved with rule of law reforms in Serbia, fieldwork was undertaken over the course of six 
months. In total, 57 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors in Serbia, as 
well as in Brussels, Paris and Strasbourg. A full list of interviews conducted is included in 
Appendix A. Undertaking an initial analysis of EU documents and the action plans for rule of 
law reforms, which were provided by the Serbian Government, helped identify a purposeful 
sample of key actors. These documents included: EU enlargement reports; EU press releases 
on the issue of rule of law reform in the Western Balkans and Serbia; action plans for Chapters 
23 and 24 provided by the Serbian Government; publications by influential research centres 
such as the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group; and civil society forums, such as the 
National Convention on the European Union in Serbia and prEUgovor, who provide their 
alternative reports and action plans on rule of law reforms in Serbia.  
The sampled documents were appropriate because they detailed the key international actors, 
domestic actors and civil society organisations who play a prominent role in Serbia’s rule of 
law reforms. In total, 15 initial actors were identified and approached for interviews. These 
15 actors were broken down into five international actors, five governmental actors and five 
influential NGOs. To move beyond this initial sample of actors, snowball sampling was used. 
This required distributing a questionnaire, which allowed actors to nominate other actors 
they considered important. This snowball method helped identify additional interviewees 
who were not visible in formal documentation.  
While the response rate from prospective interviewees was generally high, some individuals 
did not respond to requests to be interviewed or declined to be interviewed. It is important 
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to acknowledge this as it has implications for the empirical analysis, particularly the social 
network analysis, which is detailed in section 3.2.2. However, the most significant actors were 
interviewed. This was confirmed by consulting formal documents and conversing with 
interviewees, to ensure that the most important actors had been interviewed. This isn’t to 
say that more actors couldn’t have been interviewed. For example, with additional time and 
resources, the diplomatic representation of all EU Member States could have been 
interviewed.  
In the case of the network analysis, the network presented in chapter 6 constitutes the central 
actors involved in the rule of law policy field in Serbia. It is acknowledged that beyond this 
network, other actors exist and link into this network. The network diagrams presented in 
chapter 6 are designed to demonstrate how the key actors interact with one another and the 
role these interactions play in shaping policy outcomes. The analysis served a heuristic 
purpose to help demonstrate the role socialisation plays in shaping understandings among 
important actors. 
 The primary site for fieldwork was Belgrade. This is because many of the key international 
actors such as the EU, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and 
relevant diplomatic embassies, had their main regional base in Belgrade. Furthermore, as the 
capital of Serbia, Belgrade was also the location of key government institutions, as well as the 
headquarters for many NGOs, who had both a domestic and international presence. In 
addition to fieldwork conducted in Belgrade, important domestic and regional actors were 
identified and interviewed in Serbia’s second biggest city, Novi Sad. As the capital of the 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, Novi Sad has a distinctly multi-ethnic character and is 
home to a range of prominent organisations, primarily working in the fields of rule of law and 
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human rights. This second site within Serbia allowed the fieldwork to move beyond the capital 
and access the insights of important actors beyond the confines of Belgrade. 
To facilitate access to individuals and institutions in Serbia, Serbo-Croatian language skills 
were acquired in advance of the fieldwork. While many of the interviews were subsequently 
conducted in English, the ability to speak the national language was important for gaining the 
trust of potential interviewees and accessing state institutions. As has been outlined already 
and is further detailed in the empirical chapters, issues of transparency and access in many 
ways define the Serbian public administration. While many of the international actors and 
domestic NGOs interviewed were open to participating in the research project, it was 
necessary to establish a different type of rapport with public officials. This required presenting 
the research project as openly as possible, clearly communicating the conditions of anonymity 
and confidentiality, and using pre-existing relationships to organise additional interviews.  
The fieldwork conducted in Brussels required gaining access to the EU institutions, primarily 
the EU Commission. In comparison to the fieldwork conducted in Serbia, access to the EU was 
relatively formal. Among international organisations, often the relationships established with 
interviewees in one organisation, helped facilitate access to interviewees in another 
organisation. This required travelling to the headquarters of the Council of Europe (CoE) in 
Strasbourg and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris. 
The fieldwork experience helped reinforce the multilevel and international dimensions of this 
thesis. While the topics discussed were often similar and remained focused on rule of law 
issues, the sites and scales of the empirical work transcended a geographic case. 
To answer the first research question, selected interviewees were asked questions that 
explored how they understood the Western Balkans and Serbia’s place within it. They were 
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subsequently asked questions that explored which issues concerned them most and what 
they thought informed the delivery of rule of law reforms in Serbia. They were also asked 
questions about the relationships that mattered most to them, as well as the perceived role 
different relationships and socialisation mechanisms played in shaping their understanding of 
policy issues and work practices. To answer the second research question, interviewees were 
asked questions that ascertained how they understood the rule of law issue under discussion, 
why these understandings resonated and how they thought these understandings shaped 
their organisation’s work. The rule of law issues discussed were judicial reform, anti-
corruption policy and fundamental rights. These issues correspond with key rule of law policy 
areas and provided three different policy cases to analyse. Interviewees were asked how their 
understandings informed their practice. They were then asked how this compared to the way 
they thought other actors understood the issue.  
3.2.1 Analysing the interviews 
Of the 57 interviews conducted, 37 are directly cited. The interviews not directly cited 
provided valuable context. The interview transcripts were analysed with the assistance of 
NVivo software. First, the factors informing the delivery of rule of law reforms in Serbia were 
identified through the categorisation of interview material into themes under the label 
‘imaginaries’. Following this, the salient ideas, concepts and themes informing how actors 
made sense of rule of law reforms in Serbia were ascertained. This involved identifying initial 
narratives and discourses that emerged around rule of law reform issues and categorising 
them under variation. Following this, the reasons why these discourses initially resonated 
with actors was categorised under selection. Finally, the way in which these narratives were 
reinforced and reified through action was categorised under retention.  
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In addition, the contestations communicated by interviewees were considered to reveal a lot 
about the power dynamics that manifested during rule of law reforms. These different 
contestations, as well as cases where common understandings emerged, were categorised 
under the labels contestation and convergence. It was assumed that the more contested rule 
of law understandings were, the less effective the EU’s approach was in promoting the 
institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice.  
3.2.2 Social network analysis 
A CPE approach emphasises that social relations between actors enables socialisation. This 
can help produce a convergence in understanding and inform shared action. Despite 
constituting a large field of study in the social sciences, social network analysis has been 
sparsely deployed to study socialisation in policy networks. Social network analysis is a useful 
method for visualising and analysing the composition of policy networks. To capture the 
different modes of socialisation that occurred in the network, interview material was 
analysed to substantiate the network analysis and provide insight into how actors socialise. 
The scope condition for selecting participants was the key actors involved in the rule of law 
policy fields of judicial reform, anti-corruption and fundamental rights. 
Social network analysis (SNA) was operationalised to ascertain the relationship between 
different actors and the role these relationships play in producing and reproducing 
understandings, as well as the power relations within policy networks (Borgatti et al., 2013). 
SNA focuses on two types of actor relationship: similarities and relational events. Similarities 
refer to relational phenomena that are not quite social ties but can be treated as such 
methodologically, given they are often antecedent and consequential of social ties. These 
types of ties include physical proximity, co-membership in groups or similar occupation.  The 
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second type, relational events, includes interactions between individuals and flows of 
information, beliefs and money (Borgatti et al., 2013, p.4). This thesis is concerned with 
capturing relational events as these directly informed the construction of understandings.  
To capture data for the SNA, actors sampled from EU and Serbian Government documents 
were initially approached for interviews. These actors were then asked to nominate other 
actors (organisations, not individuals) that they felt were important in their network. They 
were instructed to write the name of these actors in a short questionnaire form. From here, 
a network was established using snowball sampling. The research process gave pre-eminence 
to participants and allowed them to nominate other actors they considered ‘significant’. This 
allowed actors to be incorporated that could be ‘hidden’ or omitted from documentation, but 
none-the-less were important network actors. Furthermore, it allowed a network to be 
generated inductively based on how actors perceived their own network. This allowed actors 
to say which relationships they valued most and provided insight into how actors understood 
their own network. This approach gave pre-eminence to interviewees to discuss their 
everyday practices and reflect on whether these had changed because of socialisation 
processes. This helped trace different processes and helped identify underlying mechanisms 
that may affect the behaviour of different actors. This more qualitative form of SNA requires 
accepting that networks may always be partial, but the relationship between central network 
actors can be captured (Heath et al., 2009). The established network was visualised using the 
Gephi programme.  
The approach outlined here complements and adds to the existing literature on socialisation. 
Whilst existing accounts of socialisation in International Relations and European Studies have 
added substantially to our understanding of socialisation, often these accounts favour a 
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functionalist view of socialisation. These accounts make impressive use of survey data to link 
socialisation mechanisms to a proposed change in perspective or administrative change 
(Checkel, 2005; Hooghe, 2005; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2016; Schimmelfennig, 2005). Whilst 
these accounts provide a good heuristic, they do not step inside the process of socialisation 
nor do they sufficiently consider the methodological challenge of measuring internalisation 
and cognitive adaptation (Freyburg, 2015, pp.60–61).  
 In contrast, the outlined approach of this thesis considers socialisation to have a meaningful 
influence if it results in a change in actor understanding. A more superficial realignment of 
perceived interests is possible, but this points to a more limited process of socialisation and 
sensemaking. Follow up interviews encouraged actors to reflect on their understanding of 
rule of law issues and their relationship with other actors. This approach may lack the 
robustness of large-scale survey data but it has significant advantages for three reasons. First, 
it is less concerned with trying to empirically quantify the extent to which socialisation 
changes behaviour through structured survey tools. Instead, it focuses on the relationship 
between socialisation and practice from a qualitative perspective. This approach encouraged 
interviewees to provide their perspective on socialisation. Second, it captures the multiplicity 
of socialisation processes and the many forms they take, by allowing actors to identify salient 
socialisation processes when multiple mechanisms are identified. Third, it allows a wide range 
of socialisation consequences to be discerned by linking practice to interaction and reflecting 
on the extent to which practices are a product of socialisation. This was done by asking 
questions that encouraged actors to reflect on their understandings over time, the 
institutional and other structural changes that EU integration had affected, and how their 
understandings may or may not be an outcome of socialisation with other actors.  
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3.3 The Philosophy of CPE 
As with all methodological approaches, certain philosophical underpinnings inform a CPE 
approach and have shaped the research design of this thesis. The original CPE approach 
advanced by Jessop and Sum (2013) is grounded in a critical realist philosophy. The following 
sections examine the ontology and epistemology of critical realism. Following this, the 
heuristic value of the chosen case study is outlined. Overall, this section justifies grounding 
CPE in a critical realist philosophy.  
Key to all forms of scientific realism, including critical realism, is a belief that our objects of 
study exist independently of the concepts and discourse used to describe them. This belief, 
that facts exist independently of a researcher’s own practice of inquiry, is termed ‘mind-world 
dualism’ —the worldview that an objective reality does exist. For mind-world dualists, the 
subjective can be separated from the objective because the way we understand analysed 
objects does not alter their substance; subjective understandings simply represent objects of 
inquiry in a particular way (Jackson, p.34). ‘Transfactualism’ is another important 
philosophical aspect of critical realism. Transfactualism involves theorising about the 
existence of underlying but unobservable generative properties (Ibid, p.36). These causal 
properties give rise to empirical regularities. Transfactualism’s core proposition is that the 
domain of the empirical is simply the surface of social reality and that as researchers, we 
should aim to go beyond this domain to provide meaningful explanations. Jackson (2010) has 






Table 3.3: A summary of the four key research philosophies in social science. Source: Jackson, 2010, p.74. 
  Relationship between knowledge 
and observation 
 
  Phenomenalism Transfactualism 
Relationship between the 
knower and the known 
Mind-world dualism Neopositivism Critical realism 
 Mind-world monism Analyticism Reflexivity 
 
3.3.1 Ontology 
The best way to understand the difference in approaches summarised in table 3.3. is to detail 
the ontology of critical realism. Ontology concerns what exists in the social realm, the nature 
of what exists and what is the relationship between those things that exist (Bache et al., 2012, 
p.64). Ontological stratification reflects the world view of critical realism that social reality is 
composed of three domains or ‘strata’, which interact in the following manner: (1) real or 
causal mechanisms cause (2) actual events that we as researchers (3) empirically experience 
and observe (Ibid). Ontological stratification is important because it requires critical realist 
research to try and ascertain the underlying factors that give rise to the processes and 
empirical regularities we observe.  
Another important ontological consideration is the relationship between structure and 
agency. While most interpretivist accounts take an agency-centred perspective, a critical 
realist informed CPE approach emphasises the dialectical relationship between structure and 
agency. From a CPE perspective, the choices of actors are shaped sequentially in relation to 
structure. While agents have the capacity to reshape structures, temporally they must initially 
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respond to structures as they are situated agents (Archer, 1995). This means that actors will 
construct certain understandings and pursue particular types of behaviour as a consequence 
of the way in which social structures function (Bourdieu, 1990).  
Realist philosophies of the social science underpin many ‘thin’ versions of constructivism and 
their accounts of structure and agency. These constructivist accounts integrate symbolic 
interactionist accounts of ideational motives with substantive theories of social structure in 
order to reveal the causal properties of ideas (Wendt, 1999, p. 51). By detaching constructivist 
theory from constructivist philosophy, the mediating role played by ideas can be more clearly 
delineated. Ideas in this sense can have causal power. For example, in mediating an 
individual’s material preferences and affecting how individuals perceive choice. To use a more 
concrete example, the EU’s rule of law concept invokes a set of dispositions and constituting 
practices, such as the independent exercise of the judiciary or the protection of citizens from 
the arbitrary powers of the state. Inside Serbian rule of law institutions, which are 
underpinned by their own interpretation of the rule of law, other factors and ideas may give 
rise to contrasting understandings. In both cases, social construction is shaped by the context 
in which actors are situated. Context forms an important structure that shapes and is 
reshaped by agency. While interpretivism or ‘thick’ forms of constructivism also acknowledge 
the importance of context, they differ from critical realist informed approaches such as CPE. 
This is because critical realists hold that context always shapes processes of social 
construction first in a temporal sequence (Archer, 1995).  
As highlighted in table 3.3, neopositivism is a phenomenalist approach. Phenomenalism holds 
that we can only know about the world through human perception or ‘sense-data’. As such, 
the only direct source of knowledge is experienced through empirical research. This lies in 
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contrast to critical realism and its focus on drawing inferences from empirical data about the 
underlying causes which give rise to observations. Unlike neopositivists, critical realists try to 
avoid the formulation of law-like generalisations. For critical realists, causality must be 
understood and analysed in relation to context (Jackson, 2010, p. 43). For neopositivists, valid 
assertions can only be made if they meet specific generalities, which are likely to apply across 
cases. For this reason, neopositivist research tends to focus on the analysis of objective data 
and the use of systemic cross-correlations to demonstrate how empirical findings adhere to 
general laws (Kurki, 2008, pp.57–58). In contrast, critical realism makes use of hermeneutic 
reasoning to uncover other possible causes for events, which may have not generated 
empirical ‘sense-data’, but still exist as real generative mechanisms, all be it idle when a 
researcher is undertaking empirical analysis (Ibid).  
This distinction between the critical realist position and neopositivist position has important 
methodological implications. While the focus of CPE is on uncovering the understandings of 
actors and the way they make sense of the world, its philosophical underpinnings emphasise 
the importance of ascertaining the reasons why these understandings emerge. This means 
that processes of structuration, semiosis and socialisation must be scrutinised to ascertain 
not only how they occur, but why they occur in a certain way. This requires identifying the 
underlying factors that give rise to these processes through the application of qualitative 
techniques. It also requires drawing inferences about these processes to ascertain how they 
might influence other macro level political processes, such as European integration.  
Because of its critical realist philosophy, CPE differs not only from neopositivism, but also 
mind-world monist philosophies. Mind-world monist approaches, such as interpretivism, 
assert that a researcher cannot separate their ‘analytical reality’ from an actual reality and as 
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such, the mind world dualist distinction between matter and mind is indistinguishable to a 
researcher (Jackson, 2010). At the phenomenalist end of this mind-world monism spectrum, 
analyticism stipulates the assumptions and ideas of a researcher shape the research process. 
Because of this, the production of knowledge must be grounded in the practical involvement 
of a researcher, and the construction of ‘analytical narratives’ must demonstrate how 
empirical deductions have been constructed into statements (Ibid, p.142). Reflexivity holds 
the same mind-world monist position as analyticism, believing the ideas of a researcher 
cannot be separated from reality. It differs from analyticism because of its use of transfactual 
reasoning. This reasoning calls for the researcher to locate their own research practices in a 
broader social and cultural context, within which they are embedded (Ibid, p.157).  
In contrast, a critical realist position is a mind-world dualist position. This may seem 
counterintuitive because this thesis focuses heavily on processes of interpretation and 
relationality. These are concepts usually associated with mind-world monist constructivism 
or reflexive and interpretivist approaches (Hay, 2005, pp.39-45).  However, a critical realist 
informed CPE approach holds that understandings and imaginaries, while subject to 
interpretation, can tell us about ‘real’ processes or ‘causes’. Sum and Jessop (2013) justify 
grounding CPE in a critical realist philosophy:  
Adherents of critical realism point to the existence of real but often latent causal 
mechanisms… On this basis, critical realists distinguish among real mechanisms, actual 
events and empirical observations… For critical realists then, science involves a 
continuing, spiral movement from knowledge of empirical phenomena to knowledge 





To summarise the critical realist position, empirical regularities are open to interpretation. 
However, through the application of scientific method and the use of theoretical abstractions 
that seek to elucidate the causes of empirical regularities, we can make claims about ‘actual’ 
phenomena. In our case, rule of law reforms are open to interpretation and socially 
constructed in different ways. However, by unpicking the way in which different imaginaries 
and interpretations are constructed, CPE aims to elucidate the ‘actual’ processes and relations 
that give rise to these interpretations. In contrast, reflexive or interpretivist positions hold 
that reality is a social construction and that scientific methods cannot accurately represent a 
social world that is fluid and open to interpretation.  
3.3.2 Epistemic pluralism 
Aside from its stratified ontology, critical realism differentiates itself from neopositivism 
through its epistemic pluralism (Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p.225). This involves treating 
methodological rules as principles that inform scientific inquiry and not law-like dogma 
(Pawson, 2013, p.xi). For critical realists, the ‘science’ of social science is the procedure 
followed to study and analyse phenomena (Kurki, 2007, p.372).  
Understanding epistemic pluralism requires revisiting the distinction between ‘explaining’ 
and ‘understanding’ accounts (Hollis & Smith, 1990). These two approaches have traditionally 
been cast as incommensurable, leaving a researcher with two separate empirical stories to 
tell (Jackson, 2010, p.9). Explaining approaches prioritise objective knowledge and 
understanding approaches subjective knowledge. However, critical realism integrates these 
two approaches within a single framework through epistemic pluralism. Explanatory 
knowledge can help premise foundational theories that apply across cases. These theories 
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precondition, but do not determine our work. For critical realists, accessing subjective 
knowledge through qualitative methods helps us to understand phenomenon and find 
alternatives to foundational theories (Ibid, p.13). The subsequent refinement of theory is 
useful for helping ground these subjective insights. Utilising both sources of knowledge allows 
critical realism to identify the constitutive factors that give rise to empirical regularities that 
we observe (Kurki, 2008, p.224). This is reflected in oscillation between theory and empirical 
observations. While this thesis is primarily a qualitative study, the application of different 
methods ranging from interviews to SNA, reflects an adherence to epistemic pluralism. It 
indicates the openness of this research to both explaining and understanding accounts and 
their associated episteme.  
To summarise, regarding ontology, critical realism is a mind-word dualist approach. It adheres 
to transfactualism and a stratified ontology. Regarding epistemology, epistemic pluralism 
underpins the eclectic application of qualitative methods and the search for insight that can 
help refine initial assumptions. This involves an openness to different episteme and different 
methods, provided they offer insight into rule of law reforms in Serbia.  
3.3.3 The heuristic value of case study research and inferences 
Critical realist research aims to postulate a link between empirical phenomena and underlying 
factors that explain their occurrence.  From this philosophical perspective, the purpose of 
case study research is to elaborate and provide insight into the possible causes of empirical 
phenomena, in a way which helps develop new theories.  For this reason, an analysis of rule 
of law reforms in Serbia is used to develop a theory of the role that understandings and 
sensemaking processes plays in shaping policy reforms. As a heuristic case, insights from this 
case are used to develop a more general theory of the role sensemaking processes play in 
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explaining policy reforms (Eckstein, 2000, pp.137–138). This back and forth process of 
developing and refining theory primarily involves abductive reasoning. In the first instance, 
abductive reasoning starts from certain assumptions or hypotheses. In the case of this thesis, 
the expectation is that the effective institutionalisation of the rule of law requires a 
convergence in understandings. This was detailed in section 1.3. This hypothesis is grounded 
in a perspective that the way in which actors interpret rule of law reforms matters. 
Ascertaining the extent to which it holds true requires developing a theory of sensemaking 
through the application of a CPE approach. This involves a spiral movement between the: 
‘abstract and concrete, between theoretical and empirical, involving both an interpretive and 
causal dimension of explanation’ (Belfrage & Hauf, 2017, p.260).  
This abductive approach lies in contrast to neopositivist deductive approaches, which start 
from the premise of a theory and end with conclusions that prove or disprove initial 
hypotheses. In such cases, there is little focus on theory refinement because emphasis is 
placed on the development of law-like generalisations (Jackson, 2010, p.83). There are also 
differences to inductive reasoning, which focuses primarily on the formulation of new 
theories on the sole basis of observed empirical regularities (Danermark et al., 2001). In the 
context of this thesis, initial CPE ideas are developed through empirical case study research. 
This process of theory building means that the research process is intuitively open-ended. 
Insights are continuously abstracted and analysed to understand how they fit into processes 
of rule of law reform, and the initial assumptions of this thesis presented in chapter 1 are 





This chapter outlined the methodology of the thesis. It first outlined the general principles of 
a CPE approach and showed how they apply to this thesis. It then substantiated the theory of 
CPE by elaborating on two modes of sensemaking: structuration and semiosis. This allowed it 
to develop a research design around CPE principles and outline some appropriate methods. 
The final section of this chapter then linked these theoretical and methodological points to a 
critical realist philosophy, which underpins CPE. The limitations of the chosen research design 
have not been discussed here. Instead, its limitations will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter, in section 10.4. The next chapter provides context to the chosen case study. It 
outlines political developments in Serbia since 2000. These events are important as they 
explain the current context of reforms. Following this chapter, the methodology outlined here 















Chapter 4: Developments in Serbia in the post-Milošević era and the process of European 
integration 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the key political developments in Serbia and the EU’s activities in Serbia 
since 2000. It engages with several chapter-specific questions while also beginning to 
ascertain the logics and imaginaries that characterise the relationship between the EU and 
Serbia. It focusses on the domestic political imaginaries deployed by Serbian actors and how 
these imaginaries have elicited certain responses from the EU and the international 
community. This provides insights into the logics informing action and the imaginaries 
associated with different political projects. This focus on imaginaries is explored in greater 
depth in chapter 5, which focuses on how imaginaries drive the EU’s approach, as opposed to 
the behaviour of domestic actors. In terms of chapter specific questions, these are useful for 
structuring the content of this chapter and thematically exploring key developments in Serbia 
since 2000. What are the key political events that have occurred in Serbia since 2000 and how 
do these relate to European integration? What characterises the EU’s approach and what 
have been the mechanisms for delivering reforms? What aspects of European integration 
have been contentious and how has this contestation undermined attempts to promote the 
rule of law?  
Alongside an analysis of documents, this chapter also introduces original interview material 
to elaborate on recent events and ascertain the role that different logics and imaginaries have 
played in shaping Serbian politics. This chapter is broken down into three parts.  
The first section presents an analysis of political events in Serbia since 2000. It argues that 
three political imaginaries exist within Serbia. These correspond with different political 
projects, which support or oppose Europeanisation to different degrees.  This section also 
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emphasises how Serbia’s post-Milošević political development has be heavily intertwined 
with the EU’s regional engagement. It demonstrates how the strategic mobilisation of 
different imaginaries by domestic elites in Serbia has frustrated EU reforms to date. 
Furthermore, the EU’s attempts to promote stability within the country have required a series 
of compromises. This has led to the entrenchment of political elites and the reinforcement of 
imaginaries that might have otherwise been deconstructed.  
The second section explores the specific mechanisms and instruments the EU has used to 
ensure compliance with its reform agenda. It demonstrates how the EU’s contemporary 
engagement builds upon its existing state-building agenda, the Stabilisation and Accession 
process (SAp). The focus of the EU’s approach till 2014 remained focussed on top-down 
capacity building and formal institution building.  This approach struggled to challenge elite 
actor networks or mitigate competing political projects. These shortcomings are 
demonstrated by examining two case studies — media freedom and security sector reform. 
This chapter concludes by reflecting on reforms to date. Despite progress, entrenched 
political elites continue to determine the direction of Serbian politics. It also reflects on the 
EU’s intertwining of democratisation and stabilisation, which have made political 
transformation overwhelmingly contingent on conditionality. This results in the strategic 
engagement of domestic elites with the EU in a way that is hypothesised to hinder rule of law 
reform and its capacity to construct understandings in partnership with pro-reform actors, 
which leads to positive change.  
4.1 Post-Milošević Serbia  
Since 2000, the EU and the international community have focused on the promotion of 
stability towards Serbia and the Western Balkans region more widely. The EU has ensured 
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political actors comply with its process of stability promotion through the extensive use of 
political conditionality — the release of financial capital in exchange for political reform. 
Whilst this promotion of stability appears to be a logical solution to the problem of regional 
instability, political conditionality has also produced significant downsides. In particular, a 
context of reform under conditionality is argued to have done little to induce deeper social 
reforms and the construction of authentic democratic institutions (Grimm, 2015; Grimm & 
Leininger, 2012).  The consequences of this are visible in Serbia, where strategic interests and 
nationalist tendencies have shaped political developments alongside EU accession. In the 
post-Milošević context, Serbian nationalism remains a significant political movement, all be it 
a peripheral one. However, the transformation of the previously nationalist and pro-Russian 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) into a pro-EU party in 2009, demonstrates that political 
identities are fluid among Serbia’s political elites (Subotic, 2011).  The SRS position has been 
characterised as a ‘middle-path’ political movement that advocates European integration, as 
long as it advances the national interest of Serbia and its ruling elite. Politicians have drawn 
on different imaginaries at different moments in time. Drawing on diverse imaginaries and 
their associated discourses has allowed domestic elites to strategically frame politics in 
different ways to secure their positions of power. These different political perspectives are 
considered imaginaries because they are constituted through the organisation of interests, 
ideas and discourses into a social construction, which informs action (Sum & Jessop, 2013, 
p.67). This organisation occurs via structuration, whereby social relations and interactions 
with the institutional and political landscape across time shape the formation of political 
action (Ibid, p.165). The following sections will demonstrate how these imaginaries have 




Table 4.1: Political imaginaries mobilised by Serbian actors. Source: Author generated. 
Political imaginary           Key narrative and actions                Outcome  
Normative 
Europeanisation 
• Embrace both substantive social 
reform as well as free market 
reforms.  
• Opening up of political process to 
include new actors and authentic 
institutionalisation of democratic 
norms. 
• Institutionalisation of 
democratic norms and 
construction of liberal 
democracy. 
• Creation of democracy from 
bellow. 
Strategic accession • Embrace substantial free market 
reforms to develop Serbia. 
•  Compliance with EU acquis presented 
as evidence of Serbia’s reorientation 
towards the EU. 
• Compliance with reforms on the basis 
they do not threaten the ‘national 
interests’ of Serbia. 
• Comply with political reforms on 
the basis the position of elites is 
not compromised, and free 
market reforms remain popular 
among elites and citizens.  
• Compliance primarily with 
economic chapters of acquis and 
limited compliance with rule of 
law criteria.   
• Limited adoption of democratic 
norms that threaten the 
capacity of elites to control 
politics. 
• Construction of semi-
authoritarian regime. 
 
Serbian nationalism • Presentation of government 
opposition such a NGOs and other 
civil society groups as an externally 
supported violation of Serbia’s 
national interests. 
• Protection and advancement of 
Serbian national interests. 
• EU membership as a threat to the 
national and cultural character of 
Serbia. 
• Used as a frame to silence 
criticism of government actions 
and to exert pressure on the EU 
when the Serbian government 
seeks to avoid EU demands.  
• Associated with a nationalist 
political project which is anti-EU, 
pro-Russian and supports an 






4.1.1 Events since 2000 
The complex post-Milošević political environment in Serbia has been characterised by 
extensive political compromise. This compromise has allowed establishment figures to 
preserve their own positions on the basis that some form of reorientation towards the EU has 
occurred.  This has often resulted in strategic compliance with the EU’s reform agenda for 
reasons of economic interest. The primary imaginary mobilised in this period has been 
strategic accession, although Serbian nationalism has remained significant. Well up until 2008, 
key establishment figures linked to Milošević maintained their position in the judicial, 
government and security sectors, and exerted a significant degree of control over politics 
(Clarke, 2008, pp.117–119). Where elite actors have accepted the EU’s reforms, they have 
done so on the basis that reforms do not undermine their privileged positions and are 
perceived to advance their interests (Fagan, 2012, p.112). 
The EU and other international actors welcomed the election in 2000 of Zoran Đinđić as prime 
minister and the election of his reformist alliance. Đinđić himself had been speaking in favour 
of European integration since the early 1990s and an early priority for his government was to 
pursue reconciliation with the international community and a strategic reorientation towards 
the EU (Wichmann, 2007, p.96). The reformist alliance represented a political coalition of 
actors that ranged from those who embraced Europe culturally and politically, to those that 
wished to join the EU for economically motivated reasons. The former of these positions 
aligns closely with the normative Europeanisation imaginary and the latter with the strategic 
accession imaginary.  
Despite the election of a reformist political alliance, Serbia’s orientation toward the EU was 
not without its discontents both among the public and within the reformist political alliance 
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itself. The decision to shun nationalism in favour of European integration also challenged the 
position of many Milošević era political figures that remained active in government. These 
figures remained prominent despite the election of Đinđić. Vojislav Koštunica inherited the 
position of president from Milošević and as a conservative nationalist, often stymied the 
efforts of Đinđić and his party to dissolve the institutions that had survived the ousting of 
Milošević. Koštunica continued to oppose Đinđić despite actively participating within Đinđić’s 
reformist alliance (Fraser, 2013, p.236). Consequently, Đinđić met stiff political opposition to 
his attempts to tackle the problem of corruption in high office and reform the state security 
services. This early interplay between EU integration and Serbian nationalism echoes in 
contemporary Serbian politics. Politicians who support complete European integration have 
had to work in the context of enduring political structures inherited from the Milošević era. 
Furthermore, a significant number of citizens continue to oppose any aspect of EU integration. 
This creates space for Serbian nationalism to remain a viable political project and imaginary 
to be mobilised. 
4.1.2 The consequences of compromised political reform 
In a contested environment, the EU operated a fine balancing act between reform and 
continuity during Serbia’s early democratic transition from 2000 to 2008. To maintain this 
balancing act, the EU encouraged significant political reforms, but also tried to avoid 
antagonising political elites who could mobilise nationalist opposition against the EU’s reform 
agenda. This made implementing the economic requirements for EU membership relatively 
straightforward. Meanwhile, more challenging rule of law reforms were difficult to instigate. 
Unlike political reform, economic liberalisation proved popular because the conflict of the 
1990s and subsequent international sanctions had left Serbia economically disadvantaged. 
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The EU was therefore given the green light to heavily push free-market reforms whilst, 
simultaneously, Serbian elites managed to prevent widespread institutional change and rule 
of law reform. This is reflected in the view of some civil society actors, who argued that 
political elites have become adept at protecting their own patronage networks, while 
simultaneously promoting rule of law reforms. Elites have achieved this by limiting the 
capacity of rule of law institutions and finding ways to strike informal agreements that 
prevent them from being investigated: 
They [current politicians] are not as obvious as the previous ones. To be quite honest, 
they are not running away from the institutions that are supposed to be working on 
this. The institutions are on tight budgets and capacities or are working under very bad 
laws and are not allowed to inspect some things. If they can, they refer it to the court, 
prosecutor or parliament, and then they do nothing.1 
 
In sum, the EU has remained cautious and has tried to avoid appearing too intrusive in the 
promotion of reforms, for fear it will embolden opposition to democratisation (Straus, 2000). 
To prevent hostile political figures from framing democratisation as external interventionism, 
the EU avoided explicitly challenging entrenched political elites. This meant that reformists 
that supported normative Europeanisation struggled to mobilise resources and challenge 
issues, such as high-level political corruption (President, 2004, p. 31).  During the early post- 
Milošević era, the EU tolerated partial compliance with its state-building agenda in the hope 
that initial reform would cascade into deep-rooted political reform.  
                                                             
1 Interview with a journalist from the Centre for Investigative Journalism (CINS), Belgrade. Interview conducted 
22 March 2016. 
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Because Serbia failed to make an immediate and clear break from its nationalist past, the 
reformist factions in Serbia soon became isolated and found themselves contending with 
lingering nationalist figures. Continued opposition towards attempts to radically change the 
composition of key political institutions eventually resulted in a split amongst the reformist 
collation. Consequently, nationalist politicians began speaking out against Đinđić and his 
more radical attempts to restructure the state (BBC, 2001). The emergence of an anti-EU bloc 
was further boosted by Đinđić’s efforts to decouple the association of security service officials 
from elements of criminality. This resulted in the conspiring of powerful domestic actors 
against him. In 2003, Đinđić was assassinated in Belgrade in an attack believed to be carried 
out by organised crime figures who, since the late 1990s, maintained strong links with key 
actors within the Serbian security services (Telegraf, 2015). The assassination visibly 
demonstrated how the failure to purge criminal elements from the security sector could 
dramatically threaten Serbia’s fledgling democracy and boost nationalist sentiment. 
Despite attempts to prevent the formation of a pro-EU movement, popular outcry at Đinđić’s 
assassination provided Serbia’s pro-reform coalition with the political opportunity to push for 
a radical restructuring of state institutions and temporarily delegitimised anti-EU factions that 
collaborated with the responsible criminal networks. As a consequence, Serbia’s reformist 
government under its leader, Zoran Živković, decided to crackdown on criminality in Serbia 
and attempted to dislodge the more radical figures active in its political institutions (Pare, 
2003). Despite the welcomed crackdown on Milošević-era criminal networks in Serbia, fresh 




4.2 Setting the tone:  political and economic conditionality 
The 2003 parliamentary elections resulted in the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) achieving a 
plurality of the votes with 28 per cent of the vote. The next nearest party, the nationalist but 
pro-EU integration Democratic Party of Serbia, secured 18 per cent (OSCE, 2004). This event 
was concerning for the EU, given the SRS was led by Vojislav Šešelj, a Serbian nationalist who 
at the time of his election, was also indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Despite winning a plurality of the vote, the SRS was denied a route 
to power as a new government was formed through a coalition between the Democratic Party 
of Serbia (DSS) and Democratic Party (DS). In a move further welcomed by the EU, the new 
coalition government agreed to extradite a number of prominent Serbian nationalists to the 
ICTY to face war crime charges (Europa Publications, 2003). In response to clear efforts to 
restructure its political institutions and to secure the position of Serbia’s pro-EU perspective, 
the EU announced Serbia as a potential Candidate State at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit 
(European Commission, 2003). 
Although the EU welcomed a situation that denied Šešelj and the radical nationalists control 
of Serbia, to say the DSS and DS coalition represented the pro-democratic future the EU 
expected would be an overstatement. By 2006, the DSS was being accused by both domestic 
and international critics of turning Serbia into an illiberal democracy and rehabilitating 
Milošević-era personnel (Fagan, 2012, p.114). Increasingly frustrated, the EU asserted direct 
pressure on Serbia. This culminated in a threat to withdraw vital reconstruction funds if 
significant liberalisation did not occur (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 2006a). The 
response of the Serbian government was a refusal to cooperate any further with the ICTY. In 
response, the EU suspended Serbia’s accession negotiations until the government complied 
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with the ICTY’s extradition requests (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2006b). The stalemate 
that ensued brought the two perspectives of Serbian nationalism and pro-Europeanisation 
directly into conflict.  
In response to the withdrawal of vital EU funds, the Serbian government reversed its position 
and resumed cooperation with the ICTY, despite domestic opposition. This resulted in the EU 
progressing the Stabilisation and Accession Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, with the agreement 
being initialled in 2008 (B92, 2008). A positive relationship between the Serbian government 
and the EU culminated in the eventual announcement of Serbia as an EU Candidate State in 
2012 (European Commission, 2015e). Given the apparent success of political conditionality to 
reverse the political position of the Serbian government, officials in Brussels came to view 
political conditionality as the most effective tool to ensure compliance with the EU’s reform 
agenda, as it had been in previous accession cases (Vachudova, 2005). The success of 
conditionality in this moment also helped reinforce a view among Serbia’s political elites that 
pursuing a process of strategic accession and mobilising its associated imaginary was in their 
best interests. The effectiveness of conditionality to overcome obstacles saw the EU and 
Serbia evaluate strategic accession as a pragmatic political perspective.  As the ICTY case 
reinforced, Serbians believed they could benefit from European integration whilst preserving 
their national interests through negotiation. Meanwhile, the EU saw conditionality as a tool 
to ensure compliance.  
However, conditionality alone provided a superficial solution. It did not seek to change the 
normative framework of Serbian actors nor did it encourage the institutionalisation of rule of 
law norms. Conditionality led the EU to evaluate accession progress through compliance with 
specific and often legalistic criteria. In return for compliance with reform programmes, Serbia 
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continued to receive EU funding. Consequently, the Serbian government had little incentive 
to generate transformation from below, given that the EU programmes allowed politicians to 
remain in their position to oversee the reform process and gain from EU investment.  
Furthermore, wider civil society remained poorly integrated into the political process as ruling 
political elites took credit for economic reforms that were enacted with EU financial and 
political support (Chandler, 2007, pp.593–607). The process of conditionality has set a 
precedent of intergovernmental interaction, which requires the EU to work with domestic 
political elites to enact reforms. The early exclusion of wider civil society reinforced popular 
feelings of disenchantment among these actors and cooperation between state institutions 
and civil society is lacking in Serbia, as well as the Western Balkans more generally (Fagan, 
2013). 
In summary, Serbia’s early post-Milošević era has seen some political reforms take place, 
initiated through the tool of conditionality. This however has generated little incentive for 
Serbian political elites to adopt EU norms or follow EU practice. As the use of political 
conditionality required a round of calculated negotiations between the EU and Serbia, rule of 
law reform came to resemble a rather linear and elite driven process, not dissimilar from 
political conditionality programmes administered by other international organisations that 
have sought to achieve political change through economic conditionality (Bridoux & Kurki, 
2014, p.58). Subsequently, Serbia’s political elites maintained their position by acting as 
overseers of a largely superficial Europeanisation process. This process did little to encourage 
the inclusion of civil society in Serbia or improve the perceptions held by many citizens 
regarding the democratic practice of key political institutions (Noutcheva, 2009). 
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4.2.1 Outcomes of conditionality and the failure to generate democracy from below 
The current constitution of Serbia was established in 2006 after the succession of Montenegro 
from Serbia. Article One of the constitution commits the Serbian state to the principles of rule 
of law, civil democracy, human rights and to European principles and values (Government of 
the Republic of Serbia, 2015b). The constitution makes significant provisions for the region of 
Vojvodina and grants the province and its capital city Novi Sad, a significant degree of political 
autonomy. This provision is a continuation of the autonomy granted to the region under the 
socialist system and the province has historically been an ethnically diverse region 
(Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2015a). The constitution outlines similar autonomy 
for the province of Kosovo Metohija but in truth, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 
2008 has made this a constitutional claim and not a reality. The Serbian system of government 
has the National Assembly as the supreme representative and legislative body in Serbia. It is 
composed of 250 deputies. A president heads the Serbian state, but the prime minister 
officially acts as executive (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2015c). The president of 
Serbia nominates a prime minister, but the head of the majority party always assume the 
position. Because elections to the National Assembly operate on a proportional list system, 
members from multiple political parties have often served in government. This has been less 
frequent in recent years with the political hegemony achieved by the SNS. 
Events since 2006 are characterised by the compliance of Serbia with expected conditionality 
requirements and gradual steps towards EU membership. Whilst this process of 
Europeanisation has been conceptualised as democratisation, the continued presence of 
certain political actors who tightly control politics suggests civil society has little place in the 
process. The failure to encourage Serbian actors to include a broad array of pro-democratic 
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civil society actors in the reform process further compounded the negative perception of 
citizens about their government and the state of politics more generally.  
Since 2009, the EU has attempted to break up elite actor networks that underpin the state. 
In particular, the EU has sought to remove politicisation from rule of law institutions by 
breaking the link between judges and politicians.  To put this into context, preliminary 
evaluations indicate that a new approach adopted in 2011 has removed a significant element 
of politicisation from the judiciary. Further analysis is necessary to ascertain whether this de-
politicisation results in a more transparent judiciary that responds to the needs of Serbian 
citizens and supports transparent democratic institutions (Fagan & Sircar, 2015, pp.13–16). In 
addition to asserting the need for more fundamental normative change in key institutions, 
the EU has further supported civil society in the hope that funded organisations can form an 
effective check on government action. However, the provision of capital to largely 
professionalised NGOs has led to questions about whether these groups truly represent the 
interest of Serbian citizens or whether they work to enforce EU policy (Fagan, 2013, pp.66–
67).  
Bringing this historical overview up to date with contemporary Serbian politics demonstrates 
the continued presence of key individuals linked to the Milošević’s regime. The SNS were the 
governing party from 2012 to 2014 and are a breakaway party of the SRS. The SNS leader until 
2012, Tomislav Nikolić, is a former nationalist who directly participated in Milošević’s regime. 
Although adopting a much more pro-EU stance since 2008, much of his rhetoric on issues 
including Kosovo and closer ties with Russia would appear to contradict the EU’s own position. 
The proposed alternative paths to EU integration, whilst perhaps not substantive or viable 
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alternatives to EU integration, still constitute alternative political projects that are referenced 
by elites to resist adopting reforms that threaten their long-term survival.  
Social trends are also indicative of the lingering power conservative forces exert over the state. 
In terms of social inclusion, certain minority groups still report cases of violence and exclusion. 
Whilst Belgrade successfully held its first LGBT Pride parade in 2010, attacks against LGBT 
activists remain widely reported and public identification as LGBT is still discouraged (Mikuš, 
2011, pp.834–851). Other minority ethnic groups, in particular the Roma, continue to report 
regular attacks, exclusion from democratic processes and are generally under-represented in 
Serbian politics (Human Rights Watch, 2015a). These cases suggest that EU reform has not 
resulted in a wholesale cultural shift among Serbian citizens and that liberal politics is highly 
contested (B92, 2015a).  
Corruption is another issue. Figure 4.1 demonstrates that few citizens in Southeast Europe 
believe that their governments are doing enough to fight corruption. Many citizens continue 
to perceive corruption to be a key feature of government institutions. The SNS government 
came to power on the back of a platform that promised to eradicate corruption in 2012 (B92, 
2013). However, citizens continue to question whether the government is fit for purpose to 
carry out the fight against corruption. Regardless, the issue of corruption has been mobilised 
and leveraged by the current government to win elections, boost support from the 
international community and create the illusion that progress is being made, even when 




Figure 4.1: Balkan Opinion Barometer 2017. Source: (Regional Cooperation Council, 2017) 
 
   
The attempts of the current Serbian government to prevent independent media from 
reporting corruption also demonstrate that freedom of expression is weakly enshrined. 
External evaluations suggest that the current government is increasingly resorting to threats 
of violence or financial sanctioning for media outlets which criticise the government (Freedom 
House, 2015b, 2017). A move away from press freedom is particularly controversial because 
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the Serbian president and SNS leader, Alexander Vučić, was the Minister of Information under 
the Milošević regime.  
When the Serbian government has faced allegations of corruption or been accused of 
restricting social inclusion and freedom of expression, it has typically mobilised nationalist 
discourse to justify its actions and defend itself from criticism. Whilst Serbia agreed to abolish 
parallel institutions in Kosovo in 2013 after extensive EU facilitated dialogue, such issues are 
still prominent in Serbian politics (EEAS, 2015). Instead of seeking to persuade the public to 
abandon Serbian nationalism, the SNS government has strategically deployed nationalist 
imaginaries to challenge rule of law reforms which go against its interests. Critics of the 
government’s actions are frequently labelled as pro-western interventionists, who seek to 
undermine the territorial integrity of the Serbian state (B92, 2015b).  The EU recognises 
nationalist and socially conservative rhetoric remains powerful and is reluctant to push Serbia 
to remove entrenched political elites given these elites remain capable of mobilising popular 
opinion against the EU. In effect, Serbian nationalism provides a substantial imaginary and 
anti-EU narrative should the EU attempt to exert undue pressure on Serbia’s elite. This 
provides the ruling elite with an effective strategy of resisting reforms.  
To summarise, Serbia has complied with the EU’s reform agenda. This process has been 
overseen and safeguarded by Serbian elites who have exerted a significant degree of control 
over the speed and direction of reforms. Because of the EU’s inability to mitigate alternative 
politic projects, European integration remains the most significant but not the only game in 
town. Rule of law reforms have occurred largely in response to conditionality. By reducing 
enlargement to a series of negotiable arrangements that are reliant on the underlying 
promise of financial capital, the EU does little to challenge politically embedded elites in 
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Serbia. To the contrary, allowing elites to retain their privileged positions in overseeing what 
has been widely termed a ‘flawed’ political transition has allowed elites to further entrench 
their positions (Gheciu, 2015, p.301). An alternative to the process of conditionality would be 
a more systematic socialisation process that seeks to transform the conceptual and practical 
dispositions of elite actors through engagement between the EU, government and wider civil 
society (Ibid, p.305). In the absence of this, political elites continue to benefit from an 
approach that provides them with significant resources to capture, so long as they 
superficially comply with the EU’s external demands.  
4.3 The EU’s approach  
The EU has demonstrated a clear interest in Serbia’s political development and many of 
Serbia’s key political events since 2000 have been a reaction to the prospect of EU 
membership. This section discusses the key mechanisms through which the EU has delivered 
its reform agenda. This overview demonstrates the largely technocratic approach employed 
by the EU. By attempting to export EU-style institutions to Candidate States through 
programme specific instruments based on an enlargement blueprint, the EU has often 
neglected the local realities in Serbia. This encouraged Serbian actors to ‘tick the boxes’ of 
formal programme criteria to received EU funds and comply with the accession process. 
Problematically, the EU’s approach up until 2014 did not address the need to change the 
institutional culture underpinning rule of law institutions and did not offer a specific 
consultation procedure that allowed domestic actors to internalise EU rule of law norms and 
embed them in practice. Therefore, the EU’s process of reform allowed domestic elites to 
comply with EU expectations without changing underlying institutional norms. This has reified 
the strategic accession imaginary as optimal for Serbian actors. Outlining the EU’s delivery of 
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reforms since 2000 is important for ascertaining how rule of law reforms are delivered, as 
well as ascertaining whether there is anything the EU’s new approach does differently, which 
will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
  
4.3.1 The Stabilisation and Accession process (SAp) 
Since 2000, the EU’s approach towards Serbia and the Western Balkans more widely has been 
characterised by efforts to promote regional stability. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 
outlined the EU’s reform agenda for the Western Balkans and produced the Stabilisation and 
Association process (SAp). Much of the EU’s accession policy has been delivered via the SAp 
(European Commission, 2003). The SAp is designed to be implemented through individual 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) signed with Western Balkan countries 
(European Commission, 2003). A partnership of actors is responsible for overseeing the SAp 
including the EU Commission’s Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement (DG 
NEAR), national-level EU delegations, national governments and EU supported NGOs 
(European Commission, 2015e). 
Two funding mechanisms have funded accession related projects and supported the SAp 
more broadly. The first funding mechanism was the now redundant Community Assistance 
for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS).  The programme was brought 
into action by Council Regulation (EC) no. 2666/2000). It had four main objectives (EUR-Lex, 
2015; Fagan, 2012): 
1. Stabilisation of the region 
2. Institutional and legislative development, including harmonisation with EU norms 
3. Sustainable economic development and structural reform 
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4. Encouraging cooperation between the Western Balkan countries and the EU 
The executive summary of the European Commission’s final summary of the CARDS 
programme provides an overview of the key outcomes of the programme in Serbia. In total, 
the EU provided €1.15 billion to Serbia under CARDS between 2000 and 2006. Whilst the 
majority (31 per cent) of this funding was spent modernising the energy sector, 10 per cent 
was spent on government development, 8 per cent on border management and in total, 41 
per cent of the programmes were orientated towards some form of technical assistance 
across various sectors to bring the Serbian public administration in line with the EU (Particip 
GmbH, 2009, p. 1). Whilst economic liberalisation has been the biggest priority for the EU in 
terms of allocated funds, the rule of law also received significant levels of support through 
technical assistance.  
The CARDS programme has been criticised for denying domestic stakeholders a clear sense of 
involvement in the accession process (Fagan, 2012, p.46). Furthermore, CARDs programmes 
have primarily involved large-scale institutional reforms that rarely focus on micro level 
processes and practices which might need reforming. To give an example, a lack of 
involvement from national stakeholders in an initiative to democratise the Ministry of Justice 
has resulted in the rule of law being resisted or circumvented because significant efforts to 
reform current administrative practice have not taken place (Particip GmbH, 2009, p.2). In 
this case, the Serbian Judges Association (SJA) has contested much of the EU’s reform agenda 
for not challenging Serbian ministries who wish to maintain control over the judicial process 
(Ibid, p.2). This is particularly visible in the SJA’s initial resistance to the establishment of a 
Judicial Training Centre, given the Ministry of Justice had a role in its establishment (Ibid, p.11).   
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The CARDS programme found greater success in its attempts to create a legislative 
environment that facilitated harmonisation with EU rules. In the area of local and municipal 
development, CARDS programmes helped align Serbian law with EU law to facilitate the 
process of European integration (ibid, pp.16-17). In sum, CARDS was effective at helping enact 
legal harmonisation with EU rules. This helped reinforce accession as a process of legal 
compliance and not normative change. This was discussed in chapter 2 where it was argued 
that legal harmonisation and transposition of EU laws alone does not change the way in which 
actors understand rule of law issues and enact them in practice.   
4.3.2 Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
In response to the limits of CARDS, the EU created the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(IPA) as a new mechanism for delivering the SAp. IPA is a mechanism that delivers large sums 
of money to Potential Candidate States and Candidate States to support accession-related 
activities and institution building (European Commission, 2015d). Specific sectoral level 
programmes are delivered through the IPA and are overseen by the EU and allied actors. 
Consequently, the IPA is not only administered, evaluated and monitored by the EU, but also 
key financial institutions including the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the European Investment Bank, who have worked alongside the EU in 
delivering the IPA (European Commission, 2015f). The money delivered via IPA to Serbia since 
the beginning of the programme up until 2014, is visible in table 4.2: 
Table 4.2: IPA funds delivered to Serbia from 2007-2013. Source: (European Commission, 2015d) 




189.7 190.9 194.8 197.9 201.8 202.0 208.3 
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In addition to the money received to date, table 4.3 outlines the planned delivery of funds to 
Serbia as well as a breakdown of funds by policy sector. These tables demonstrate the scale 
of the state-building project taking place in Serbia: 
Table 4.3: IPA Funding allocated to Serbia by sector for period 2014-2020. Source: (European Commission, 2015f) 
INDICATIVE ALLOCATIONS (million EUR) per policy areas and 
sectors, per year 
     Total 
Governance Area -2014- -2015- -2016- -2017- 2018-2020  2014-2020 
       
a. Reforms in preparation for Union 
membership 
95.1 61.4 77.9 78.4 230.2 543.0 
Democracy and governance 177.8 100.2 278.0 
Rule of law and fundamental rights 135.0 130.0 265.0 
b. Socio-economic and Regional development 85.0  75.0 85.0 80.0 240.0 565.0 
Environment and climate change 85.0 75.0 160.0 
Transport 90.0 85.0 175.0 
Energy 80.0 45.0 125 
Competitiveness and innovation 70.0 35.0 105.0 
c. Employment, social policies, education,  
promotion of gender equality, and human  
resources development 
15.0 40.0 20.0 27.0 88.0 190.0 
Education, employment and social policies 102.0 88.0 190.0 
d. Agriculture and rural development 0 25.0 25.0 30.0 130.0 210.0 
Agriculture and rural development 80.0 130.0 210.0 





IPA operates specific programmes in designated ‘priority sectors’.  For example, the IPA for 
Serbia has a democracy and governance priority sector that seeks to promote administrative 
reform through specific programmes (European Commission, 2015f). Despite the 
categorisation of priority sectors, programme delivery often cuts across priority sectors. For 
example, the EU administers its anti-corruption programme within the democracy and 
governance policy area. This programme also encourages investment in Serbia by increasing 
the trust investors place in the Serbian government. Whilst being allocated specifically to the 
democracy and governance priority sector, the EU’s anti-corruption programme indirectly 
supports its competitiveness and innovation priority sector. This demonstrates how the IPA 
operates at the sectoral level in a way that integrates the various political and economic 
components of the EU’s enlargement approach. 
The EU’s state-building agenda in the Western Balkans is clearly ambitious and supported 
with significant material resources. Ascertaining the effectiveness of IPA funding and its role 
in institution building is vital, but it is not the focus of this thesis. However, ascertaining the 
size and scope of the EU’s state-building agenda is important because it demonstrates the 
scale of the EU’s economic and political investment in Serbia. Rule of law is a priority for the 
EU and it is prepared to support it with significant funds. The EU has a clear stake in the 
success of its rule of law reform agenda and aims to ensure that it makes the most of its 
financial assistance. To what extent it has moved beyond formal institution building and has 
encouraged the institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice will be explored in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
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In sum, the SAp seeks to stabilise the region by enforcing contractual bilateral relationships 
with and between Western Balkan countries, enhancing market integration and improving 
regional cooperation (European Commission, 2012a). Whilst the SAp clearly reduces the 
prospect of regional instability, it has not been concerned with creating a political 
environment where critical reflection and dialogue is encouraged. The continued prevalence 
of nationalist political views in Serbia remains a significant challenge to the EU’s integration 
efforts. Instead of directly challenging nationalist discourse and associated imaginaries, the 
EU has attempted to mitigate contestation by offering economic development. It has 
therefore become EU strategy to link democratisation and market liberalisation as a mutually 
reinforcing and mutually beneficial process. This approach has been successful in creating 
economic interdependence but has also neglected a more explicit focus on rule of law reform 
(O’Brennan, 2014). Consequently, the EU’s new approach has arisen to put rule of law at the 
heart of the accession process.  
4.4 Challenges to reform   
The following sections highlight two interrelated challenges, which particularly confound the 
EU’s new approach. These are: the relationship between government and civil society and the 
continuation of political elites. 
4.4.1 Case study: BIRN 
While EU reforms must be delivered through government, the ability of domestic elites to 
pushback against reforms can undermine the rule of law. Serbian political elites can use 
different imaginaries to either promote or contest EU interventions, depending on whether 
they challenge their interests. Drawing from table 4.1, a case study of media freedom 
demonstrates the strategic use of political imaginaries by the government. Following the 
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release of a critical report from an EU funded civil society organisation, the government 
switched from a strategic accession imaginary to Serbian nationalism. The threat of mobilising 
a nationalist narrative appeared substantive enough to prevent the EU from challenging the 
government and whilst it did seek to defend the civil society organisation under attack, it 
largely sought to mitigate the mobilisation of nationalist forces. This case demonstrates how 
socially constructed political imaginaries can be deployed strategically, as well as the 
contested nature of rule of law reforms. 
The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network is an organisation that seeks to analyse 
transitional issues in the Balkans and the process of European integration (BIRN, 2015a). BIRN 
is a not-for-profit organisation whose donors include the EU, National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Balkan Trust for democracy 
(BIRN, 2015b). BIRN seeks to hold the Serbian government to account and supports the 
development of a free media environment in Serbia. BIRN gained national and international 
prominence in 2014 after conducting an investigative report into the Tamnava mine. The 
Tamnava mine is located in Western Serbia and is critical to Serbia’s fuel economy, providing 
43 per cent of the fuel for three major power plants nearby (World Bank Group, 2015a).  
Following the severe flooding that occurred in Serbia during 2014, the government 
distributed a World Bank financed project to two construction companies. The companies 
received contracts to pump water from the mine and restore its operations. BIRN’s report 
concluded that the companies awarded the contract to undertake this were not well suited 
for the task, given neither company had any prior experience with dewatering mines. The 
final report revealed that €100 million had been disbursed through the project and that the 
companies who received the contracts also had connections to Elektromreža Srbije, the state-
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run electricity utility company (BIRN, 2015c, pp.1–7). In effect, BIRN were claiming to have 
found evidence that government funds were distributed to the companies as a ‘kick back’ for 
the benefit of government elites (Ibid).  
Despite the focus placed on corruption as part of rule of law reforms, corruption has largely 
been conceptualised in terms of its macroeconomic impact and as a product of administrative 
culture by the Serbian government and other important external actors the EU has tasked 
with supporting its enlargement programme (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2015a, 2015b). Because of this, less emphasis has been placed on the political 
dimension of corruption.  Consequently, the Serbian government defended its actions by 
stating that the case did not violate the World Bank’s procurement policy and in doing so, 
deflected attention away from its own actions (World Bank Group, 2015b, p.4). By referencing 
the World Bank, the Serbian government knew any challenge to its own position would 
require challenging the World Bank. As the World Bank is an advisory partner to the EU, the 
Serbian government appeared to anticipate that the EU could not directly challenge the case 
(European Commission, 2015c).  
When the issues uncovered by BIRN were was raised with the World Bank’s office in Belgrade, 
the World Bank responded by reiterating its stance that the procurement had occurred in 
accordance with their policy and they would not be investigating the issue (BIRN, 2015d). This 
verdict legitimised the actions of the government and failed to address the key issue raised 
by BIRN — that elite individuals at the centre of political and economic life in Serbia continued 
to be linked on the basis of informal personal connections and gain from the resources of the 
state (BIRN, 2015c). The EU did not push for any further investigation because it did not want 
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to undermine the judgement of a key partner, the World Bank.  This lack of intervention 
encouraged the Serbian government to mobilise Serbian nationalist rhetoric against BIRN. 
The Serbian government delegitimised the findings of the BIRN report by representing BIRN 
as an externally funded organisation who were interested in undermining Serbia’s national 
sovereignty. By accusing BIRN of being ‘EU-paid Liars’, PM Vučić eventually sparked a direct 
intervention from the European Commission to speak in support of media freedom (B92, 
2015b; European Commission, 2015g). Whilst this intervention resulted in Vučić reducing the 
hostility of his narrative, he was still able to mobilise nationalist support against BIRN. This led 
to a series of threats aimed at BIRN staff (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). It has been suggested 
that this case is indicative of the Serbian government’s attempts to covertly silence media 
critics, while formally complying with the EU’s rule of law agenda (European Fund for the 
Balkans, 2015, pp.9–13).   
The case study of the Tamnava mine demonstrates two things. First, the case study 
demonstrates the EU’s reluctance to challenge government elites, even when they mobilise 
rhetoric that undermines the freedom of the press, a key rule of law principle. Second, this 
case study demonstrates the presence of separate imaginaries in Serbia that can be utilised 
simultaneously by the Serbian government to preserve its interests.  
This case study also demonstrates the tension between government and civil society within 
Serbia. Pro-reform actors question EU policy because it is delivered in cooperation with the 
government and mistrust between NGOs and government runs deep: 
I believe that whoever came to power in the last 180 years, it was never different. If 
you look at the discourse of the ruling elites, there was never a time to have either a 
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free-thinking people or politicians, or elite that will actually lead. It was always much 
easier and preferable to have the ones that will listen and the ones that will comply.2 
 
The high levels of social and symbolic capital elites have within the field of Serbian politics 
perpetuates a system of patronage, confounding corruption (Kleibrink, 2015). As substantive 
reforms potentially jeopardise the position of elite actors, deep reforms have been 
particularly difficult to induce. Attempts to break apart elite networks by encouraging the 
inclusion of civil society has only involved a small number of NGOs that represent a specific 
segment of civil society. This fails to encourage the participation of wider civil society as the 
EU only engages with civil society instrumentally to monitor the accession process (Wetzel & 
Orbie, 2015, p.109). Civil society actors have questioned their own role in the accession 
process and consider their involvement to be ‘tokenistic’ — they are often ignored in practice 
but included to demonstrate the accession process is inclusive of civil society actors (Fagan, 
2013, p.13). This contestation defines the relationship between government and civil society. 
Subsequent chapters demonstrate the effect this has on the EU’s capacity to initiate the 
emergence of shared rule of law understandings.  
4.4.2 Case study: Security sector reform and entrenched public administrations 
A second dimension of contestation concerns the delivery of the EU’s approach. The EU’s 
enlargement approach has focussed on promoting institutional reform and technical 
assistance through its conditionality procedure.  This use of conditionality and the provision 
of financial assistance to enact reforms has intertwined political objectives and economic 
incentives. This is problematic as it has produced a ‘surface level’ process of reform within 
                                                             




key institutions. Security sector reform offers a good example of how the Serbian public 
administration remains entrenched and resilient to deep-rooted reform, despite EU 
interventions.  
Security sector reform is necessary for Serbia to meet the requirements outlined in Chapter 
24 of the EU acquis. The EU and other international actors have invested a great deal of time 
and energy trying to depoliticise the security sector, remove corruption and ensure 
transparency of the security sector (Edmunds, 2007). EU-related reforms have sought to 
disseminate New Public Management principles in Serbia’s public administration (Vetta, 
2009). This has been reflected in attempts to reorganise key security sector institutions, 
primarily the Ministry of Interior.   
Reforms within the Ministry of Interior have struggled to change practices and existing 
institutional hierarchies have proved difficult to abolish. One key external actor active in this 
reform process outlined the problem with these entrenched public administrations and the 
persistent difficulties in trying to reform a hierarchical organisation: 
We have these institutions still from the old socialist times that have not been reformed 
enough, in terms of breaking these very tight hierarchical relations of authority and 
power. For them to understand that they need to cooperate more freely and 
understand that they’re not working in some box and that this is their competency.3 
 
Part of the difficulty in achieving reform has been the reluctance of domestic actors to engage 
with reforms. There is a significant degree of contestation and reluctance to change work 
practices. In Serbia, part of the reason this has occurred is the lack of resonance new reforms 
                                                             
3 Interview C, OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 21 April 2016. 
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have with existing organisational cultures. An interviewee working in the Ministry of Interior 
articulated this: 
Because, as a result of a 10-year period of this soft approach [of security sector reform], 
it has almost embedded into [the] organisation culture, that managers themselves 
think “oh, there is some project, whatever happens, it doesn’t really matter, it isn’t my 
priority.”4 
 
Path dependencies no doubt play a role in inhibiting reforms, as do capacity issues. However, 
it is also important to consider the effectiveness of the EU’s own interventions and its 
attempts to promote reforms. One reason why EU reforms have failed to enact substantive 
administrative restructuring is the phasing of the SAp process. One interviewee outlined how 
up until 2014, reforms had largely been promoted by the international community in an ad-
hoc manner. This promoted ‘tactical’ change but not a ‘strategic’ change in thinking. Despite 
these criticisms, the interviewee stated that the opening of accession chapters might 
subsequently enact a deeper change and generate momentum for reform: 
I think the biggest change factor will be the EU negotiating process because it will 
enforce change. Just this morning I was explaining again to people that the EU is not 
just some project, it is de facto a contractual obligation, which the Minister both 
politically and from a legal perspective has taken to enforce, to enact.5 
 
The case of reform within the Ministry of Interior demonstrates the limits to date of the EU’s 
approach. The EU has worked with other international organisations to do what it can in terms 
of providing resources to enact institutional reform. However, previous rounds of reform 
                                                             




have not adequately considered the deep-rooted cultural structures and material factors that 
make it difficult to change the behaviour of public officials: 
The EU does not understand, you can’t have a sustainable change in this area unless 
you have all these other things. You can build the additional specialist skills of financial 
investigators, you can bring some external experts, you can use TAIEX, but what 
happens with the next generation?6 
 
In sum, insights from the security sector suggest that a more effective method of rule of law 
reform would require greater bottom-up working, socialisation and information exchange to 
engage with points of contestation and reform the security sector. It remains to be seen to 
what extent the EU’s new approach does this in other rule of law policy areas. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provided important insight into political developments in Serbia and its 
relationship with the EU since 2000. It made three key points. 
 First, developments in Serbia have seen the country clearly orientate toward the EU. Whilst 
this has placed Serbia on a path to EU accession, the extent of reform induced by this process 
is questionable. Serbia has complied with the EU’s reform agenda based on conditionality. 
This has elevated an imaginary of strategic accession, which has framed the actions of 
domestic actors. However, the articulation and mobilisation of a nationalist imaginary has 
been used to reinforce domestic elites and undermine government critics.  
                                                             
6 Interview C, OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 21 April 2016. 
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Second, the EU’s approach has been characterised by its focus on ensuring Serbian actors 
comply with EU reforms and construct formal democratic institutions. It has relied on formal 
instruments such as the IPA to deliver pre-accession assistance. It is unclear how much the 
EU’s approach has focussed on informal institution building. This raises important questions 
about whether the EU has tried to significantly advance corresponding rule of law norms 
alongside formal institution building.  
Third, this chapter demonstrated the limits of rule of law reforms to date. The tension 
between civil society and government and the entrenched position of political elites are both 
significant issues, which will be explored in subsequent chapters.  
The next chapter highlights the logics and imaginaries driving the delivery of rule of law 
reforms in Serbia. This chapter builds on significant themes outlined here and points to the 
role that previous experiences, perceptions of instability and contemporary politics all play in 
structuring the EU’s own imaginary of the Western Balkans region and Serbia. This imaginary 
differs from the imaginaries constructed by domestic actors in this chapter. The EU’s 
imaginary is significant because it determines the issues prioritised by the EU and the way it 
engages with Serbia. It has profound implications for how accession-related rule of law 













Chapter 5: What are the key logics and imaginaries driving the EU’s contemporary 
approach to enlargement? 
 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the question: What are the key logics and imaginaries driving the EU’s 
regional engagement? Answering this sub-question helps answer the research question: 
What are the key logics, imaginaries and interactions driving the delivery of rule of law 
reforms in Serbia? This chapter focuses on how EU actors construct an imaginary of the 
Western Balkans region through structuration, and outlines the key logics driving its 
engagement. This imaginary differs from the imaginaries mobilised by domestic actors in 
chapter 4, although there is an interplay between EU politics, regional politics and domestic 
politics in Serbia. This chapter analyses enlargement policy in relation to the changing nature 
of European integration. Analysing enlargement policy in this manner demonstrates how the 
interplay between formal objectives and political concerns shapes the issues prioritised by 
the EU in Serbia.  It is further demonstrated how this interplay produces contradictory 
responses that undermine the formal objectives of the EU’s enlargement policy in Serbia and 
the Western Balkans more generally.   
Analysing enlargement policy in the context of European integration overcomes the limits of 
existing theoretical approaches discussed in chapter 2. Existing approaches tend to eschew 
questions about the factors that drive integration and by extension, the impact these factors 
have on enlargement policy.  In contrast to these approaches, this chapter will seek to identify 
the integration dynamics that effect the formation and application of enlargement policy. It 
does so by focussing on how the interplay between institutions, events, experience and actors, 
shapes the formation of understanding through a process of structuration. This chapter will 
make the argument that a ‘strategic’ logic drives the EU’s enlargement approach. This 
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strategic logic is driven by the concerns of key Member States who seek to construct an 
enlargement approach that can reinforce an increasingly challenged hegemonic project at the 
European level.  However, as this strategic logic is informed by the way in which actors make 
sense of EU enlargement, it differs from the strategic logic associated with rational choice.                  
This chapter first outlines briefly the formal criteria that is formally meant determine how the 
rule of law policies promoted by the EU. However, subsequent sections suggest that further 
considerations drive the formation and delivery of enlargement policy, subsequently 
circumventing this formal criterion. Second, this chapter places enlargement policy into the 
broader context of European integration to demonstrate how and why key Member States 
play an increased agenda-setting role in determining the political agenda of enlargement 
policy. At the same time, the European Commission plays a monitoring role and is eager to 
present enlargement policy as technocratic and apolitical. This has resulted in enlargement 
policy being increasingly shaped by the strategic input of key Member States concerned with 
mediating tensions within the EU. This section demonstrates the role that events and current 
experiences play in shaping the judgement of actors and the construction of an imaginary that 
prioritises stability. 
The third section explores other reasons why this shift in enlargement policy has occurred. 
This section emphasises the key role past enlargement experiences have played in shaping 
enlargement policy. It also demonstrates how the 2007 enlargement was perceived as a 
warning against further ‘rapid’ enlargement. Placing contemporary enlargement policy in a 
comparative perspective demonstrates how previous enlargement experiences have shaped 
the EU’s current enlargement approach. Key Member States are increasingly concerned with 
reinforcing a liberal political model in future Member States against the backdrop of concerns 
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about the poor institutionalisation of the rule of law, and persistence of organised crime and 
corruption in new Member States. The retrospective evaluation of both the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement is shown to shape how actors frame contemporary enlargement policy.  This 
demonstrates the importance of retrospective evaluation in shaping structuration and the 
construction of an imaginary that the EU’s new approach should avoid past mistakes.  
The fourth section demonstrates how the EU’s enlargement approach plays out in practice 
and how the EU acts through enlargement policy. This section demonstrates the way 
contemporary challenges and perceptions of risk inform its imaginary and drive 
contemporary enlargement policy. This is demonstrated with three examples. First, the 
economic crisis has framed further enlargement as a risk. It is believed that the Western 
Balkan Candidate States are not economically competitive and as such, accession poses a risk 
to the EU’s economy.  Second, the perception of the Western Balkans as a perpetual region 
of instability frames enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans as an opportunity to 
secure the region and prevent conflict along the EU’s border. Third, the use of enlargement 
policy to address the ‘migration crisis’ demonstrates how enlargement policy is used in an ad-
hoc and instrumental manner to address an emerging crisis affecting Member States.  
This chapter concludes by reiterating that the EU’s enlargement policy is constructed through 
the interpretation of contemporary events, previous experiences and current crises of 
concern to EU actors.  The way these challenges are framed and organised into a political 
imaginary of the Western Balkans region determines how the prospect of future enlargement 




5.1 The EU’s rule of law criteria 
Table 5.1 outlines the key rule of law content the EU aims to promote through enlargement. 
These are primarily detailed in Chapter 23 of the EU acquis. The rule of law content outlined 
in table 5.1 informs the decision to analyse three rule of law policy areas relating to judicial 
reform, anti-corruption policy and fundamental rights in subsequent chapters. Chapter 24 is 
also included in table 5.1. This is because part of this Chapter supports the implementation of 
the rule of law criteria associated with Chapter 23. For example, by outlining the need for 
adequate law enforcement capacities, which can effectively enforce the rule of law. It thus 
plays a cross-cutting role in supporting implementation. However, the majority of Chapter 24 
is focussed on the implementation of Schengen and cross-border cooperation: 
 
Table 5.1: Key aspects of the EU acquis concerning the EU’s rule of law criteria. Source: European 
Commission, 2018. 
 
Chapters of the Acquis Key rule of law content 
Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights 
• The establishment of an independent and 
efficient judiciary. 
• Impartiality and integrity of the courts for 
safeguarding the rule of law. 
• Eliminating external influences over the 
judiciary. 
• Legal guarantees for a fair trial. 
• Effective engagement in the fight against 
corruption. 
• Solid legal framework and reliable 
institutions to prevent and deter corruption. 
• Respect for fundamental rights and EU 
citizens’ rights, as guaranteed by the 
Fundamental Rights Charter. 
Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security • Strong and well-integrated capacity within 
the law enforcement agencies and other 
relevant rule of law bodies. 
• Schengen acquis to facilitate cross-border 
cooperation and support the fight against 




The policy issues associated with this part of the acquis communautaire are formally stated 
to be the key drivers of enlargement policy (European Commission, 2016b). However, the 
following sections show how intergovernmental dynamics, perceptions actors have of 
previous enlargements, and interpretations of contemporary events, inform the design and 
delivery of enlargement policy. This suggests that objective rule of law criteria are not the 
only drivers determining the EU’s engagement with Candidate States and the development 
of enlargement policy.  
5.2 The new intergovernmentalism of enlargement policy   
Arguably enlargement policy has always been driven by intergovernmental politics as the 
admission of new Member States must be unanimously approved. Since 2014 however, a 
further shift has taken place.  During previous enlargements, the Commission had significant 
input in directing the speed of the enlargement process. In contrast, contemporary 
enlargement policy is driven by several key Member States, who have adopted a far more 
cautious approach to enlargement. This shift in competencies is demonstrated when two key 
events are considered in tandem. In 2014, the Juncker Commission announced a five-year 
freeze on enlargement stating that: 
The EU needs to take a break from enlargement so that we can consolidate what has 
been achieved among the 28. This is why, under my Presidency of the Commission, 
ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the Western Balkans will need to keep 
a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take place over the next five 
years. (Juncker, 2014). 
 
Shortly before the formation of the Juncker Commission, the Berlin Forum was established. 
The establishment of a new informal intergovernmental forum prior to the announcement 
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that the Commission would be taking a step back from enlargement is interpreted as an 
attempt by Member States to reassert themselves as the agenda setting actors of 
enlargement.  
Germany has played a key role in enlargement policy and was an early advocate of post-
conflict reconciliation in the Western Balkans. The increased involvement of Germany in the 
enlargement process coincides with its emergence as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ in several policy 
fields since the 2008 financial crisis (Bulmer & Paterson, 2013; Krotz & Maher, 2016). Prior to 
the establishment of the Juncker Commission, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced 
the Berlin Summit on the Western Balkans. The Summit was designed to demonstrate 
Germany’s ‘strong commitment’ to the Western Balkans and that a ‘clear prospect for the 
Western Balkan states’ should exist if the criteria for accession is respected (Deutsche Welle, 
2014). The other key Member States active in the Berlin Process are France, Austria, Italy, 
Croatia and Slovenia (Lilyanova, 2016, p.2). The first Berlin process summit was held in 
Germany, the second in France, third in Austria and fourth in Italy. The Berlin process includes 
current Candidate States and potential Candidate States in the Western Balkans region. It is 
designed to act as the key forum through which pro-enlargement Member States and 
Candidate States interact.  
Intergovernmental bodies allow the Member States to define the political agenda of 
enlargement and the content of key reforms that are subject to the Commission’s monitoring 
exercise (EurActiv.de, 2014; Lilyanova, 2016, p.2). The Commission’s role in the enlargement 
process remains that of monitor and enforcer. Taken at face value, the Commission’s 
insistence on benchmarking and measuring reform progress impedes the type of flexibility 
that a more experimental approach to enlargement policy might provide. This isn’t the case 
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however when the competencies of the Commission are considered. During the enlargement 
process, the Commission seeks to monitor and evaluate progress made towards meeting 
benchmarked reform objectives. Action plans are drawn up by Candidate States to show how 
they will work towards meeting benchmarked objectives. This process remains technical and 
involves formally transplanting the EU’s legal system into Candidate States. This formal 
process of monitoring and evaluation runs parallel to and is shaped by the political agenda of 
intergovernmental forums such as the Berlin Forum. 
The Berlin Process not only demonstrates the important role played by Member States in 
driving the enlargement process, it also demonstrates the increasingly process-oriented 
approach favoured by the EU. A process-orientated approach allows for emerging issues 
facing the EU to be placed onto an enlargement agenda, while simultaneously a formal 
accession process based on fixed criteria is promoted. Moving the agenda setting aspect of 
enlargement from formal arenas to informal arenas allows for contemporary concerns to be 
reflected onto and embedded within the EU’s enlargement approach. The EU’s new 
enlargement dynamic is characterised by the formulation of policy through a process of 
deliberation between key agenda setting actors and the informalisation of the policy process 
through intergovernmental forums and ad-hoc bilateral relations (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010, p.4). 
This has implications for how the EU’s enlargement approach is constructed through 
structuration. It suggests that the interplay between the understanding of formal criteria and 
progress by Candidate States is not the only factor influencing EU actors. Ad-hoc and 
emerging concerns will shape the construction of the EU’s enlargement agenda and inform 
various imaginaries of both the Western Balkans and EU politics. The following sections 
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demonstrate how this subsequently shapes the application of the EU’s approach and 
determines the prioritisation of a socially constructed strategic logic.   
5.2.1 The 2015 Vienna Summit 
Briefly analysing the Vienna Summit, Paris Summit and Trieste Summit statements 
demonstrates how contemporary events have shaped the EU’s enlargement agenda. This 
analysis shows how the relationship between event and actors shapes the way they interpret 
enlargement policy. While this section does not focus on the actors themselves, it shows how 
policy statements reflect the judgement of actors and the ways in which they have made 
sense of enlargement policy. This is consistent with the concept of structuration — the 
process of sensemaking where the relationship between actors and their environment shapes 
the way they construct understandings of an issue.  
The Final Declaration of the Vienna Summit in 2015 reaffirmed the Berlin Forum’s 
commitment the key areas of reform in rule of law and good governance.  In addition, the 
summit integrated new policy issues previously omitted from the enlargement agenda. These 
issues are not outlined as requirements for membership in the EU acquis but were 
nonetheless put onto the enlargement agenda. These issues were migration management 
and the fight against radicalisation (Chair of the Vienna Western Balkans Summit, 2015). 
Insights from Commission staff demonstrate how enlargement policy is increasingly shaped 
by the concerns of Member States through intergovernmental forums: 
So, with the migration crisis, there were the first [intergovernmental] meetings in 
October 2015, the Member States and Candidate Countries were on the same footing, 
so it means that there could be several paths to react to a specific crisis… I think the 
fact that the accession process puts the candidate country, Member States and 
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commission on the same track, also enables the stakeholders to find a solution on 
particular ad hoc issues when they pop up.7 
 
The insights of an interviewee present at the Vienna summit demonstrates how the Vienna 
Summit was conceptualised as a reactive forum for addressing emerging events and political 
concerns. It also demonstrates the role perceptions of crisis played in constructing a new 
enlargement agenda. The implications of this and the role crisis plays in constructing an 
imaginary of the Western Balkans region are analysed in detail in section 5.4. The key point 
to note here is how contemporary events feed into and shape the structuration of EU actors. 
This subsequently determines their prioritisation of a strategic logic for delivering EU reforms.  
5.2.2 The 2016 Paris Summit 
Following the Vienna Summit, the Paris Summit in July 2016 emphasised the importance of 
enhancing regional cooperation between Western Balkan countries. Further emphasis was 
placed on the contingent relationship between stability in the Western Balkans and security 
within the EU. Rule of law and good governance criteria were reaffirmed from earlier summits 
as the key accession issues to be addressed. Once more, the need to engage with the Western 
Balkans countries to help resolve the migration crisis and the need for them to respond to 
issues of radicalisation in the Western Balkans region were emphasised. Finally, the summit 
made a point of emphasising that the outcome of the UK’s referendum on EU membership 
should not undermine the European perspective of the Western Balkans participants (The 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The Paris Summit further demonstrated that 
enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans is shaped by a need to react to challenges 
facing the EU. Increasingly enlargement policy is used to address challenges facing the EU and 
                                                             
7 Interviewee A, DG NEAR, Brussels. Interview conducted 6 June 2016.  
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is no longer about only ensuring the implementation of the EU acquis in Candidate States. 
This shows how contemporary events shape EU actors’ formation of priorities, their 
understanding of what’s important in the region and the issues they prioritise during 
enlargement.  
The Berlin Process is designed to keep the enlargement process alive by facilitating 
engagement between Candidate States and those Member States supportive of further 
enlargement. The process is particularly important considering the increased scepticism 
towards the enlargement process by many Member States and growing Euroscepticism 
across Europe (Belloni, 2016). One key interlocutor confirmed that without the impetus of 
key Member States in the Berlin Forum to drive the enlargement agenda, the whole 
enlargement process could be unbound: 
[Concerning the Berlin Process] How else to push [enlargement] when the EU is in such 
a depressing situation? You cannot convince the Western Balkan politicians 
enlargement will happen tomorrow. Or to develop a new EU wide narrative on 
enlargement would not be audible these days. The best supporter, the UK in the fifth 
enlargement, doesn’t even talk about enlargement these days. So, this is the only 
pragmatic approach I could think of to hopefully move them a bit further.8 
 
The impact the Berlin Forum has had on setting the political agenda of enlargement is further 
demonstrated when the annual Western Balkan Summits are considered in the context of the 
Commission’s annual enlargement strategy reports. These reports do not only emphasise the 
‘objective’ accession criteria that is claimed to drive enlargement. The reports also emphasise 
the issues raised as political priorities at each Western Balkans Summit. An overview of the 
                                                             
8 Interview with former head of the Western Balkans Unit, DG NEAR. Interview conducted 10 June 2016. 
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2016 enlargement strategy alone demonstrates that alongside rule of law, fundamental rights 
and public administration reform, the ‘migration crisis’, regional cooperation and anti-
radicalisation efforts are mentioned in the strategy paper as priority issues (European 
Commission, 2016b, pp.1–8). These were all identified as significant political issues for the 
Member States at the Western Balkans Summit 2016. This demonstrates how actors’ 
perception of events and their attempts to respond to events through enlargement policy, 
prioritises a strategic logic. Furthermore, it also shows how EU actors’ understanding of 
events shapes their imaginary of the Western Balkans region. This determines the issues they 
prioritise when engaging with this region. 
5.2.3 The 2017 Trieste Summit 
The Trieste Summit carried forward the themes raised in the previous summits, while also 
emphasising an increased focus on regional interconnectivity. This summit committed 
Member States and Candidate States towards a new roadmap for regional economic 
integration and promised additional EU funding to support the further development of 
regional infrastructure (Farnesina, 2017). The initiative to establish a Regional Economic Area 
at the summit was welcomed by Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations (DGNEAR) Commissioner Johannes Hahn who described this move as ‘an 
important milestone on the path for EU accession’ (Ristić, 2017).  
As well as the new regional connectivity agenda, issues identified at previous summits were 
also reiterated. Rule of law was discussed, and a specific focus was placed on the fight against 
corruption. Other issues, such as the prevention of irregular migration, were readdressed. It 
was agreed that Candidate States should remain committed to safeguarding the EU’s external 
borders (Farnesina, 2017): 
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All the six partners in the Western Balkans clearly want to be more integrated in the 
EU, determined to have a future in our Union for all of them; once the right reforms 
are passed, we will be very consistent from our side. Secondly, many new practical 
projects were confirmed and a Transport Community Treaty was signed, opening new 
connections. So, practical steps and European perspective, a very successful summit 
(European Commission, 2017a)’ — Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
 In sum, the Trieste summit emphasised the importance of regional connectivity alongside 
themes established at previous summits. The outcome of this increased focus on regional 
economic cooperation was to strengthen the economic dimension of enlargement and ensure 
that Candidate States were better prepared to undertake free market reforms. This 
prioritisation of connectivity was constructed because EU actors perceived the Western 
Balkans as underdeveloped. It was further shaped by ongoing EU discussions about the future 
of the single market and a need to ensure that further enlargements did not undermine the 
efficiency of the single market (Gotev, 2017). This demonstrates how contemporary political 
debates within the EU and existing understandings shape the way EU actors formulate their 
external priorities.  
The Trieste summit emphasised and revisited the need for the accession process to consider 
economic factors, alongside established criteria including the rule of law. Four 
intergovernmental summits; the Berlin Forum, Vienna Summit, Paris Summit and Trieste 
Summit, have defined a new enlargement agenda. This agenda emphasises the importance 
of rule of law. It also emphasises key issues of interest to the EU and reflects these issues onto 
the enlargement agenda. The concept of structuration has been useful for understanding how 
institutions and events shape the understandings of EU actors, who in turn shape institutions 
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and events. The following section discusses how these understandings prioritise the 
application of a strategic logic for delivering accession reforms in Candidate States. This logic 
is strategic but socially constructed — actors prioritise certain interests based on their existing 
perceptions.  
5.2.4 The Strategic logic of enlargement policy 
The strategic logic outlined here differs notably from the strategic logic discussed in chapter 
2, which is associated with rational choice theories. The reflection of contemporary concerns 
and interests onto the enlargement process by key Member States demonstrates that 
enlargement is an iterative process. Preferences are not fixed and are shaped by the way in 
which actors understand the world around them. Preferences are thus constructed in 
adaptive political contexts and pre-existing objectives are mediated through forums of 
intergovernmental interaction.  
The following sections demonstrate the construction of political imaginaries in line with this 
strategic logic. These imaginaries of the Western Balkans are shaped by history, the context 
of contemporary events and the organisational experiences of EU actors. Section 5.3 also 
considers the role that power relations play in shaping the current enlargement agenda. It 
highlights the construction of a clear hierarchy between the EU and Western Balkans 
Candidate States. These sections further demonstrate how the prioritisation of a constructed 
strategic logic prioritises political interests, which may undermine the EU’s efforts to promote 
the rule of law. The prioritisation of these political interests stems from the EU’s imaginary of 
the region as one of persistent instability.  
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5.3 Explaining the new enlargement policy in comparative perspective 
This section outlines how experiences of previous enlargements have shaped the way the EU 
approaches contemporary enlargements. Pro-enlargement Member States now push 
enlargement in a more cautious manner. This is due to enlargement fatigue and the challenge 
new Member States have posed to the EU’s liberal project, once admitted into the EU. 
Examining contemporary enlargement policy in comparative perspective further 
demonstrates a clear strategic logic underpinning the enlargement process. Whilst the 
existing literature has been keen to emphasise the rational character of the enlargement 
process, it has tended to overlook the complex ways in which actors construct an 
understanding of enlargement policy or define their interests within this process (Vachudova, 
2005).   
5.3.1 The experience of the 2004 enlargement  
The 2004 enlargement was primarily driven by the economic interest of expanding the single 
market and by the political desire to complete the symbolic reunification of Europe. The fifth 
enlargement saw the rapid expansion of the single market into Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and proliferated the spread of transnational capital towards the periphery of Europe 
(Bieler, 2002; Bohle, 2006). The expansion of the single market into the CEE and the influx of 
cheap labour into the European labour market were undoubtedly seen as a positive 
development by EU national governments and business elites across Europe that favoured 
neoliberal economic policy. The eastern enlargement alone brought some 100 million new 
consumers into the single market and encouraged the migration of low-wage labour to shore 
up industry in the economies of the EU-15 (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003, p.50). In sum, there 
were clear material interests driving the Eastern enlargement. 
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However, there were also strong ideational motives behind the 2004 enlargement. A 
rhetorical commitment compelled the EU to complete the symbolic reunification of Europe 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). Liberal democracy was promoted during enlargement as a means of 
deepening the liberal internationalist order beyond Western Europe: 
I think the political circumstances were different. It was more about the symbolic 
reunification of Europe. That thinking prevailed. I think it was the right thing to do at 
that time.  Now, whether it could have been done differently, with different tools in a 
less political way, sure.9 
 
Immediately following the Eastern enlargement, many scholars begun emphasising the 
‘transformative power’ of enlargement on the CEE countries (Grabbe, 2005). In hindsight, the 
Eastern enlargement did not result in the complete transformation of the post-communist 
space into liberal democracies. Alternative political projects have been emboldened in recent 
years and challenges to the liberal democracy status quo have come from both the left and 
the right of the political spectrum. However, it is the emergence of right-wing populist 
projects in the CEE countries that have caused alarm among the EU Commission and EU-15. 
The election of Viktor Orban as Hungarian PM in 2010 directly challenged the hegemony of 
liberal politics that has come to define the EU. Orban’s government has promoted a form of 
illiberal democracy that is grounded in social conservativism and ethnic politics (Simonyi, 
2014, p.33). Despite vocal criticisms of Orban’s regime by the Commission and Member States, 
few disciplinary measures have been taken to prevent Hungary from establishing an illiberal 
political model within the EU. 
                                                             
9 Interviewee B, DG NEAR, Brussels. Interview conducted 6 June 2016. 
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The election of Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, the EU’s sixth biggest Member State and one 
of the early success stories of the post-communist region, has further influenced how the EU 
frames its enlargement policy: 
[in the 2003 enlargement report] Poland’s membership application in the area of rule 
of law, I mean there’s nothing!... I think what is happening in Hungary and Poland 
touches not so much on rule of law in the real sense, but the illiberal democracy as 
they say goes beyond rules.10 
 
Based on the developments in Hungary and Poland, previous enlargements have been re-
assessed and future enlargements reframed. Increasingly, actors feel that not enough effort 
was made to embed EU norms during the accession of the CEE countries and consequently, 
populist governments are now unpicking accession reforms ex post. There is a connection 
between way in which EU actors understand previous enlargements and construct their 
understanding of current enlargement policy. The shortcomings of previous enlargements are 
well understood in EU institutions. A reflection on previous enlargements shape actors’ 
understandings and prioritises a more cautious but direct enlargement approach. This 
demonstrates the structuration between previous experiences and contemporary policy.  
The experience of the 2004 enlargement and the subsequent developments in Hungary and 
Poland have resulted in the application of a more assertive and stringent approach to 
enlargement. The conditions necessary for joining the EU have increased, while the perceived 
benefits of membership are less tangible for Candidate States. This has reduced the credible 
prospect of any immediate accession for many countries in the Western Balkans. 
Consequently, the absence of an appetite for further immediate enlargement and the inability 
                                                             
10 Interview with former head of the Western Balkans Unit, DG NEAR. Interview conducted 10 June 2016. 
131 
  
of the current Candidate States to meet the EU’s stringent conditions, has resulted in the 
accession process entering an interim period. In this interim period, accession talks have been 
repurposed to address immediate political and economic concerns raised by the EU. The 
overall objective of the EU has been to ensure that any further enlargement does not pose a 
risk to the EU’s liberal democracy. It also aims to ensure that enlargement policy can be used 
reactively to address any immediate concerns of regional instability through the convening of 
intergovernmental forums.  
5.3.2 The Experience of the 2007 enlargement 
The experience of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession has also played a decisive role in 
convincing the EU to pursue a more cautious enlargement approach. Whereas concerns about 
the limits of the Eastern enlargement occurred much later, immediate doubts about the 
decision to admit Bulgaria and Romania were raised. Bulgaria and Romania’s accession were 
technically part of the fifth enlargement and as such, the two countries were exposed to the 
same assessment criteria as the 2004 enlargement countries. Both countries were deemed to 
have inadequately addressed issues of corruption during the accession processes and Bulgaria 
was also seen to have not adequately tackled organised crime. Despite these concerns pre-
accession, both countries were still admitted on the basis that they agreed to be subject to 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) — a post-accession conditionality tool to 
ensure that Bulgaria and Romania are only able to obtain EU funding and integration into 
Schengen if progress is made on key rule of law issues (Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012b, 
pp.55–56). Although the CVM is considered a successful conditionality mechanism, many 
within the EU now believe that the post-accession issues of rule of law and corruption should 
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have been addressed prior to enlargement. Therefore, the EU’s new approach was devised as 
a new policy approach to avoid similar post-accession issues in future enlargements: 
Since the cases of Croatia and Bulgaria and Romania the EU has put Chapters 23 and 24 
to the fore of negotiations as part of its “New Approach”.11 
 
The experience of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession also contributed to the formulation of an 
even more stringent form of accession conditionality for the current Western Balkans 
countries. 12  Chapter 23 concerning judicial reform, the fight against corruption and 
fundamental rights, must be addressed first and last during the accession process. Similarly, 
Chapter 24 on the enforcement of security and justice must be one of the first chapters 
opened and last ones closed during the accession process. As of 2013, Candidate States must 
develop a series of comprehensive action plans that are subject to EU Commission 
benchmarks and screening before the accession negotiations can begin. This procedural shift 
has also matched a political shift in the way the EU approaches enlargement.  The current 
accession process emphasises the thorough implementation of the EU’s formal criteria:  
Their [Candidate States] sovereignty and national pride should be taken into 
consideration, but it would be good to say let’s stop talking about them during 
enlargement. Nobody wants to repeat Bulgaria and Romania where political 
considerations prevailed over technical criteria.13 
                                                             
11 Interviewee A, EU Delegation to Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 6 March 2016 
12 Although Chapters 23 and 24 existed in the accession of Croatia, the new approach did not apply. As such it 
did not open Chapters 23 first and last because it began its accession negotiations in 2007. The new approach 
was devised in 2013. 
13 Interviewee with MEP, EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC), Brussels. 




The EU’s new approach is applied in consideration of previous enlargement experiences. 
Based on the experience of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the EU’s contemporary 
enlargement approach seeks to ensure that Candidate States undertake comprehensive 
reforms in the rule of law field. This approach is constructed to ensure that future 
enlargement does not undermine the EU’s liberal character or cause political discord.  
This section demonstrated how previous experiences and contemporary political concerns 
are organised into an understanding of EU enlargement, which prioritises a strategic logic. It 
has been shown that different interests and previous experiences intersect in a process of 
social construction. The structuration between events, context and actors outlined here has 
been shown to result in the construction of an approach that is perceived to address previous 
policy shortcomings. The EU’s interests are not purely rational because processes of social 
construction shape the formation of preferences within a distinctive historical and political 
context. In sum, the negative experience of previous enlargements, most notably the 2007 
enlargement, have informed a distinctly new approach to enlargement. An understanding of 
previous enlargements is necessary to explain why this shift in enlargement policy has 
occurred. The final section of this chapter will further demonstrate how enlargement policy 
is increasingly designed to address issues of crisis and risk that are interpreted as a challenge 
to both regional stability in the Western Balkans and the EU’s liberal democracy. The response 
to these perceived issues of risk is shown to manifest in a policy focus on stability related 
issues. Importantly, these ideas of instability stem from the way in which the EU constructs a 
political imaginary of the Western Balkans region.  
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5.4 Contemporary enlargement policy in practice 
The concept of stability and its power as a driver over enlargement policy arises from the way 
in which historical perceptions and contemporary concerns of instability are associated with 
the Western Balkans region by EU actors. Previous military conflicts, perceptions of economic 
underdevelopment and the belief that the region is ill prepared to tackle emerging global 
challenges shapes the formation of an imaginary of the region. This imaginary informs a view 
that the Western Balkans is a region of perpetual instability. Consequently, it justifies the EU’s 
application of a strategic logic to avoid instability in the EU’s back yard. The shaping of these 
imaginaries and application of a strategic logic demonstrates how EU action is shaped by the 
way in which actors make sense of previous experiences, contemporary events and perceived 
issues of risk.  
This focus on stability and risk mitigation can be mapped to three issues:  economic stability, 
geopolitical stability and border stability. Enlargement policy is increasingly used as a strategic 
instrument to address challenges in these areas. Consequently, enlargement policy is not only 
driven by the objective criteria outlined in the Commission’s monitoring and benchmark 
programmes, but also by the way in which EU actors understand and respond to perceptions 
of instability through enlargement policy. The purpose of this section is not to explore the 
three themes in depth. Rather, the purpose is to show how ideas of instability and risk frame 
the prospect of further enlargement. The first example demonstrates that the EU has pursued 
a more cautious and arm’s-length approach to enlargement in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. The second example illustrates how perceptions of geopolitical instability and 
insecurity in the Western Balkans determine engagement with the region. The third example 
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shows how an emerging global challenge, the migration crisis, can affect the way in which the 
EU understands and engages with the region. 
5.4.1 Enlargement in a changing political economy 
The EU’s enlargement strategy papers from 2003 to 2016 demonstrate a clear discursive shift 
from 2008 onward. Analysing these documents demonstrates the effect the financial crisis 
has had on the way the EU approaches enlargement. A concern for economic stability and the 
perception that further enlargements would involve taking on underdeveloped economies 
increasingly frames enlargement as a risk for EU actors. From 2008 onward, the need to 
consider enlargement in the context of Europe’s economic crisis was emphasised. This 
consideration resulted in the EU understanding its commitment to the Western Balkans 
region in the context of the economic crisis and the region’s prospective integration was 
evaluated in light of the crisis:  
The European Union’s current enlargement process takes place against the 
background of a deep and widespread recession. The crisis has affected both the EU 
and the enlargement countries (European Commission, 2009, p.2). 
 
In addition to the more cautious approach towards enlargement justified in the context of 
the financial crisis, the crisis has been used to justify a more stringent set of economic reforms 
in Candidate States: 
The recent global financial crisis and the present difficulties in the Eurozone have 
highlighted the interdependence of national economies both within and beyond the 
EU. These events underline the importance of further consolidating economic and 
financial stability and fostering growth, also in the enlargement countries. The 




The economic crisis has had three effects. First, enlargement is framed as a risk in its 
aftermath, resulting in a more cautious and pessimistic approach to enlargement. Second, an 
imaginary of the Western Balkans region has been shaped in this context. This means 
perceptions of the region are shaped by events beyond its borders through the structuration 
of events and actor sensemaking.  Third, it has resulted in the reconfiguration of relationships 
between actors. Collaboration between EU actors and various international financial 
institutions (IFIs) has increased. The empowerment of new actors and creation of new 
working relationship has resulted in enlargement policy taking a distinctly economistic 
direction. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the EU has increasingly collaborated with the 
IFI advisory group during the enlargement process (European Commission, 2013). These 
actors now play an increased role in monitoring the accession process through their own 
evaluations and their evaluations also feed back into the EU’s own evaluation reports. The 
ability of the IFI advisory group to impact enlargement evaluations has elevated the 
importance of reducing Serbia’s public debt and national deficit throughout its accession 
process.  
Specific interventions in Serbia demonstrate the increased role played by IFIs in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis. For example, the IMF has had an increasing role in shaping the reform 
process in Serbia through its Stand-By Arrangement. Whilst the involvement of IFIs was a key 
feature of previous enlargements, the coordination between their work and the EU has 
increased. Most significantly, the EU is prepared to adjust its expectations and accession 
requirements in response to the actions of IFIs like the IMF. In Serbia, the IMF has insisted 
that in exchange for loans, Serbia must reduce the ‘drain on public resources’ by state owned 
enterprises (IMF, 2016). This has had a significant impact on the extent and speed of Serbia’s 
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accession related public administration reforms. By insisting Serbia achieve ambitious public 
administration reforms whilst cutting public spending; the capacity of Serbia to enact 
significant public administration reform has been reduced. Consequently, the EU has 
provided additional funding through IPA programming to address public spending shortfalls. 
The EU has also encouraged private sector actors and NGOs fill to gap left by public service 
cuts.14  
Other institutions established to facilitate European integration such as the Regional 
Cooperation Council (RCC) have also played an increased role against the backdrop of the 
economic crisis (Regional Cooperation Council, 2016). Regional cooperation bodies are 
increasingly used to facilitate economic integration in the Western Balkans. These forums can 
be used to tackle a range of regional specific issues such as social inclusion, economic 
sustainability and state ownership. The EU sees these issues of increased importance because 
the prospect of integrating the Western Balkans when it constitutes an economic risk is 
undesirable. While the region is economically underdeveloped, a broader understanding of 
economic instability shapes the way in which actors understand and engage with Serbia and 
the other countries in the region.  Further regional integration is perceived as necessary to 
improve the economic outlook of the region before European integration is once again 
feasible. EU actors understand that enlargement can be used as a strategic opportunity to 
avoid further economic crisis. This is based on a perception that Candidate States with 
liberalised markets, high employment rates and budget surpluses will not pose a future risk 
when accession occurs:  
                                                             
14 As one interviewee from the UNDP stated, in this context, the EU has increased its support to NGOs that act 
almost like service delivery bodies rather than civil society organisations responsive to the needs of citizens. 
Interview conducted in Belgrade, 11 April 2016. 
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Doing more on the economic front. A bit like Ukraine in that sense…at some point those 
enlargement countries are a risk due to unemployment etc. in their countries and if on 
the EU side there is a risk of taking them to quickly, that [expansion of the CEFTA free 
trade area] could be a way out on the economic and social front. Otherwise, one thing 
is sure, we cannot continue just like that. It’s impossible. Unemployment is too high.15 
 
In summary, the idea of economic risk has justified the need to ensure Candidate States enact 
economic reforms that reinforce economic stability. Despite the rhetoric of the EU’s new 
approach, rule of law reform is not the single most important driver of the accession process 
or even the most significant driver at any one time. A constructed imaginary of the Western 
Balkans region around the issue of economic instability and risk has, since 2008, increasingly 
shaped what Serbia’s accession process looks like. In response to this imaginary of risk and 
instability, IFIs have played an increased role in prioritising austerity policies alongside public 
administration reforms. The logic that the expansion of the single market would produce self-
equilibrium has been replaced with the view that future Member States must be engineered 
to avoid undermining the EU’s internal market. This consideration is a key factor currently 
driving the strategic logic of enlargement. 
5.4.2 The Western Balkans and the Perception of Persistent Instability 
The second example shows how geopolitical perceptions of risk inform an imaginary of the 
Western Balkans region and drive enlargement policy towards it. As discussed in chapter 4, a 
focus on regional stability has always in-part driven the EU’s approach towards the Western 
Balkans. However, increased emphasis has been placed on other security issues in recent 
years. Most notably, the Berlin Forum has placed increased emphasis on the risk of religious 
                                                             
15 Interview with former head of the Western Balkans Unit, DG NEAR. Interview conducted 8 June 2016. 
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radicalisation in the region. The frequency with which the need for regional stability is evoked 
in enlargement reports is evident given its presence in every single enlargement strategy and 
country specific enlargement report for the region since 2003. Often the EU’s concern for 
regional stability is invoked in tandem with the need to institutionalise post-reconciliation 
processes and democratic state-building: 
The Western Balkans are today confronting a number of testing issues which could 
affect security, stability and prosperity in the region. Reform and reconciliation have 
yet to become entrenched. In much of the Western Balkans, state-building, 
consolidation of institutions as well as better governance constitute priority concern 
(European Commission, 2008, p.3). 
 
The narrative of regional stability is however increasingly linked to a wide array of security 
issues and threats. As such, the discourse of enlargement often constructs the image that 
insecurity is a perpetual feature of the region. In challenging this perception, it can be argued 
that the relevance of regional stability constitutes a discursive usage, designed to legitimise 
different types of intervention and policy priorities. By frequently choosing to invoke regional 
stability as a legitimate reason for justifying intervention, the EU uses enlargement policy to 
tackle security issues that pose a threat to the EU, which are not necessarily endogenous to 
the Western Balkans. This is visible when considering developments in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. Whilst conflict in the Middle East may not be a priority issues for the 
government in Belgrade, it is an issue of paramount concern for the EU. Based on reasoning 
in relation to events, EU actors conclude that unless liberal democracy is thoroughly 
entrenched in the Western Balkans, the type of instability seen in its distant neighbourhood 
could spread across South East Europe: 
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Through the enlargement policy, the EU extends its zone of peace, stability, democracy, 
and prosperity; concepts that have gained renewed relevance, in the light of recent 
developments: The dramatic events in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, as well as the fragility of the ensuing situations, underline the importance of a 
pole of stability and democracy in South-East Europe, solidly anchored in the EU’s 
enlargement process. (European Commission, 2011, p.2). 
 
Enlargement policy has allowed perceived security issues to be addressed on an ad-hoc basis. 
All three Western Balkan Summits since 2014 have highlighted the issue of radicalisation as a 
security issue. The integration of anti-radicalisation programmes into its enlargement agenda 
correspond with the EU’s attempts to address the issue within the EU. Perceptions of 
insecurity have a powerful framing effect. Consequently, the EU tends to push security issues 
through its enlargement policy and actors tend to frame enlargement in security terms:  
Looking at enlargement, because of Moscow’s attitude with Serbia and Republika 
Srpska. Turkey as well in Bosnia. Radical Islam as well in places like Kosovo and Bosnia, 
well these issues are why Merkel organised this Berlin Forum. Understanding it was a 
time to look a bit more closely at the Western Balkans. We don’t need another 
instability region. We have enough with neighbourhood. 16 
 
 If we neglect this region it can at any time endanger the whole situation in Europe. 17 
 
The issue of Kosovo typifies how perceived security risks drive state-building in the region and 
how perceptions of instability shape EU imaginaries of the region.  Key Member States 
continue to emphasise the importance of dialogue between the authorities in Belgrade and 
Pristina. The need for normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo may be pushed 
                                                             
16 Interview with former head of the Western Balkans Unit, DG NEAR. Interview conducted 09 June 2016. 
17 Interviewee with MEP, EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC), Brussels. 
Interview conducted 14 June 2016.    
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for normative reasons and the feeling among key Member States that they failed to do 
enough to address the conflict that ravaged the country in 1999. However, as one interviewee 
from the EU delegation in Serbia stated: 
Germany made the main priority Kosovo. This was not meant to have a role in the 
accession process, but it is now the number one condition.18 
 
The need to prevent conflict between the two governments may also be perceived as a 
necessary requirement to prevent armed conflict in a region that is prone to a flare up in 
tensions. For example, the riots that erupted in 2004 further exacerbated ethnic divisions 
within Kosovo. This aided the call from then Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica that 
Serbian enclaves should be given autonomy within Kosovo and once again pushed the issue 
of geopolitical instability to the fore of the EU’s engagement with the region (BBC, 2004). 
Whilst one interviewee from the OSCE stated that the region now remained ‘largely pacified’, 
it remains difficult to predict whether conflict may once more erupt in the region. 19  
Provocations of the type enacted by the Serbian government in January 2017 when it tried to 
send a ‘nationalist train’ over the border into to Kosovo, ensure that the region remains a 
perceived source of instability in the EU’s backyard (BBC, 2017). 
The continued perception of instability has driven how key actors approach the region. 
Domestic actors are argued to play up perceptions of regional instability when it is seemingly 
politically useful to do so. While regional stability can be enhanced through the solving of 
contentious security issues alongside rule of law reform, this requires both being promoted 
in tandem. It is unclear to what extent this is the case in Serbia or whether these security 
                                                             
18 Interviewee A, EU Delegation in Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 7 March 2016. 




concerns are considered separately as a driver of accession. The existing evidence suggests 
that in Serbia’s case, geopolitical considerations and security threats divert attention away 
from substantive reforms that are focussed on enacting normative change in key policy areas, 
such as the rule of law (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015, pp.1038–1039).  
In sum, an imaginary of the Western Balkans as a region of persistent geopolitical risk and 
insecurity acts as an important driver of enlargement policy. The continued perception of the 
Western Balkans as a zone of perpetual insecurity, has only been heightened by internal 
conditions within the EU, and the growing number of external threats the EU perceives in its 
neighbourhood. As with the previous example, the consequence of this is that a focus on the 
rule of law is often neglected in favour of strategic considerations that resonate with 
constructed imaginaries of the region. Accession related reforms tend to be driven by the 
EU’s perceptions of security and less by the rule of law needs of Candidate States. 
5.4.3 The migration crisis and border security: an example of an emergent security issue 
The migration crisis 20 and its impact on perceptions of border security and stability provides 
a third example of how contemporary challenges and perceptions of risk drive the 
enlargement process. The Western Balkan Summits have emphasised the need for the 
Western Balkan countries to play an active role in managing migration and to prevent further 
irregular migration into the EU. It has been emphasised that the countries of the Western 
Balkans need ‘to fully assume their responsibilities in the field of migration, asylum and border 
management with a view to their European perspective’ (Chair of the Vienna Western Balkans 
Summit, 2015). The 2015 Western Balkans Summit in Vienna coincided with the second 
                                                             
20 Whilst the crisis in South East Europe has been recognised by some organisations as a refugee crisis, the 
term migrant crisis is used here because most interviewees understood the crisis to be a migration crisis.  
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implementation package of the European Agenda on Migration. The European Agenda on 
Migration had a distinct impact on the integration prospects of the Western Balkans 
Candidate States by emphasising the role Candidate States should play in securing the EU’s 
own borders (European Commission, 2015h).  
Because the EU lacked a single coherent external policy on migration that could deal with the 
crisis, it attempted to manage the crisis through existing policy tools, one of which was 
enlargement policy. This proved pragmatic because it provided existing mechanisms to 
support the countries of the Western Balkans to manage migration, through the distribution 
of financial support. The use of enlargement policy in this manner demonstrates that the EU’s 
regional engagement is not a policy only driven by the need for Candidate States to 
sufficiently internalise the rule of law. It is also a driven by Member States’ understandings of 
contemporary events. The perceived risk migration posed to the EU’s internal character and 
security shaped its understanding of the Western Balkans countries. It did so because these 
countries were increasingly viewed as important actors who could help solve the migration 
crisis. Consequently, the EU’s strategic logic was modified to ensure that the countries of the 
region would act as key partners in preventing further migration into the EU. 
Because of these perceptions of instability caused by the migration crisis, cooperation on 
migration has become an additional issue on the enlargement agenda. As an example, in its 
2016 Enlargement strategy, the EU placed addressing the issue of irregular migration to the 
front of its report. Much of its comments on the migration crisis praised the Candidate States 
for collaborating with the EU ‘to effectively close the Western Balkans route’ (European 
Commission, 2016b, p.4). The report further praised the impact collaboration between 
Member States and Candidate States has had on reducing ‘migratory pressures on the Union’ 
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(Ibid, p.4). Intertwining the process of accession with action on migration pragmatically 
utilised existing mechanisms of cooperation between Member States and Candidate States.  
Candidate States are rewarded financially for managing migration through the disbursement 
of additional IPA funding (European Commission, 2015i). Candidate States are also rewarded 
politically through the unlocking of accession chapters for negotiation that might otherwise 
remain locked. In sum, by adding the migration crisis onto the enlargement agenda, accession 
has become less contingent on fundamental reforms and more contingent on the capacity of 
countries to reinforce the stability of the EU’s border regime. It demonstrates how 
perceptions of instability shape the way in which the EU constructs an understanding of the 
accession process and the role it ascribes to the countries of the Western Balkans region 
during this process. 
Often responses to the management of migration, such as the rapid processing of asylum 
claims, undermine the formal requirements outlined in the EU acquis. For example, Chapter 
24 asserts that Candidate States must build robust asylum systems in line with international 
law. These standards have been substantially eroded in the context of the migration crisis. 
Similarly, the fundamental rights criteria Candidate States should support through alignment 
with Chapter 23 cannot be supported in tandem with adhering to the EU’s border policy. This 
demonstrates the contradictory outcomes sought by the EU. This new focus on reinforcing 
the EU’s external border is particularly problematic in the context of Western Balkans as 
countries like Serbia do not have the capacity to adequately process asylum applications. As 
one interviewee from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) UNHCR 
stated in contradiction to the EU’s recommendation: 
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Serbia does not have a fair and functional asylum system. UNHCR has issued its 
position paper not being a safe country of asylum from 2012 and this remains valid.21 
 
Despite vocal opposition to the EU’s approach by some international organisations, the 
message communicated by the Member States to Candidate States is that further integration 
can be offered in exchange for securing the EU’s external borders. To this extent, the 
instrumental and strategic use of enlargement policy may produce policy contradictions and 
disseminate a contradictory message to Candidate States. As one interviewee in the Serbian 
Interior Ministry emphasised concerning the EU’s attempt to promote human rights: ‘It 
becomes difficult to take human rights seriously in the face of EU double standards. Look at 
the migration crisis’.22 
There exists a clear tension between the imaginaries of instability prioritised by Member 
States and the promotion of rule of law standards. Incorporating the migration crisis into the 
enlargement agenda rewards Candidate States with further integration for assistance in 
managing the migration crisis. This makes accession informally contingent on the extent to 
which Candidate States cooperate with Member States to prevent irregular migration. It also 
shows how contemporary political events and crises shape the way in which the EU 
understands the region. The occurrence of refugee movement through the region reinforced 
existing perceptions that the region was unstable and posed a threat to the EU’s own stability. 
This shows how the EU’s interpretation of events shapes its understandings through the 
sensemaking process of structuration, and how this shapes its engagement with the Western 
Balkans region. It shows that while the EU’s new approach aims to make rule of law the driver 
                                                             
21 Interviewee A, UNHCR, Belgrade. Interview conducted 1 March 2016. 
22 Interview conducted with a senior official for Cooperation and Border Management, Ministry of Interior, 
Belgrade. Interview conducted 10 May 2016. 
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of enlargement, ultimately the interpretation of other concerns, namely the stability of the 
EU and its neighbourhood, drives enlargement policy.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that a socially constructed strategic logic drives the EU’s approach 
to enlargement. In doing so, it demonstrated how key actors within the EU are increasingly 
concerned with using enlargement as an instrument, to address issues of perceived risk and 
uncertainty facing contemporary European integration. This more cautious approach to 
enlargement considers issues of security and stability to be paramount to the enlargement 
process. This enlargement perspective is further reinforced by the experiences of the 2004 
and 2007 enlargements, in which the failure to pursue a more cautious and rigorous approach 
to key enlargement related reforms resulted in unexpected post-accession outcomes in some 
new Member States. The final section demonstrated that enlargement is increasingly shaped 
by a need to address key issues of risk and uncertainty that are seen to exacerbate problems 
within the EU.   
In terms of imaginaries, this strategic logic is underpinned by an imaginary of the Western 
Balkans region as an inherently unstable entity. The construction of imaginaries occurred 
through a process of structuration — actors constructed understandings in relation to their 
interpretation of contemporary events and retrospective interpretations. The focus on this 
mode of sensemaking at the policy formation stage helped demonstrate the role that 
interpretation plays in shaping policy understandings.  
The contribution of this chapter has been to show how formal policy objectives do not 
necessarily drive EU external action. Instead, constructed interpretations of the Western 
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Balkans region and political events lead to the prioritisation of policies focussed on stability 
and risk reduction.  This means the region’s rule of law needs are surpassed by those of EU 
actors. Rule of law may help meet the priorities of EU actors, but other policies are promoted 
to address issues of risk and instability. These policies may not necessarily support the rule of 
law and may detract from the EU’s focus on rule of law reforms in Serbia and other Candidate 
States. There is a clear tension between transformation and stasis in the EU’s approach. This 
stems from its understanding of stability and the need to work with regional elites to support 
stability. The following chapters will build further on the findings of this chapter and 
demonstrate how the tension between transformation and stasis inherent within the 








Chapter 6: Socialisation and its role in shaping understandings and action 
Introduction 
This chapter establishes the role that socialisation plays in shaping the delivery of rule of law 
reforms in Serbia. This focus on socialisation corresponds with the structuration mode of 
sensemaking as it is concerned with how policy network interaction — a type of social 
structure — shapes interpretation.  While the previous chapter looked at how events and 
institutions shape the construction of understandings, this chapter focuses on how relations 
between actors shape understandings and subsequently, the delivery of rule of law reforms. 
 In addition to addressing the second sub-research question and by extension, the first 
research question, three chapter-specific questions drive this chapter’s analysis. First, how do 
we conceptualise different modes of socialisation? Second, how do actors respond to 
different socialisation mechanisms? Third, which socialisation modes and corresponding 
mechanisms are dominant and what are the implications? Guided by these questions, this 
chapter conceptually and empirically explores the role socialisation plays in the case of 
Serbia’s rule of law reform process. 
The EU states that rule of law reforms should not just follow a procedural model. They should 
also ensure that enlargement countries ‘embrace the necessary reforms’ and make it their 
political agenda (European Commission, 2016b, p.2). Such statements by the Commission 
suggest the need for a deep change in the beliefs and practices of actors in Candidate States. 
This is particularly important in the priority policy fields related to rule of law reform. This 
chapter suggests, however, that despite these aims, a strategic form of procedural 
socialisation is still characteristic of the EU’s engagement with domestic actors in Serbia. This 
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fails to achieve widespread or substantive socialisation that may foster a change in 
understanding and subsequently practice.  
The chapter begins by outlining four modes of socialisation that fall along a continuum: ‘deep 
socialisation’, ‘substantive intergovernmental socialisation’, ‘procedural intergovernmental 
socialisation’ and ‘instrumental NGO socialisation’. Each mode of socialisation is broken down 
into its range of actors, transmission mechanisms, content of interaction, outcomes and 
corresponding political project. Conceptually defining different modes of socialisation allows 
this chapter to construct a typology of socialisation and assess the prevalence of different 
socialisation modes in the analysed policy network.  
Second, the different actors active in the examined network are outlined. The examined 
policy network incorporates actors taking part in the reform process concerning Serbia’s 
alignment with Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis. The transgovernmental policy network 
that forms around these reform topics constitutes the key site of actor socialisation. The EU 
delegation in Serbia is identified as a key focal point in the network around which socialisation 
occurs. This demonstrates the power of the EU to drive the reform process.  
Third, the scope for substantive intergovernmental socialisation is assessed. This mode of 
socialisation is characterised by epistemic linkage and communicative interaction between 
external actors, who are mostly international organisations and external state actors,23 and 
domestic actors, who are mostly governmental actors. This chapter shows the limited 
application of this mode and prevalence of a socially constructed strategic logic in processes 
                                                             
23 These actors are also interchangeably referred to as bilateral actors, because of the bilateral relationships 
they form with the Serbian government.  
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of socialisation, which means the substantive intergovernmental socialisation mode finds 
limited applicability.  
Building on this, it is shown that strategic calculation is a dominant transmission mechanism 
between external actors and governmental actors to support a procedural intergovernmental 
form of socialisation. This is demonstrated by analysing the content and outcomes of 
interaction between external and governmental actors.  
Finally, the role played by civil society in the policy network is explored. A mode of 
instrumental NGO socialisation best corresponds with how NGOs socialise in the network. 
The prevalence of strategic calculation as a dominant transmission mechanism again points 
to a process of procedural socialisation. The instrumental involvement of NGOs fails to 
facilitate a convergence in perspective between different actors.  This chapter concludes by 
reflecting on how the key actors involved in promoting rule of law reforms are external actors 
and governmental actors. Consequently, governmental actors do adopt some change in 
understanding which aligns with external actors. This change is limited however and enacted 
for reasons of perceived interest.  
6.1 Towards a typology of socialisation  
Figure 6.1 demonstrates four proposed modes of socialisation located upon a continuum of 
socialisation. Each mode has a corresponding range of actors, corresponding mechanisms, 
content of interaction, outcomes and a corresponding political project. The dimensions 
outlined in figure 6.1 will be used to help discern how different actors engage in the network 
and the continuum of socialisation that interactions reflect. It will further be elaborated on 






Figure 6.1: Different modes of socialisation located along a continuum of socialisation. The continuum ranges 
from norm driven modes of socialisation to instrumental modes of socialisation. Source: Author generated. 
 
These modes of socialisation are not mutually exclusive. Locating different modes upon a 
continuum avoids the pitfalls of bracketing off different transmission mechanisms exclusively 
with one mode of socialisation. This can allow the interplay between different mechanisms 
to be explored and the outcomes of this interplay to be analysed. At the same time, proposing 
distinct modes of socialisation can help further identify, differentiate and analyse the 
dominant form socialisation takes within the network.  
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6.1.1 Defining mechanisms  
The following section briefly specifies three mechanisms of socialisation that can be deployed 
to change the understanding of actors. ‘Communication’ can be defined as an extensive 
process of dialogue between one or more actors. Actors engage in argumentation and can 
persuade others to adopt specific practice (Checkel, 2005, p.812). Communication occurs in 
instances of structured dialogue between actors but also informally. For example, meetings 
between external actors and domestic actors can provide an opportunity for external actors 
to employ argumentation and persuasion to ensure domestic actors reform their 
understandings and subsequently, practice. 
Epistemic linkages are the connections made between various actors through shared 
membership of organisations or shared expertise. Epistemic communities share knowledge 
and produce ‘best practice’ as a standard of expected behaviour. For example, international 
organisations (IOs) run training programmes to socialise domestic actors into new forms of 
practice. This mechanism conceptually builds on Checkel’s notion of ‘role playing’ but 
broadens the definition to focus on practical change (Ibid, pp.810-811). This practical change 
means actors do not only conform to a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Actors are also socialised 
into new practices because they make sense of reforms in relation to existing practice and 
adopt new practices that are perceived to be beneficial and conducive to self-betterment.  
Strategic calculation primarily refers to a form socialisation that orientates around perceived 
interests. For example, external donors provide money to domestic actors and in exchange, 
domestic actors ensure reforms focus on certain issues. Strategic calculation also 
encompasses the use of rhetorical action to communicate negative consequences and ’shame’ 
target actors (Ibid, pp.808-809). For example, the EU conditionality process communicates 
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that if reform compliance is not forthcoming, EU funds will cease. Rhetorical shaming can also 
make use of normative legitimacy to ensure compliance. For example, rhetorical arguments 
may be used to show that Serbia’s none-compliance with EU norms and standards 
circumvents regionally legitimised rule of law standards. 
The presence of these transmission mechanisms alone does not guarantee certain outcomes. 
For example, deep socialisation and substantive intergovernmental socialisation share two 
transmission mechanisms. However, deep socialisation requires the involvement of all actors 
and involves significant engagement between actors that results in practical change. The 
limited presence of these two dynamics in the studied network means this mode is not widely 
applicable.  
6.2 The formation of a network around the EU 
Prior to an examination of network socialisation, the network itself must be identified. It is 
crucial to consider the role of the EU as a focal point in the network. Many of the actors 
subsequently analysed are central to processes of socialisation due to their relationship with 
the EU. Figure 6.2 visualises the constellation of actors that form the policy network 
implementing rule of law reforms in Serbia. Figure 6.2 details the node degree of each actor 
in the network. Node degree demonstrates which actors have the highest number of 
connections in the network. Darker nodes have a higher node degree. The higher a node 
degree, the more relations (both inward and outward) a node has.24 The darkest node visible 
in figure 6.2 represents the EU Delegation. The high number of connections between other 
                                                             
24 In relations are a form of relationship where another network actor identifies a selected actor as significant. Out relations 
are a form of relationship in which the selected actor identifies another actor as significant. The network visualised in Figure 
6.2 includes both types of tie as it was important to ascertain whether relationships were seen to be mutually important or 
whether actors differed in their interpretations of how valuable a network relationship was.  
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actors and the EU Delegation in Serbia is to be expected because the EU delegation monitors 
EU related reforms in Serbia and acts as the EU’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground.  
Figure 6.3 visualises the EU Delegation’s ‘ego’ network.25 Many of the actors identified here 
have the capacity to shape and influence the rule of law reform process. The EU Delegation’s 
ego network acted as an entry point for actors to engage in processes of socialisation. Figure 
6.3 is significant because many of the visible actors are key network actors and will be 
frequently referenced in the subsequent sections.
                                                             
25 An ego network is the actor network of a specific actor that is embedded within a larger set of network relations. 
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The actors present in the EU Delegation’s ego network are primarily a mix of key domestic 
institutions that are the target of reform and other external actors. Among the other 
international organisations located in the EU’s ego network, the Council of Europe (CoE) and 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were the most significant 
external actors enacting complementary reforms to the EU. These actors and other external 
state actors were particularly significant in the examined network and could influence the 
network due to their extensive ties with the EU delegation. The delegation in this sense acted 
as an entry point for other actors to access accession related reforms and achieve their 
perceived objectives through the network. Overall, the network was considered to have three 
key fissures composed of different actors. First, external actors, including international 
organisations and external state actors, were close to the EU and central to the process. 
Second, domestic institutions tended to interact more extensively with one another and were 
guided by domestic institutional logics. Third, IOs, external state actors and governmental 
actors treated NGOs instrumentally. These three fissures will be explored subsequently and 
analysed along the conceptual dimensions of socialisation outlined in figure 6.1. Figure 6.4 
visualises the network with actor type coded for reference.

















Figure 6.4. Network by attribute. Light blue= international organisation, orange = bilateral mission from external state actors, green= domestic government institution, pink = professionalised civil society including NGOs and 
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6.3 The limited scope of deep socialisation 
The first mode of socialisation to consider is deep socialisation. Deep socialisation was limited 
to a select few actors. These actors reported a fundamental change in their beliefs due to 
socialisation with other actors. Many of these actors were also NGOs. Given the orientation 
of these prominent NGOs as pro-European, it seems unsurprising that they were open to deep 
socialisation and further integration into epistemic communities. The organisational studies 
literature highlights how existing pre-dispositions, the perceived positive and negative 
consequences of enacting change, and ideological beliefs, all contribute to how actors 
respond to socialisation and change (Erwin & Garman, 2010, pp.43–47; Lamm & Gordon, 2010, 
pp.433–434; Williams, 2001, p.69). Based on this literature, it can be suggested that actors 
who are already predisposed to a belief that European integration and the rule of law are 
good, are likely to be included in modes of deep socialisation.  
The distinguishing characteristic of the deep socialisation mode is the presence of all actor 
types in instances of socialisation. However, the involvement of all actors in processes of 
communication and epistemic linkage did not occur. Whilst the Serbian government has 
attempted to introduce new forums that include NGOs in the same dialogue processes as 
governmental actors, international organisations and external state actors, these were often 
perceived negatively by those who participated. As these negative responses are outlined in 
section 6.6, this section only outlines the positive experiences.  
One domestic actor did suggest that the domestic ‘konvents’ could act as a key site where 
deep socialisation could occur (EU Konvent, 2014). Their perspective was difficult to 
triangulate with other responses that supported their claims about the konvents’ capacity to 
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facilitate change. Consequently, the evidence for deep socialisation in comparison to other 
modes of socialisation is lacking: 
I think we have more than 100 [groups] dealing with Chapter 23 and we have 
extremely fruitful cooperation with them because every three or four months we have 
meetings with representatives of national konvents. We use this to discuss all relevant 
issues that are important for implementation of the action plans. For example, when 
the Ministry of Justice was working on the strategy for war crimes proceeding we 
received comments from civil society and we included more than 80 per cent of 
suggestions from civil society…Our intention is to continue that practice with regular 
meetings and public calls.26 
 
Two interviewees countered praise for the konvents by arguing that they had a limited impact 
in promoting authentic socialisation. One interviewee from the EU Delegation reflected on 
the konvents scope and conceded that they were not fully inclusive and tended to empower 
key NGOs at the expense of other non-professionalised civil society actors. This interviewee 
also raised the curious point that despite often disagreeing, these konvent actors often 
interacted extensively. This suggests that social contact alone cannot be indicative of a 
convergence in understandings or conducive to constructing new understandings. Existing 
predispositions appear to remain extremely influential in determining the type of dialogue 
and linkage that occurs during socialisation: 
The main power lies with NGOs involved in the feedback and consultation process for the 
working groups and each chapter. These NGOs have huge say and often close links with 
the political elite, at least in terms of their contacts, even if they don’t agree on issues. 
These NGOs provide feedback and help draft the chapter action plans. 27 
 
                                                             
26 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Justice, Belgrade. Interview conducted 20 April 2016. 
27 Interviewee B, EU Delegation to Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 6 March 2016. 
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The EU Delegation was also keen to stress that civil society actors were sometimes 
deliberately prevented by government actors from engaging fully in the conversations around 
rule of law reforms. However, civil society could mobilise externally to government networks 
and raise the public profile of political battles and change policy: 
Civil society continues to do its job but it is often blocked by the administration. For 
example, the new gender equality law had lots of issues with its name, politicians didn’t 
want to call it a gender equality law. Women organisations raise their voice and halted 
the process and now the law must be revisited. 28 
 
The capacity of network socialisation to induce a deep change in understanding would appear 
to be limited by the absence of interactions aimed at facilitating deep socialisation. This is 
particularly problematic given senior staff at DG NEAR recognised that European integration 
required a high degree of social cohesion among all actors and a sincere commitment to 
enacting fundamental change to be truly transformative: 
You cannot have the government pulling in one way and the opposition completely 
against [on rule of law reforms] so you need to have a critical mass of political and 
social actors that are pulling towards the same direction.29 
 
Some NGO groups expressed the belief that they were included in inclusive processes of 
communication and knowledge sharing. However, the instances in which this occurred were 
limited and NGOs felt it was extremely difficult to systematically change the practice of 
domestic actors through dialogue. Among NGO actors interviewed, one interviewee did give 
an example of interaction with the government that did produce positive change. In this case, 
NGOs could use persuasion to elicit change. Persuasive argumentation could only take place 
                                                             
28 Ibid. 
29 Interviewee A, DG NEAR, Brussels. Interview conducted 6 June 2016. 
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under the right conditions and through the careful construction of a dialogue processes 
between government and NGOs: 
We made a conscious effort not to be critical of them when we started meeting these 
people… After establishing that they started working with us and implementing things 
we suggested, they changed their understanding of certain problems in their 
organisational scheme because we showed them the statistical data they had never 
seen before.30  
 
However, due to the hierarchical nature of government institutions and the formation of 
political activity around elite political interests as opposed to public interests, the same 
interviewee was sceptical about the capacity of this one instance to be replicated in the future 
due to the structure of domestic politics: 
I think the entire political sector in Serbia isn’t formed around public interest, it never 
has been. The government will deal with issues in a PR crisis. They will manipulate 
everything in their power like the media to show that they care, but they don’t care.31  
 
In sum, deep socialisation was reflected in only a select few instances by actors during 
network interaction around rule of law reforms. The instances of deep socialisation that 
occurred were not reflected among a wider range of actors in multiple instances of interaction. 
Consequently, whilst some individuals may have felt they had experienced deep socialisation 
that resulted in a change in understanding, many interviewees did not report system wide 
instances of deep socialisation. This suggests that other modes of socialisation are more 
prevalent in the network. 
 
                                                             
30 Interview with a journalist from the Centre for Investigative Journalism (CINS), Belgrade. Interview 




6.4 Instances of substantive intergovernmental socialisation 
The limited presence of deep socialisation is partly a consequence of limited epistemic linkage 
between network actors. However, epistemic linkage between international organisations 
(IOs) was a significant network feature. IOs did significantly engage with one another in 
transnational epistemic communities and did attempt to integrate domestic actors into 
transnational epistemic communities. The results of these attempts are, however, mixed. 
 IOs tended to share common political objectives and deployed the full range of transmission 
mechanisms to achieve these political objectives. The political objectives of IOs converged 
due to their functional similarities and shared membership. This is particularly the case with 
the EU, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe 
(CoE). A large majority of CoE and OSCE member states are also Member States of the EU. As 
such, the organisational norms underpinning these institutions are similar and promote a 
liberal internationalist vision of global politics (Panke et al., 2017, pp.105–106). This is 
reflected in the work these organisations carry out in countries like Serbia. For example, the 
promotion of human rights, rule of law and minority inclusion.  These issues are intrinsically 
linked with liberal democracy. 
The common membership of IOs resulted in significant epistemic linkage between IOs. IOs 
collaborate extensively on the programming of ‘liberal’ reforms and this resulted in extensive 
social learning and interaction between epistemic communities within these IOs (Adler & 
Haas, 1992; Faleg, 2017; Galbreath & McEvoy, 2013; Wenger, 1998). Interview data shows 
that experts from one organisation may have had experience working in another organisation 
or would have contacts at another IO. This is evident when a specific reform issue outlined in 
Chapter 23 is examined. Based on input from the CoE, the EU has sought to produce a more 
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uniform approach to the fight against corruption that applies across Member States and 
Candidate States. The EU’s new anti-corruption standards further align with the common 
norms outlined in the UN convention against Corruption and the OECD’s Anti-Bribery 
Convention (European Commission, 2016c). These norms and standards are well 
communicated in some cases when IOs interact with domestic institutions in Serbia. The 
Serbian government’s anti-corruption agency gave one example of how they fit into this 
network of anti-corruption practitioners through epistemic linkage and how they have come 
to see the value in integrating professional experience and education into practice:   
The agency and myself are part of the ACN OECD network. I participated in the advisory 
group in the drafting of the prevention of corruption advisory group for SEE. These are 
platform for exchange of information and professional experience and best practice. 
You know, mechanisms that work in practice and show some results.32 
 
In other cases, however, the linkage between external actors and domestic institutions was 
weaker. The extent to which epistemic linkage occurred appeared to be highly dependent 
upon how new knowledge and new forms of practice were communicated to domestic actors. 
This suggests the importance of communication alongside epistemic linkage. An interviewee 
working in the judiciary articulated how attempts to disseminate new forms of knowledge 
and practice failed in the absence of effective communication: 
When you mention Chapters 23 and 24, my colleagues have heard about it but they 
don’t know what’s in it. There was no proper education on EU membership in terms of 
what it is, what we would gain and what we would lose from membership and what 
the judges role is in the process. We are not an isolated case.33 
 
                                                             
32 Interview with official from the Serbian Anti-corruption Agency, Belgrade. Interview conducted 2 March 
2016.   
33 Interview with a judge, Serbian Supreme Court of Cassation, Belgrade. Interview conducted 6 April 2016. 
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 The mixed experience of domestic actors suggests that an epistemic linkage mechanism is 
applied with varying success in the network. The discussion in section 6.4 and analyses 
presented in chapters 7 and 8, highlight the continued resistance of domestic actors to new 
sources of knowledge and subsequently, new understandings. This resistance demonstrates 
that substantial epistemic linkage across a range of actors is low. Whilst a form of linkage 
between different external and internal practitioners does exist in some cases, it is not 
widespread enough to suggest the emergence of a general trend towards epistemic linkage. 
In terms of communication, external actors are increasingly pushing a uniform policy narrative. 
For example, interviewees from the OSCE emphasised the extensive interaction between 
themselves and the EU in the field of judicial reform. On the issue of norms and standards, 
interviewees rhetorically emphasised that the OSCE’s rule of law criteria was similar to the 
EU’s criteria and this naturally led to collaboration on a whole range of issues including post-
conflict reconciliation, democratisation, Roma inclusion and judicial reform.34  The extent to 
which the formation of shared narratives remains a communicative tool is questionable 
however. Often narratives are used strategically to ‘name and shame’ none-complying actors. 
Interviewees highlighted the rhetorical power of narratives for rhetorically naming and 
shaming domestic actors to act: 
 I can say this was useful tool [EU accession] for influencing decision makers because 
they would be exposed to the public and naming and shaming, and with the elections 
they gave up and accepted [reforms].35 
 
                                                             
34 Interviewee A, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Belgrade Office. Interview conducted 
10 March 2016. 
35 Interviewee B, Serbian Government Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Unit, Belgrade. Interview 
conducted 31 March 2016. 
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The use of communication in a strategic manner may elicit a response from actors but this is 
problematic. As discussed in chapter 2, socialisation must result in a change in practice based 
on belief and not strategic pressure if it is to be meaningful and devoid of power relations. In 
sum, the sporadic linkages between domestic communities of practice and external actors, as 
well as the infrequent presence of a communicative process, means that the substantive 
intergovernmental socialisation mode is not widely applicable.  
The next section explores the role of strategic interaction. This type of interaction encourages 
sporadic engagement between external and domestic actors. It exacerbates domestic 
resistance to outside socialisation and promotes a form of procedural intergovernmental 
socialisation. Based on the presented evidence, procedural intergovernmental socialisation is 
the dominant model of socialisation within the network. This mode of socialisation supports 
a process of strategic accession and reifies its associated imaginary.  
6.5 Procedural intergovernmental socialisation 
Despite the presence of epistemic linkage and communication between IOs, strategic 
considerations tended to influence actor socialisation. IOs in figure 6.4 had a strong material 
linkage with one another. The CoE, OSCE and the OECD all stated in interviews that whilst not 
reliant on EU funds, often the EU helped fund their reform programmes. For example, the EU 
funds the OECD SIGMA public administration reform programmes in neighbourhood and 
enlargement countries. This programme uses OECD expertise, but the OECD works towards 
training public officials to enact EU reforms (OECD, 2017). This means that reform 
programmes will be orientated to EU objectives as a pre-requisite to secure program funding.  
The use of strategic mechanisms to induce change is well documented in previous EU 
accession cases (Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Spendzharova 
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& Vachudova, 2012b; Vachudova, 2005). This still appears to be the dominant mode at play 
in Serbia’s accession despite the assertion that the EU’s new approach represents a 
qualitative shift that is focussed on securing the fundamental transformation of Candidate 
States (European Commission, 2016b, p.2). Based on the evidence presented in this section 
and further evidence presented in chapters 7 and 8, this thesis critically challenges the claim 
that the EU’s new approach has put rule of law ‘fundamentals first’ and that its new approach 
encourages a change in practice. Instead, perceived interests still drive socialisation between 
actors. 
Examining the role of external state actors further demonstrates the dominance of strategic 
calculation in the network. Two case studies of active actors in the policy network elaborate 
how external state actors engage in the network primarily through strategic calculation.  
The Dutch embassy in Belgrade is active in promoting rule of law in both Serbia and 
neighbouring Montenegro. The rule of law programmes promoted by the embassy fall under 
the wider umbrella of the Matra Rule of Law programme (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2016). This programme aims to promote maatschappelijke transformatie (social 
transformation). Underpinning these reform efforts are considerations shaped by the Dutch 
domestic context. There exists a rhetorical commitment to promoting rule of law as 
something ‘fundamental’ to social progress. There also exists an interest-based imperative to 
advance rule of law as a means of creating a regulatory environment that safeguards Dutch 
investment and foreign direct investment more generally in countries like Serbia. Dutch rule 
of law reforms thus creates an enabling businesses environment in Serbia for Dutch 




The Dutch approach pre-dates the fundamentals first approach…Rule of law is needed 
for foreign direct investments (FDIs). Companies want guarantees when investing. Rule 
of law isn’t trying to do it all at once. It is a chain reaction. By focussing on the judiciary, 
Ombudsman, Anti-Corruption Agency and data protection, wider social processes 
follow. The priority is making the institutional framework. From there the criminal 
justice chain can follow. 36 
 
There are two ways in which the Dutch network to achieve their objectives. First, the EU 
accession process is the key external factor driving reforms. In the absence of this, there is 
not a substantive internal driver for reform. A credible accession prospect is used to frame 
Dutch reform programmes. This framing process is a strategy designed to legitimise the need 
to comply with Dutch reforms. Dutch reforms are presented in Serbia as part of the process 
of becoming an EU Member State (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). This is used 
to foster domestic engagement by communicating an implicit threat that not complying with 
Dutch interests would damage Serbia’s EU accession prospects. There is also symbolic 
legitimacy attached to the accession process by the public and politicians. This means that 
not cooperating with Dutch interests as part of the accession process may result in negative 
political consequences. 
Second, the Dutch mission also links heavily with other external actors, including the EU, to 
achieve its objectives. To this end, the aim of creating a secure investment environment for 
Dutch business sees the Dutch collaborate with the World Bank and a series of other external 
state actors in the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support (MDTFJSS). The MDTFJSS 
is a World Bank donor fund designed to promote the rule of law in Serbia (World Bank Group, 
                                                             
36 Interview with a Dutch diplomat, Belgrade. Interview conducted 1 April 2016. 
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2016). Its rule of law reform programmes take place in partnership with the EU, who also 
supports the MDTFJSS. The MDTFJSS aims to improve the efficiency and perception of judicial 
institutions in Serbia, enable business security and increase investment in Serbia. These 
objectives overlap with Dutch interests in promoting the rule of law. Both institutions advance 
the interest of European businesses and wish to see a more secure business environment for 
investment in Serbia. However, the MDTFJSS acts as an amplifier for Dutch interests. It does 
so by coordinating the resources of likeminded donors so that these actors can influence 
government strategy more effectively: 
Its hand holding, basically what the Bank is doing and what the donors are doing 
through this trust fund is encouraging government to make decisions.37 
 
 This imperative is even more important amidst the ongoing structural changes inflicting 
global capitalism that are encouraging advanced economies to seek new investment 
opportunities in countries like Serbia. The case of the Dutch Matra programme shows how 
Dutch actors engage strategically to promote reform processes in Serbia that can benefit 
Dutch interests. 
A second external state actor, the UK, is also focussed on creating an enabling business 
environment in Serbia. The UK government favours an issue specific approach that applies 
across multiple regions and emphasises bilateral engagement. This is demonstrated when 
examining the Good Governance Fund (GGF) launched by the Department for International 
Development (DFID) in 2015. It covers several countries including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (UK Government, 2015). These countries are targeted for 
                                                             
37 Interview with senior management, World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support, 
Belgrade. Interview conducted 1 March 2016. 
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development assistance on the basis that they are developing democracies that remain 
susceptible to significant external and internal shocks. The development of good governance 
is argued to build resilience and inoculate these societies from further shock. Furthermore, 
the UK government claims good governance reforms support poverty reduction, growth and 
stability. The overriding characteristic of this approach is promoting economic resilience and 
improving the business climate. The GGF claims that open and accountable governments 
support the creation of market-based societies built on the rule of law. This explains the 
inclusion of judicial reform and media freedom support in the programme alongside market 
reforms (UK Department for International Development, 2016b).  
Whilst the UK government has its own foreign policy objectives in the Western Balkans, it 
recognises that ‘good governance’ in Serbia can be leveraged through the EU accession 
process: 
This initiative complements the UK’s broader objectives to support a prosperous and 
stable region in the European neighbourhood. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have 
signed Association Agreements (AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (DCFTAs) with the EU and the EU has committed to support the 
implementation of reforms. The GGF complements this support. Serbia opened 
accession negotiations with the EU in 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential 
candidate for EU accession — (UK Department for International Development, 2016a, 
p.3) 
 
Harmonisation with the accession process helps increase the impact of development 
programming by embedding UK foreign policy objectives in a wider set of political reforms. 
Overall, the UK approach to Chapter 23 and 24 related reforms orientates around the need 
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to create a safe investment environment for business, a concern for ensuring Serbia remains 
resilient to internal and external shock and a desire to increase partnership between state 
and non-state actors in the delivery of public services to promote ‘innovation’.   
The examples of Dutch and British bilateral action demonstrate how different actors use 
accession related rule of law reforms as a means through which to achieve their perceived 
objectives. This requires seeing EU external policies as an outcome of the way different 
multilevel actors shape policy and project their own interests onto the accession process. The 
complex way in which EU reforms are communicated: sometimes by the EU Delegation, 
sometimes by EU Member States, and even sometimes by none EU actors, means the EU can 
struggle to create a coherent and unified reform narrative. The diverse communication of rule 
of law reforms on the ground by different actors means Serbian actors often struggle to make 
sense of the reform process in a meaningful way. This is visible when EU Technical Assistance 
and Information Exchange (TAIEX) and Twinning programmes — two programmes designed 
to socialise Candidate States with Member States — are considered.  
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) programmes are designed to support 
public administrations in their alignment with the EU acquis and facilitate the sharing of EU 
best practice. They occur at the request of Candidate States and allow for a secondment of 
experts to deliver training in Candidate States or for domestic actors to learn from peers in 
EU Member States and institutions (European Commission, 2016a).  TAIEX programmes are 
normally implemented at short notice to address emerging issues related to the reform 
process. As such, they are primarily used as a short-term instrument for facilitating the 
exchange of expertise and knowledge on a specific reform topic. The exchange between 
Candidate State and Member State actors normally occurs through the format of workshops, 
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expert missions or study visits (European Commission, 2016a). Rule of law is a policy field in 
which TAIEX is frequently used and therefore many of the actors visible in the network had 
some experience with TAIEX. 
TAIEX programmes were generally considered as the most beneficial form of social learning 
available to domestic actors through the accession process. In the case of TAIEX, the 
instrument itself was considered beneficial for procuring short-term expertise. Some 
interviewees subsequently reported that they had ‘excellent experiences with TAIEX’, felt it 
helped them keep up with sector specific practices occurring elsewhere in Europe and that 
the instrument acted almost as an ‘expert task force’.38 
The possibility for TAIEX to facilitate substantive socialisation and changes in understanding 
is however limited due to the programme’s scope. TAIEX is peer-group specific and therefore 
does not contribute to changing institutional practice beyond a select group of paired actors. 
This means that skills learned in TAIEX tend not to spread within domestic institutions through 
domestic actor socialisation and long-term planning is not built into TAIEX programmes. In 
the words of one interviewee: ‘What happens with the next generation?’39 
The short-term and fragmented nature of TAIEX means that it struggles to promote sustained 
change and the quality of expertise received via TAIEX is heavily dependent on the quality of 
national experts that domestic actors are paired with. Even in instances where pairings are 
suitable and domestic actors perceived the experience as positive, the type of change it 
promoted tended to be short-term. One interviewee argued the short-term nature of TAIEX 
                                                             
38Interview with official from the Serbian Anti-corruption Agency, Belgrade. Interview conducted 2 March 
2016.  Official from the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, Belgrade. Interview 
conducted 8 April 2016. Interview conducted with interviewee from Serbian European Integration Office, 
Belgrade. Interview conducted 11 March 2016. 
39 Interview C, OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 21 April 2016. 
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would appear to promote a more short-term ‘tactical’, as opposed to long-term ‘strategic’ 
form of thinking in domestic institutions.40 
 The second EU programme is Twinning. This is a mid-term mechanism that pairs domestic 
institutions in neighbourhood countries and Candidate States with a similar institution in a 
Member State. This programme is designed to educate actors and facilitate the exchange of 
practice. Like TAIEX programmes, Twinning projects are embedded in a wider set of accession 
related reforms (Roch, 2017, p.72). The impact of Twinning is variable. Much depends on the 
internal enthusiasm of Candidate State actors to engage with the process. When enthusiasm 
is high and partners are carefully selected, interviewees reported good experience of 
Twinning programmes: 
It [the positive Twinning experience] involved the Greeks, Slovenians and Austrians and they 
made time to understand the national context. This is not always the case with Twinning 
however. 41  
 
However, the more common experience of Twinning was negative. The more mid-term 
nature of Twinning was not seen as adequate for enacting fundamental change in practice. 
The process was undermined by an incoherent reform narrative with different Member State 
actors emphasising different aspects of the reform process. Interviewees reiterated the need 
for a long-term process of social learning. This process should ideally be facilitated through 
unilateral mechanisms that were focussed less on the individual experiences of Member 
States and more on recognised best practices endorsed by international bodies: 
                                                             
40 Interviewee A, Serbian Ministry of Interior, Belgrade. Interview conducted 7 March 2016. 
41 Interviewee A, State Ombudsman, Belgrade. Interview conducted 29 April 2016. 
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There is no uniform approach. Twinning should be learning on mistakes not by telling 
people to do what you think they should be doing…At the operational level, it requires 
more than just exchange. It requires a hands-on approach and working with that 
person or institution for some time. So, the Spanish project should second five people 
from the high judicial council in Spain to work with the high judicial council in Serbia to 
change their business practice.  Because I just don’t think they will employ the Spanish 
experience simply by learning how it’s done in Spain.42  
 
Overall, interviewees were reflective that even the most effective Twinning programmes 
were no substitute for long-term processes of social learning that could help motivate actors 
to enact reforms on their own initiative and translate EU rule of law principles into practice:  
It [reform] should come from the inside… it’s difficult to learn from Scandinavians as 
they are far ahead. Some of the Baltic countries can serve as good examples. Because 
we share the same history. They have been EU Member States for 12 years however 
and have very developed ICT and infrastructure.  I can’t imagine a productive Twinning 
with them. 43  
 
In sum, the fragmented nature of the reform process and the preference given to bilateral as 
opposed to multilateral forms of socialisation, means a uniform set of rule of law 
understandings and practices are not communicated by external actors to domestic actors. It 
also means substantive epistemic linkage is absent because interactions tend to promote 
Member State specific know-how. This varies depending on the Member State’s own 
institutional structure and its own experiences with a certain topic. In contrast, a more joined-
                                                             
42 Interview with senior management, World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support, 
Belgrade. Interview conducted 1 March 2016. 
43 Interview with a judge, Serbian Supreme Court of Cassation, Belgrade. Interview conducted 6 April 2016. 
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up multilateral approach might lead to the implementation of uniform practice that could 
then be contextualised in rule of law policy fields. This may overcome the shortcomings of the 
fragmented socialisation processes that occurred within the analysed network.  
The fragmented nature of network socialisation between external and domestic actors means 
that domestic actors continue to implement their work in-line with existing institutional 
understandings. In the long-term, this may undermine the EU’s ability to not only ensure 
compliance with its rules and norms, but also ensure they are meaningfully enacted in 
practice. Figure 6.5 emphasises that domestic governmental actors tended to socialise more 
with one another. Figure 6.5 filters the network by IOs, external state actors and 
governmental actors. This demonstrates how domestic governmental actors tend to cluster 
with one another in a network clique. This clique produces its own socialisation dynamics. 
These dynamics are more substantive than external actor socialisation.


















Figure 6.5: Network filtered by connections between international organisations, bilateral missions and domestic institutions. International organisations= Light blue, bilateral missions of external states=orange and domestic 
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In the configuration of domestic government institutions highlighted in green in figure 6.5, 
justice sector institutions are particularly central. The key domestic actors in this 
configuration are ‘Serbian Government authorities’—a generic label for important executive 
officials— the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation, State Prosecutors Office and Anti-corruption 
Agency. These actors are strategically motivated to socialise with external actors. Key 
domestic actors tended to use their network connections to access new sources of funding 
and technical assistance. This resulted in the extensive application of strategic calculation as 
a transmission mechanism and reinforced the network’s procedural intergovernmental 
character. 
The strategic engagement of domestic actors with external actors means epistemic linkage 
rarely occurs. This was also recognised to be the main feature of engagement by external 
actors. The EU Delegation in Serbia even went so far as to concede that it ‘could not change 
hearts and minds’. Rather, it could only use the ‘carrot and the stick to ensure reform 
compliance’. 44 This process of relying on incentives to reward or punish domestic actors for 
compliance does little to promote a change in practice. The absence of epistemic linkage 
means that domestic actors struggled to understand and adopt an ‘EU mindset’. 
Despite the presence of socialisation between domestic institutions and external actors, 
interviewees suggested that many domestic actors are engaged in a procedural mode of 
intergovernmental socialisation. The EU’s approach is viewed by domestic actors as a top-
down process, focussed on lesson drawing from the EU. Interaction with the EU was not seen 
                                                             
44 Interviewee A, EU Delegation to Serbia, Belgrade. Interview conducted 6 March 2016. 
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as organic but formulaic. The entire accession process was seen to follow a ticking the boxes 
approach and little space was provided to build bridges between existing practice and outside 
examples of EU best practice. The limited opportunity to contextualise and produce context 
specific reform solutions was also exacerbated by the sporadic nature of interaction as well 
as the externally driven nature of the reform process. The EU failed to encourage network 
actors to enact change from the bottom-up. This could have been achieved by employing 
argumentation and persuasion more consistently or by showing the benefit of new practice 
via epistemic linkage. In the absence of these mechanisms, the EU returned to its default 
conditionality instruments of material linkage. Domestic actors felt this promoted superficial 
change: 
In summary, I think much of the reforms required for EU membership should be driven 
because they are good in and of themselves and should also change practices. I’m not 
sure this is the case currently as EU membership is the major incentive.45 
 
Some interviewees felt that external actors poorly communicated with domestic actors. Poor 
communication between external actors and domestic practitioners meant that external 
actors often failed to appreciate the context of reforms. For example, when it comes to the 
issue of fighting corruption in Serbia, one interviewee felt the EU needed to pay closer 
attention to the internal political dynamics impeding reforms in Serbia to understand the 
limits of existing reforms: 
The experts they send often misrepresent things as they see certain things and don’t 
understand the national context of Serbia.46  
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The EU’s new approach aims to place fundamental rule of law issues at the centre of accession 
reforms and ensure that reforms are implemented in practice. The Serbian case suggest that 
this new focus has not yet facilitated a systematic change in mindset across the justice sector. 
Part of this failure may lie in the way outside actors interact with domestic actors. If the EU 
and other external actors involved in the network fail to appreciate the contextual specificities 
of the Serbian case and fail to engage with actors to understand the rule of law issues that 
are important to them, a change in practice seems unlikely to occur. 
Another interviewee from the Ministry of Interior spoke about the difficulty of achieving 
change through the accession process. In comparison to routine interaction, engagement 
with external actors by domestic actors was ‘ad-hoc’ or ‘soft’.47 The same interviewee from 
the Ministry of Interior supported this by providing insight into how the turbulent nature of 
post-democratic transition in Serbia and its historically tense relationship with Western actors 
has made domestic government actors cautious towards outside socialisation. For this reason, 
he thought engagement between outside actors and domestic actors would eventually 
change understandings but this would take many years:  
The depth of what’s gone wrong over the past 20 years is so extensive you just can’t fix it in a 
year or two or five years, I think it will take a good 5-10 years to fix things such as, again going 
back to this culture thing. And that is almost at the core of the problem I think. That is this lack 
of willingness to change, to do something better…people are so fearful, they don’t know 
what’s going to happen, they don’t trust politicians, it is a transition country... There’s a lack 
of trust in the West in general. Which again you could say is understandable. So, you could say 
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what is this British, what is this French adviser doing here. They don’t really want any good for 
this country, why are they here. So, you get that type of resistance as well. 48 
 
In sum, insight from interviewees in combination with an analysis of the transnational policy 
network, highlights the dominance of procedural intergovernmental socialisation. Whilst a 
communicative component is present, a coherent reform narrative is fragmented. The 
overwhelming presence of strategic calculation employed by different actors contributes to 
this fragmentation. Furthermore, the dominant presence of strategic interaction prevents 
substantial epistemic linkage forming between external actors and domestic actors. This is 
reflected in the inability of external actors to fully engage with domestic actors to understand 
the institutional conditions in the justice sector that inhibit reforms.  Domestic actors feel an 
understanding of these conditions is important to help address reform challenges in a 
meaningful way and produce contextualised and appropriate responses to the key issues that 
must be addressed to achieve EU membership. Overall, the mode of socialisation that seems 
most dominant between different actors is procedural intergovernmental socialisation. This 
results in a process of top-down lesson learning and ‘thin’ socialisation. Dominant actors use 
the reform process and engage in the network to achieve perceived interests and objectives. 
This is problematic, as it does not facilitate a process of dialogue which attempts to change 
understandings and contextualise rule of law reforms. 
6.6 Instrumental NGO socialisation 
The final mode of socialisation present in the network is the instrumental NGO socialisation 
mode. Figure 6.4 demonstrates the peripheral location of NGOs and other professionalised 





civil society groups in the network.  Of the NGOs present in the network, nearly all are highly 
professionalised advocacy groups. Figure 6.4 shows that civil society actors tended to interact 
more extensively with each other than with actors of another type. Governmental actors 
tended to treat NGOs sceptically. When they did interact with NGOs, it was usually to obtain 
knowledge on an issue when they lacked expertise. When NGOs socialised with external 
actors, external actors tended to use them instrumentally to carry out work on donor 
programmes or to lobby the government on an issue. Interestingly, despite the increased 
resources available to INGOs, they occupied a similarly peripheral position in the network. 
NGOs tended to be given second-order status behind governmental actors. This impeded the 
construction of a broader socialisation process and reinforced the intergovernmental 
character of the network.  As for why intergovernmental interactions are dominant, one 
interviewee felt this was a functional outcome of the integration process: 
It is a valid argument from the civil society in that they are not included in this huge 
transformation process of accession to the EU. On the other side, if you look at it from 
a legal perspective, the accession negotiations are a negotiation between an 
international organisation and a state so by its nature it is between the state and the 
EU. But I do think the EU has come a very long way in trying to include civil society.49 
 
This suggests that there is a dominant intergovernmental character to the network and that 
governmental actors are likely to be the focus of external actors who engage in rule of law 
reforms in Serbia.  
                                                             




 Domestic NGOs stated they tended to work with other small organisations and larger INGOs 
because these collaborations were effective in achieving their day-to-day organisational 
objectives. For example, whilst the Centre for Investigative Journalism (CINS) advocates for 
greater media freedom, its day-to-day work is focussed on securing funds from donors to 
carry out its journalistic activity. Beyond a select few NGOs that were primarily working in the 
field of social inclusion or migration issues, contact between domestic NGOs and 
governmental actors was low. When the government consulted NGOs, interviewees 
described the experience negatively. For example, one interviewee stated that the dialogue 
with government often felt forced and tended to go in circles: 
I mean when we approach the government, we are talking about the same things for 
years. Things are moving so slowly.50 
 
This suggests that a sustained process of dialogue is not a feature of NGO interaction with 
governmental actors. Communication is not characterised by features of argumentation and 
persuasion. NGOs felt that consultations were used to window dress the government’s 
limited rule of law reforms: 
I find them [government meetings] boring. I find them demeaning and meaningless and you 
basically feel like a puppet of the state over there as they are going to put in their report that 
they have had consultations with the NGOs with this and that. 51 
 
Many NGOs working on rule of law issues have been active in Serbia since the 1990s and were 
particularly instrumental in the early democratisation period. Many of the key actors in 
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government made their political careers in the same period. As such, their political careers 
were born in the context of an adversarial relationship between government and civil society. 
The Milošević government articulated a narrative that many NGOs were foreign agents. This 
narrative remains salient amongst the public. A survey funded by the EU and published in 
2014 demonstrated the continuation of this trend, with only 30 per cent of the public 
expressing confidence in civil society organisations (TACSO, 2014, p.14). An interviewee from 
the government’s Office for Cooperation with Civil Society aptly summarised the way NGOs 
are perceived: 
By the public, they [civil society] are not seen to vocalise citizens’ views and our main 
issue in the past 20 years is that the public does not stand with civil society 
organisations…they see those elite couple of organisations [NGOs] that are doing the 
EU job here or even worse the American job.52 
 
Given the low level of public trust in NGOs, the lack of substantive socialisation involving these 
actors in the network is neither controversial nor difficult for government actors to justify. 
The arm’s length approach of government towards NGOs also impacts the way external actors 
approach NGOs. Whilst external actors do fund NGOs, their collaboration is often limited to 
the instrumental level. This may be a result of external actors not wishing to sacrifice good 
intergovernmental relations for the sake of supporting NGO groups that are unpopular with 
the government.  Interviews suggested that external actors tended to approach civil society 
as a vehicle for achieving their own objectives. One interviewee reflected on how external 
actors understood NGOs in liberal market terms and used them instrumentally: 
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A neoliberal understanding… virtually a Cameronite big society view. What you have 
is low cost, high skilled service delivery from NGOs53 
 
Another interviewee demonstrated that their organisation approached NGOs as a type of 
market agent who could deliver donor programmes in a low-cost manner: 
 
One area, which is one of the current babies we are working on, is that the state is also 
using civil society organisations to carry out specific functions. This is a thing we are 
doing in the corrections area, specifically when it comes to rehabilitation. We are 
working on establishing a group of NGOs that could carry out these care services, but 
this is a new idea in Serbia.54 
 
The instrumental socialisation between NGOs and other actors is problematic for two reasons. 
First, it utilised strategic calculation as its primary transmission mechanism. This strategic 
mechanism was not useful for generating substantive socialisation between actors, which can 
begin to help mediate differences and construct shared understandings. Second, this 
instrumental approach favoured large domestic NGOs who have an existing capacity to 
engage with external actors and apply for donor funding via grant bids and project calls. This 
dynamic seems likely to exacerbate the representation gap between NGOs and wider civil 
society in Serbia. The failure of prominent NGOs to frame their work against local issues has 
been shown by other scholars to proliferate a perception that NGOs are ‘self-righteous’ and 
pursue a ‘Western agenda’ (Danković & Pickering, 2017, p.15; Obradović-Wochnik, 2013). As 
such, even those NGOs that are included in the network and can shape the reform process 
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represent what has been termed a ‘narrow slice’ of the civil society cake (Danković & Pickering, 
2017, p.4). 
In sum, a mode of instrumental NGO socialisation characterised the way in which NGOs 
engage in the network. Whilst on the surface there may appear to be a communicative 
mechanism present, often consultation processes simply created the illusion that rule of law 
reforms involved constructing shared understandings and agreeing mutual objectives. NGO 
actors felt communication with the government was superficial and that external actors 
instrumentally used them. Despite this, NGOs felt mistrusted by government actors and 
government actors felt able to legitimise the lack of substantive NGO inclusion in the reform 
process. External actors, whilst more supportive of NGOs, tended to view them instrumentally. 
The focus of interaction with NGOs was determined by what function they could serve and 
whether they could advance donor interests. Strategic calculation is the key mechanism 
guiding socialisation with NGOs because interaction generally served an instrumental end.  
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter conceptually outlined four proposed modes of socialisation that fell along a 
continuum of socialisation. It then outlined and analysed a relevant actor network to ascertain 
the prevalence of these different modes. Of the outlined modes, the substantive 
intergovernmental socialisation mode appeared to be visible in some instances of network 
interaction. It was not, however, consistent and was not a general characteristic of network 
socialisation. A combination of network analysis and interview material found that a mode of 
procedural intergovernmental socialisation best characterised the type of socialisation that 
was dominant in the network. The instrumental NGO socialisation mode supported the 
procedural network dynamics and interviews conducted with NGOs visible in the network 
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further emphasised the procedural and intergovernmental character of network socialisation. 
This type of socialisation was previously argued in chapter 4 to contribute to the preservation 
of Serbian elite actor networks, whilst ensuring Serbia’s strategic integration into the EU. 
Overall, the dominant transmission mechanism through which socialisation occurred was 
strategic calculation.  
The EU’s capacity to diffuse rule of law reforms is undermined due to the limited presence of 
deep socialisation and the sporadic presence of substantive intergovernmental socialisation 
in the network. As was outlined in chapter 2, a rich body of literature suggests successful 
‘translation’ of diffused policy reforms is only possible through meaningful interactions that 
contextualise policy reforms. A form of socialisation which focused on dialogue to help 
overcome contestation and construct mutually amicable understandings was not dominant.  
Overall, this chapter demonstrated that the key actors involved in rule of law reforms are 
international organisations and governmental actors. It showed that interaction orientated 
around actors attempting to advance their perceived interests. This chapter further 
elaborated on how structuration occurs. In line with the concept of structuration, the 
analysed network acted as a structure that determined actions, shaped perceived interests 
and actors’ interpretations of reform processes. This chapter further demonstrated the 
important role social relations play in shaping the way actors understand European 
integration and rule of law reforms. Ultimately, it showed that social relations between actors 
can enable and constrain certain actors to undertake certain actions and engage in the policy 
network.  
In sum, the socialisation that occurs in relation to Serbia’s rule of law reforms is strategic in 
nature. It overwhelmingly corresponds with the procedural intergovernmental mode and is 
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also characterised by the instrumental use of NGOs to achieve strategic outcomes. The 
subsequent chapters will outline the significance of this in terms of the institutional reforms 
taking place in Serbia. Chapters 7, 8 and 9, focus on specific rule of law policies to ascertain 
the effectiveness of the EU’s new approach in changing understandings. Emphasis is placed 
on the contradictions and contestations inherent in the EU’s approach and how these 





Chapter 7: Understandings of judicial reform 
 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three focussing on the semiosis mode of sensemaking. The previous 
chapters focussed on the role that institutions, events, social relations and socialisation play 
in shaping the EU’s regional engagement and the delivery of rule of law reforms in Serbia. The 
remaining chapters of this thesis focus on the way that delivered reforms are interpreted by 
actors in the domestic context of Serbia. As these chapters focus on the way diffused policy 
reforms are interpreted, the semiosis mode of sensemaking is considered appropriate. This is 
because structuration focuses on the ‘structural’ aspects of complexity reduction and the way 
institutions, events and social relations shape the construction of imaginaries and determine 
the actions of actors (Jessop, 2010, p.338). In contrast, semiosis focusses on the role that 
discourse, semantic images and ideology play in shaping understandings. For this reason, 
semiosis is considered appropriate for understanding how diffused reforms are interpreted 
and enacted in practice, as opposed to the previous chapters that focussed on how the 
relationship between social structures and agency shaped the formation of an approach for 
diffusing rule of law reforms.  
This chapter opens the ‘black box’ of the EU’s reform process by analysing how actors 
understand and make sense of judicial reforms taking place in Serbia. It is the first of three 
chapters focused on one of the policy areas detailed in Chapter 23 of the EU acquis. Focussing 
on three rule of law policy areas allows for a detailed examination of different rule of law 
reforms in Serbia. It also allows for comparisons to be drawn across different policy areas. 
 To answer the second research question of this thesis, this and the following two chapters 
engage directly with the final three sub-research questions: How do actors construct an 
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understanding of rule of law reforms — in this case judicial reform — through semiosis and 
what informs these understandings? To what extent do we find convergence, divergence and 
contestation between different understandings and why? What do the different 
understandings of actors tell us about rule of law reforms in Serbia and European integration 
more generally? In answering these questions, this chapter demonstrates the importance of 
semiosis for explaining rule of law reform outcomes. It further demonstrates that the 
organisational context, as well as the relationship actors have with other actors, is crucial for 
explaining how understandings are constructed and reform actions pursued.  
Examining how actors make sense of reforms in Serbia can advance our understanding of how 
EU reform processes are shaped in the domestic context of Candidate States. A focus on 
semiosis helps move beyond the Europeanisation paradigm and its problematic tendency to 
focus on macro level functional explanations, as well as the methodological individualism 
evident in rational choice approaches. In contrast, CPE demonstrates how situated actors 
understand and make sense of rule of law reforms, how these understandings lead to the 
construction and evolution of EU reforms and examines what these understandings reveal 
about rule of law reforms and European integration in Serbia.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, this chapter identifies a dominant understanding that 
emerges among actors in relation to judicial reform. This section shows how some actors 
select and retain a discursive variation that focuses on the relationship between judicial 
reform, efficiency and state development. This understanding reflects an emergent neoliberal 
political project being constructed in Serbia, which is partly being supported by the 
understandings that external actors diffuse into Serbia. Second, alternative understandings 
are presented that partly conflict with this ‘efficiency’ understanding. These understandings 
190 
  
emphasise independence and ownership. Third, the significance of these different 
understandings is related to European integration more broadly in a discussion section. Finally, 
this chapter concludes by reflecting on the importance of actor semiosis for explaining 
divergent reform outcomes and the possibility for cohesive rule of law reforms in Serbia.  
7.1 Modern judiciaries, economic development and the importance of efficiency 
What does judicial reform mean to those actors tasked with implementing it on the ground 
in Serbia? The dominant understanding that emerged among actors emphasised efficiency. 
Efficient judiciaries are commonly emphasised in modern (neo)liberal democracies in which 
judicial bodies and the bureaucracy more broadly, are encouraged to operate on business 
management principles (Duggan, 2012, p.10). A common narrative that emerged among both 
domestic and external actors was the need to address Serbia’s problematic backlog of court 
cases (European Commission, 2012b, p.4; Serbia Ministry of European Integration, 2017; US 
Embassy in Belgrade, 2017; World Bank Group, 2015c). This backlog, according to a World 
Bank interviewee, stymied foreign investment in Serbia and limited economic growth. 55 
Domestic actors understood this and were aware that their organisation’s work would also 
be increasingly judged in relation to efficiency. As a result, the first key variation that emerges 
in terms of discourse reflects the concept of efficiency.  The concept of efficiency is reflected 
in the way important domestic and international justice sector actors understand justice 
sector reform. These actors include the Judicial Academy, Ministry of Justice, World Bank, EU 
and USAID. How then was this narrative constructed and how did a semiotic process of 
variation, selection and retention help lead to its enactment in organisational action? 
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The Judicial Academy is a key institution tasked with training and retraining judges. The 
academy was established in-part due to the financial support of the EU, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). The academy was initially designated the Judicial Training Centre 
before being formally recognised in Serbia’s constitution as an integral part of its judicial 
framework through the Law on Judicial Academy (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2016, 
p.2). In terms of variation, the Judicial Academy focussed on a discourse of efficiency. This 
variation of judicial reform reflects a neoliberal state-building paradigm that is concerned 
with increasing investment in Serbia and constructing a market-based society (Visoka & 
Richmond, 2017, pp.114–115).  The intertwining of judicial efficiency and market efficiency 
are visible in this variation. Issues of judicial efficiency are related to arguments about 
economic growth and development in Serbia. For example: 
For me though if you don’t have rule of law, if you don’t have knowledge in the judiciary 
and execution of cases in commercial courts is long, over five years. In that case, of 
course that foreign investor won’t invest in Serbia. Or if you have high corruption and 
protectionism you are not attractive for investors. 56 
 
The selection of efficiency was considered to help the Judicial Academy demonstrate it was 
making progress with reforms. This is because efficiency could be easily measured. For 
example, by observing the time it takes for a case to pass through the court system.  However, 
efficiency was also set as a goal by external actors. The Academy’s own organisational 
objectives were partly constructed and perceived in relation to how external actors would 
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judge the Academy. This is because external actors were important advocates for the 
existence and expansion of the Academy. Therefore, social pressure and existing social 
relations played a role in shaping selection:  
At the beginning, from 2002, we spoke too much about rule of law and independence 
[at] the beginning of [the] process, but we changed the opinion in the judiciary and the 
academy because according to the new reform strategy, we put the knowledge and 
efficiency as [the] basic ground for [the] judiciary. 57 
 
Efficiency was also selected because reforms were understood sequentially. That is, once 
efficiency was achieved, the Judicial Academy believed that other aspects of judicial reforms 
could be implemented. Therefore, efficiency was selected on the basis that it could serve as 
a gateway to achieving other reforms and start a snowball effect: 
If you speak about independence, yes, it’s a crucial part in the judiciary, rule of law, 
independence. But, it’s a theory and philosophy. If you speak about independence 
there must be results but before that you must have knowledge and efficiency. 58 
 
The judicial Academy’s selection of efficiency as a dominant variation appeared logical to its 
staff. Interviewees suggested that it seemed sensible and practical to understand efficiency 
as a necessary pre-requisite for achieving judicial knowledge and independence. Through the 
construction of an internal narrative linking knowledge and independence to efficiency, the 
Judicial Academy came to understand efficiency and knowledge as necessary prerequisites to 
achieving judicial independence: 





Especially as a judge, if you have good knowledge and finish a case on time you are 
on safe ground to be independent. 59 
 
The retention of the efficiency narrative was visible in the way the Judicial Academy 
constructed its training programme for judges. Judicial training was designed to communicate 
to judges the importance of efficiency, both in terms of improving judicial practice and for 
advancing Serbia’s European integration more generally. As such, organisational training and 
institutional rules helped reinforce the idea of efficiency and convince domestic actors of its 
importance for achieving judicial and state-level objectives. It was subsequently implemented 
in practice and codified in the way the Judicial Academy communicated reforms to the judicial 
community through training and personal interactions: 
Judiciary and execution of cases in commercial courts is long, over 5 years. In that case, 
of course that foreign investor won’t invest in Serbia.  Or if you have high corruption 
and protectionism you are not attractive for investors. Sometimes I explain to judges 
it is important to have investment because if we do we will have income into the state 
and our salaries and court rooms will be better.60 
 
A second key domestic actor also prioritised efficiency in its reform efforts. Like the Judicial 
Academy, the Ministry of Justice understood judicial reforms in relation to efficiency. 
Efficiency reflected a desire to create a modern and effective set of state institutions. The 
narrative of judicial efficiency subsequently emerged within the Ministry of justice because it 
was perceived as important for constructing a well-functioning state: 





Chapter 23 is probably the most important chapter because when it comes to judiciary 
you cannot imagine efficient state authorities at all if you don’t have efficient 
judiciary.61 
 
Efficiency was selected because it was seen to help meet objectives and was considered 
performance enhancing. The Ministry of Justice emphasised how reforms could provide new 
ideas that helped staff do their jobs better and administer justice more effectively. Efficiency 
was once again legitimised because it was seen to resonate with the Ministry of Justice’s 
objectives and its desire to reinforce reforms and align the ministry’s work with ‘effective’ 
practice:  
But it’s hard to make people understand the benefits of a training when they’re 
swamped by day to day work.  And often it happens that we have to remind them they 
know they are aware of different business practices which they should be employing 
in their day to day work and not to do things in the way they did the past 10 years to 
help reinforce our reforms.62 
 
Retention of efficiency in the Ministry of Justice occurred through its embedding in new 
organisational routines and technological innovations that reinforced the importance of 
efficiency and the need to do work quickly and effectively. Focussing on new practices and 
introducing new technologies was beneficial in helping to ensure that the ministry’s staff were 
aware of the need to be efficient. New technologies also helped speed up existing work flows 
in a way that would reinforce efficiency sub-consciously. These methods of retention were 
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viewed positively in helping push ministry staff to reform and as a means for measuring 
reform progress: 
That concept [efficiency] requires a lot of patience and to step out of our comfort zones. 
But when you became part of an institution in that way you honestly want to change 
something. And when you see results, when you see completely new mechanisms, 
practices, the website with all the relevant information, when you see new ideas coming 
from all civil servants, that’s a good result.63 
 
Efficiency has found pertinence among reform actors because its selection and retention is 
legitimised and encouraged by other external actors active in Serbia. A form of ‘stupidity 
management’ exists in this sense, whereby external actors in collaboration with some 
domestic actors seek to block communicative action to ensure adherence to organisational 
edicts and prevent substantive reasoning beyond the efficiency paradigm. While this 
improves cohesion between these actors, it limits reflexivity by cutting short conversations 
about what judicial reform might mean beyond the dominant discourse of efficiency. Through 
their reinforcement of the efficiency paradigm, external actors seek to legitimise the concept 
of efficiency. This ultimately leads to the decline of ‘open’ social conditions as efficiency-
orientated reforms are justified through reform edict and not internal dialogue or 
appropriateness (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, pp.1199–1200). 
For example, efficiency is reflected in the way USAID engaged with judicial actors, primarily 
through their JRGA programme, which engages directly with the Supreme Court of Cassation, 
Serbia’s highest judicial body. The JRGA programme aims to improve efficiency, promote 
transparency and consistency, and reduce opportunities for corruption in judicial institutions 
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to improve the investment environment in Serbia and its attractiveness to foreign business 
(USAID, 2013, p.28, 2016b, p.1). Judicial reform is a sub-component of USAID’s Mission 
Strategy in Serbia. This is to support Serbia in its Euro-Atlantic integration, the construction 
of democratic structures and to create a competitive market economy (USAID, 2013, p.31). 
USAID has its own mission agenda but in seeking to enhance Euro-Atlantic integration, it tries 
to ensure its reforms complement EU accession reforms. It does not seek to initiate a process 
of dialogue about the appropriateness of such reforms and in the words of one critic: 
To give an example, the USA is active and likes to transplant its system. However, this 
has no tradition here so is likely to experience difficulties.64 
 
Despite criticisms, USAID remains a significant actor in shaping judicial reform both in 
partnership and independently from the EU. For example, while the EU contributed €2 million 
to a programme of ‘Capacity Building of the Judicial Academy’ (British Council, 2016a),65 
USAID funded its own parallel programme, the Judicial Academy Support Project’ (USAID, 
2016a). The idea of efficiency it promotes can therefore be viewed as a variation of judicial 
reform discourse that corresponds with USAID’s core interests. 
In terms of selection, USAID focussed on efficiency as it was seen to complement and help 
support Euro-Atlantic integration. The disposition of USAID to promote efficiency is reflective 
of its overall mission to ‘create a democratic and prosperous Serbia that is a full member of 
the Euro-Atlantic community’ (USAID, 2012, p.16). Efficiency thus resonated with existing 
objectives and the identity USAID attributed to itself as a reform actor. For USAID, improving 
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the efficiency of the state and its ability to manage politicians through the establishment of 
checks and balances is an important part of transforming Serbia into a fully functioning 
market-based democracy. Efficiency was subsequently legitimised as it could help achieve 
these objectives. 
In terms of retention, USAID engaged with key judicial stakeholders to introduce new 
techniques such as record keeping and ICT innovation. These were designed to improve the 
efficiency of Serbia’s judicial sector and embed efficiency in practice. The introduction of new 
technologies is well noted to change the way practitioners understand their role (Orlikowski, 
2008; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). In simple terms, this means that USAID anticipates that new 
practices and technologies of judicial management will emphasise the idea that efficiency 
matters and reinforce the construction of efficient state institutions. One interviewee 
suggested new technologies helped embed efficiency because it gave domestic actors the 
opportunity to see how new work processes could achieve the goal of backlog reduction:  
A lot could be done with very simple changes in work processing. That’s what I was 
doing with USAID… The USAID project I worked with, the component I was leading was 
really focussed on backlog reduction. 66 
 
We see USAID effectively embed a focus on efficiency within the judicial sector through the 
deployment of new work practices as well as through its funding of various reform 
programmes.  
The final significant actor that helped reinforce the efficiency paradigm was the World Bank. 
The World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support (MDTFJSS) committed itself 
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to improving rule of law through a large trust fund targeted primarily at the Ministry of Justice.  
In terms of variation, its reform agenda is focused on ‘improving the capacity, efficiency, 
integrity, accountability and professionalism of justice sector officials’ (World Bank Group, 
2015d). These concerns are reflected in the reform strategy of the World Bank, which clearly 
demonstrates the presence of the efficiency discourse in its reform agenda: 
All the donors are interested in is efficiency, quality and its access. So, these are the 
three elements that the Serbian judiciary needs to improve. 67 
 
In terms of selection, efficiency is emphasised because it supports the World Bank’s 
organisational objective of creating a competitive and inclusive economy and through this, 
further European integration (World Bank Group, 2017). This objective aligns closely with 
USAID’s objective of improving Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. This shared objective is 
unsurprising given the close relations between the two organisations outlined in chapter 6.  
This objective reflects an interest in ensuring the expansion of free market capitalism in Serbia 
and the construction of a state that successfully demarcates the boundaries between state 
and market through judicial bodies. This in the words of one interviewee is their ‘main priority’ 
in Serbia. 68  Selection occurs because it conforms to existing beliefs and objectives, and 
reinforces existing World Bank interests, while also legitimising its reform programmes to its 
donors.  
Regarding selection, it is also important to note that like the Judicial Academy, the World Bank 
believes its focus on efficiency was important for achieving other objectives, primarily 
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independence. Selection therefore also occurred because efficiency helped actors understand 
and interpret reforms sequentially. This makes reforms seem more manageable and allows 
actors to interpret judicial reforms as a procedure, whereby efficiency precedes 
independence:  
It’s [efficiency and independence] interlinked… Independence is more about 
professional dignity and independent court budgets and being able to justify why you 
are doing something and how you are doing something. 69 
 
Retention occurred through the construction of rule of law reform processes and new 
institutional rules in Serbia. The World Bank’s functional review of the judiciary is designed to 
foster alignment with Chapter 23 of the EU acquis and the World Bank seeks to encourage 
further European integration (World Bank Group, 2014, pp.1–2, 2015e, p.40). Its reform 
programmes are explicitly supported by the EU Commission and aggregated into accession 
related reforms. Support for the World Bank’s work is evident in the link drawn between 
judicial reform, free market reforms, democratisation and EU integration in EU enlargement 
strategy (European Commission, 2015a, pp.2–5, 2016b). This means that common 
understandings of efficiency are retained and reinforced through the strategic coordination 
of judicial reform in new reform processes that occur as a sub-component of European 
integration. This leads to retention because it associates World Bank reforms with the 
European integration agenda and makes compliance with World Bank reforms a necessary 
requirement for domestic actors to advance accession negotiations: 
We asked the World Bank to prepare a functional review, which we co-financed on the 
judiciary to highlight the main challenges and difficulties in this area. This was the basis 





for Serbia to develop its action plan for Chapter 23. We asked them to fully incorporate 
this study from the World Bank to reflect on the challenges that were highlighted to 
ensure synergies.70 
 
In sum, efficiency was selected when it was perceived to help achieve organisational 
objectives, conform to existing identity structures and legitimised existing and planned action. 
Its retention is visible in several reform processes, including new technologies, work processes, 
institutional rules and routines. Efficiency understandings represent a rather economistic 
understanding of the accession processes. This is unsurprising given that European 
integration is a fundamentally political and economic process, in which political concepts of 
the market inform the establishment of functioning market-based democracies. Variations of 
this market terminology permeate the discourse of judicial reform processes and the 
discourse of actors who are active in the policy field. However, the following section suggests 
that the myopic focus on achieving this goal limits dialogue between these actors and other 
actors that raise contestation with the reform process. This leads to ignorance about the 
broader actions needed to undertake judicial reform in a holistic manner. This ultimately 
frustrated the wider institutionalisation of rule of law understandings and prevented dialogue 
between actors.  
 
7.2 Contestation I: Independence 
While an approach to reforms that focused on efficiency was viewed positively by some actors, 
it was problematic for others. Contesting actors argued that efficiency-based understandings 
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are problematic when they conflate independence with efficiency. This leads to 
independence being poorly engaged with as an independent and important concept. 
Consequently, contesting judicial actors, argued that government actors do not place 
independence at the heart of the reform process when they focussed heavily on efficiency. 
These contesting actors did not understand judicial reform sequentially and did not believe 
that efficiency would enable greater independence. They argued that independence should 
be the key factor driving reforms and should, therefore, be focussed on first. Some civil society 
actors also advocated this contesting perspective. Frequently, these actors defined 
themselves in contrast to governmental actors who they felt wished to control the reform 
process and accommodate judicial reforms so far as they advanced the accession process but 
did not harm their own positions of power. They felt that this prevented wider change within 
the judiciary and undermined substantive reforms that could more effectively institutionalise 
the rule of law in practice. 
In terms of the construction of alternative understandings that sought to prioritise 
independence and not link it sequentially to efficiency, an alternative process of semiosis was 
visible. A variation of reform discourse that emphasised judicial independence was evident 
among some interviewees. One actor appeared to place judicial independence at the centre 
of their work and sought to communicate this concept to their colleagues within the justice 
system. This variation of this judicial reform narrative focussed less on efficiency and more 
on the freedom of judges to undertake their work independently from ministerial oversight. 
This is particularly visible in the way this interviewee discussed the World Bank and other 
actors that supported the intertwining of efficiency and independence. They argued that 
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these actors, in prioritising efficiency as a means of achieving independence, did not fully 
support the concept of independence as they understood it:  
But how the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support (MDTFJSS) is run, 
unfortunately, I’m not very happy with it. It doesn’t fully support the principle of 
independence. 71 
 
This interviewee expressed their belief that efficiency has become such a dominant 
understanding in the context of Serbia’s judicial reforms that it was now intertwined 
inexorably with judicial reforms. This, it was argued, marginalised the focus placed on judicial 
independence because it was subsumed with a focus on efficiency. They felt that this made 
reform actors less likely to engage with the issue of independence directly. Consequently, 
their discursive and practical variation of judicial reforms focussed more concretely on 
independence.  
In terms of selection, a discourse that prioritises independence is selected in response to the 
dominant understanding of efficiency-orientated reforms. Some actors were critical of the 
way in which reforms neglected meaningful engagement with a full range of judicial actors 
and instead prioritised governmental justice sector actors. This perspective was 
communicated by an interviewee who highlighted how current reforms empowered 
ministerial bodies that had sought to curtail judicial independence in the past. They also went 
further and argued that judicial reforms empowered justice sector ministries and not judges. 
This demonstrates how existing institutional competition and tension influences the selection 
of discourses in organisational settings:  
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What I’m concerned about is the inclusiveness of the process. They [Ministry of Justice] 
are the ones driving the process but they are the ones behind the wheel, no one else is 
in the car. And then they have to go back and correct it as the process is not inclusive.72  
 
Selection was further reinforced because the interviewee had pre-existing negative 
experiences with EU-led judicial reforms in Serbia. The EU was seen to emphasise other 
concepts such as efficiency and accountability at the expense of independence. The 
interviewee argued that this demonstrated the EU’s interest in promoting its own interests 
through judicial reforms at the expense of judicial independence. It was argued that this had 
resulted in the failure of reform projects to improve judicial integrity. The interviewee’s 
internal narrative of events appeared plausible because it resonated with their existing 
experiences and interpretation of events:  
The least successful projects when it comes to rule of law in the judiciary were EU 
projects. It’s difficult to comprehend and then it’s awful because the EU keeps on 
insisting on efficiency, accountability and other bullshit and then on the other hand 
they are not offering meaningful assistance.73 
 
Selection also occurred in this case because the interviewee could relate judicial 
independence to their own personal identity. The interviewee had spent many years in 
Serbia’s judicial sector and had worked at different levels. For them, independence was 
central to their professional identity and any attempt to subvert independence or associate 
it with other concepts was resisted. Their personal identity helped retain and reinforce the 
discourse that independence should structure reforms first and efficiency should follow.  
                                                             




Historical events and circumstances also confirmed the need to focus decisively on 
independence. Serbia’s previous poor track record on judicial reforms, its historical 
illiberalism during the 1990s and protracted nature of its democratisation process, reinforced 
the belief that any variation of judicial reform that did not prioritise independence would 
enable judicial politicisation. Identity, context and retrospection are clearly important in this 
case: 
As of 2001, that is a crucial year for Serbian judiciary as crucial laws were introduced 
in 2001. There was a separate law on judges, a separate law on prosecutors, the law 
on court organisation was significantly changed. That was the first milestone for the 
judicial reform process in Serbia. Ever since then, that was the start but also the peak 
in terms of judicial independence. Ever since then we have been losing it bit by bit.  Or 
it has been restricted from different sides so it’s an on-going battle. I think 2001 is 
when I felt most freedom in the judiciary and in the courts as a judge.74 
 
In terms of retention, the independence discourse was retained through the actions of the 
interviewee to try and make sure their own organisation’s procedure fully adhered to 
independence. This meant that the interviewee tried where possible to prioritise and 
promote reforms that they felt supported independence. This was perhaps most visible in the 
institutional culture they had helped co-construct within their institution. One way in which 
they did this was through extensive internal consultations and the construction of everyday 
work practices that occurred alongside and separately from externally driven reforms. These, 
they argued, helped the institution stay ahead of the reform curve and embed the concept of 




independence in everyday work practices. It also demonstrated how rule of law reforms 
grounded in independence could be effectively institutionalised in practice:  
That’s why I’m very happy the [Supreme] Court is probably always one or two steps 
ahead of everyone else [in terms of judicial reform]. They are planning very much in 
advance. They are getting criticised in the sector and among colleagues that they are 
hurrying compared to the others and are not respecting the pace of the rest of the 
sector. Luckily, they have very good leadership now and people who are progressive 
thinkers.75 
 
Another way in which retention occurred was through the mobilisation of institutional staff 
to produce a domestically driven reform agenda. By using the experiences of staff and looking 
inwards as opposed to looking outwards to understand how independence could be 
prioritised, the interviewee argued that their institution had successfully reached an internal 
consensus that would safeguard and enhance judicial independence wherever possible. 
Having done this, the institution could then begin to construct their own reform strategy. This 
reinforced the retention of independence by codifying independence as an institutional rule, 
as well as by allowing the institution to reach out and communicate the importance of judicial 
independence to other institutions: 
I’m working now with judges who have been judges for 40 years already. They can 
estimate how the system behaves when certain things occur. In that sense, I don’t think 
that kind of intellectual and institutional memory exists anywhere else in the sector. At 
this moment, I think that when it comes to proactive thinking that newly created 
chambers are also very proactive in reaching out to partners [to support independence]. 




They want to exchange, they want to meet, they want to discuss problematic issues 
and issues of common interest, but I don’t see that anywhere else unfortunately.76 
 
This alternative understanding of judicial reform demonstrates how different understandings 
can act as a driver of judicial reform. In this case, independence is constructed as a competing 
focus to efficiency. While its proponents would argue this is important to safeguard the 
judiciary from other influences, the narrow-minded focus of these contesting actors also 
reinforced the limited dialogue between different actors. In this sense, it reinforced the same 
atomised dynamics as efficiency because it prioritised a single concept and drew limited links 
between independence and efficiency. This further demonstrates the fragmented nature of 
the reform process and the failure of different reform actors to break out of their institutional 
silos to create a cross-sectoral reform dialogue. In turn, this frustrated attempts to construct 
shared understandings and institutionalise the rule of law in practice.  
While both groups of actors adopt a singular dominant understanding that limits cognitive 
capacity and the ability to construct a holistic reform agenda, the presence of these 
differences are telling of the integration process. The differences in discursive variation, 
selection and retention, demonstrate that EU accession reforms are far from a linear process. 
Actor semiosis shapes how accession reforms are interpreted. Reforms are understood and 
reconstructed differentially, depending on how actors understand reforms within their 
organisational context. Different understandings impact reform strategies and influence the 
extent to which distinct discourses become embedded within institutional rules and norms. 





This impacts the institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice when different 
understandings are not reconciled and related to one another effectively.  
 
7.2.1 Contestation II:  Ownership 
A second understanding emerged as an alternative understanding to efficiency. This 
understanding focussed on the need for reform ‘ownership’. Its discursive variation highlights 
how accession-based reforms are perceived as difficult to implement because they are overly 
complex. Consequently, it constructs an alternative understanding that contests outside 
reforms and calls for the construction of more parsimonious and domestically derived reform 
solutions. This variation is interesting in that unlike the previous discourses, its proponents 
tried to initiate cross-sectoral dialogue that was based on substantive reasoning and sought 
to be ‘stupidity-disturbing’ (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p.1212). 
In terms of the discursive variation of ownership, its origins lie in the belief among some 
actors that current reforms are too complex and over-emphasise information. These actors 
were again peripheral to the previously outlined policy network. This suggests that part of the 
reason that reforms were seen as too complex, lacked domestic ownership and did not 
resonate, is because they were not adequately communicated towards actors who were not 
central to the policy network. The idea of complexity and its association with judicial reforms 
was communicated by one interviewee. For them, judicial reform was likely to occur only if 
domestic actors were given space by the EU and the international community to construct 
their own reform strategy. This variation emphasised the idea of ownership and the need for 
Serbia to develop its own strategy of reform. The emphasis placed on the ownership concept 
208 
  
stood in contrast to the other concepts of efficiency and independence because it concerned 
the practice as opposed to the content of reform processes: 
The EU needs to let Serbia pick its own ways to its goals.77  
 
Another interviewee that shared this perspective provided insight into why the ownership 
variation was selected. The failure of the efficiency narrative to reflect the interviewee’s 
organisational reality meant that accession reforms were deemed too complex to effectively 
implement. They referenced their organisation’s lack of resources and expertise as significant 
barriers that blocked the implementation of efficiency-orientated judicial reforms. 
Consequently, the interviewee felt that reforms should consider these limitations if they were 
to be successfully implemented and their complexity reduced:  
For other colleagues, European integration is seen as some sort of additional pressure 
on them. Maybe the way of functioning has changed slightly as we are more efficient 
in some communication, but I can say we can only talk about efficiency only when we 
have to do something in regard to EU integration as we are given strict deadlines.78 
 
Selection of this ownership discourse also emerged in response to externally driven reforms 
that had taken place in Serbia.  One interviewee explained how they focussed on the need for 
ownership based on their own experience of working in Serbia over the past decade. Their 
experiences had convinced them that authentic reform would only occur if reforms were 
domestically driven and domestic actors had true ownership.  They argued that when it came 
                                                             
77 Interviewee A, State Ombudsman, Belgrade. Interview conducted 29 April 2016. 
78 Interview with official from the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, Belgrade. 
Interview conducted 8 April 2016. 
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to judicial reform, ‘ownership’ was used as a buzzword by external actors to legitimise 
reforms. In terms of strategy that embodied ownership, they felt bottom-up approaches were 
largely neglected. Despite its current absence, they argued ownership was important for 
achieving true judicial independence. The viability of the ownership variation was thus 
sustained because it was perceived to be an effective strategy for achieving other 
organisational objectives such as independence: 
The key buzzword is local ownership, but it doesn’t really seem like they care about 
local ownership. But in Serbia, there doesn’t really seem to be local ownership or faith 
that reform can be generated from the bottom up…. local ownership is really important 
[for improving independence] but unfortunately it is rare.79 
 
In terms of retention, ownership appeared to be a poorly institutionalised concept and was 
thus weakly retained. This lies in contrast to the previous variations that could be retained 
through their reproduction in organisational rules, routines and technologies. While weakly 
retained in comparison to the other variations, one interviewee gave an example of how 
ownership could be retained as an organising principle for judicial reforms:  
Reforms often lack ownership and there is a lack of authentic political desire. Therefore, 
accession often follows a ‘ticking the boxes approach’ for enlargement. Countries need 
to be able to produce their own strategies.80 
 
This demonstrates that providing domestic actors with the agency to devise their own reform 
strategies and empowering them to pursue these strategies, could serve to translate the 
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80 Interview with a Dutch diplomat, Belgrade. Interview conducted 1 April 2016. 
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concept of ownership from discourse to practice. This highlights the important role that the 
construction of new organisational routines plays in retaining selected discursive variations. 
Another interviewee gave an example of how ownership had been successfully retained, all 
be it in a comparatively limited manner to the other variations discussed in this chapter. This 
external actor argued that they had supported ownership by changing the way in which they 
engaged with domestic actors in Serbia. They highlighted how new institutional procedure 
that reduced some of the complexities that surround reforms — such as tendering processes 
for selecting domestic partners — had opened the possibility for new forms of ownership.  
We can also turn around and have a dialogue to change programmes when things 
aren’t working. I think that makes us a good partner. We are also not bound by this 
tendering in Europe. We leave it to the institution here to do the tendering, which has 
been very challenging by the way, and has been the cause of delays, but it creates 
ownership and interest. 81 
 
This approach improved the institutionalisation of the ownership concept by enabling 
domestic actors to select their own strategy to achieve reform outcomes. This helped embody 
the idea of ownership in practice and translate an at times abstract concept into a functional 
outcome. The interviewee argued that facilitating ownership in practice helped the concept 
resonate by demonstrating its practical benefit:  
When we focus on disciplinary mechanisms in courts we invite people who work on 
that, but that’s not enough. You need the Supreme Court judges, you need the 
ownership elsewhere, so we try to have a mix.  82 
                                                             





In sum, interviewees felt that current reform complexity increased the organisational 
pressure placed on institutions tasked with undertaking reforms. They felt that domestic 
institutions often had to implement complex reforms that tried to communicate too much 
information, with limited knowledge and resources. The idea that more information is good 
was challenged by these actors who felt it could not be put to good use. This is an important 
point as successful organisational change is not only the result of available information, but 
also organisations having the capacity to be able to understand and apply information 
effectively (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, pp.1201–1202). The failure of current reforms to find 
resonance not only led to poor understanding, it also reinforced calls for ownership. While 
embryonic, calls for more ownership have the potential to help create a holistic reform 
process, because it calls for open dialogue between actors and enhanced domestic agency. 
The more effective institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice would require a necessary 
reconciliation of ownership with efficiency. Instead of thinking about efficiency as it is defined 
by external actors, one way this might come about is through the bottom-up generation of 
efficiency concepts which are grounded in domestic ownership and simultaneously support 
judicial independence. This shared understanding would overcome contestation and more 
effectively support the internalisation of shared rule of law understandings.  
7.3 What do these understandings tell us about the state of European integration? 
Four points of discussion emerge from the analysis of how actors understand judicial reform. 
First, it is evident that different understandings of the judicial reform process exist. 
Interviewees that emphasised efficiency tended to view the outcomes of current reforms 
positively. Those that prioritised independence expressed concern that judicial reforms would 
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empower government actors at the expense of judicial actors. Interviewees that emphasised 
ownership were rather indifferent to the outcome of reforms and instead focussed on the 
extent to which reforms achieved their intended outcomes. This cross-section of different 
understandings demonstrates the contested nature of EU reforms. Chapter 2 outlined how 
the existing literature tends to underemphasise contestation and views actors as conforming 
to a set ‘logic’, whether it consequential or normative, during their enactment of EU reforms. 
A CPE approach has demonstrated that this is too simplistic. Looking at the organisational 
context in which actors are situated demonstrates the different factors that shape how they 
interpret reforms and subsequently the different understandings that emerge. The role 
occupied by actors, their interactions with other actors, their experiences past and present of 
reforms and their perceived interests are all significant in shaping their understanding of an 
issue. These understandings have been shown to be significant because they shape the type 
of judicial structures that are being reformed and constructed in Serbia.  
Second, in terms of what this tells us about the EU’s new approach, despite trying to create a 
more coherent approach that puts rule of law first, reforms seem to be inevitably 
multifaceted. This is exemplified by the different meanings that actors attach to EU reforms. 
Given that the data presented here represents only a cross-section of actors, albeit a 
significant cross-section, it is reasonable to assume that different understandings are likely to 
permeate multiple levels of governance. This lack of coherence is not a failure of the EU’s 
approach per-se, but rather an organisational reality that makes the implementation of 
reforms challenging. The EU’s new approach aims to create a clear and identifiable reform 
agenda for Serbia and other Candidate States to follow. However, reforms are multifaceted 
and coherence unlikely. The emergence of different understandings and the limited dialogue 
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between actors who hold these contrasting understandings demonstrates how actors tend to 
lack a holistic approach when it comes to organisational reform. The myopic thinking, evident 
in the cases of efficiency and independence, suggest that current reforms would benefit from 
more open dialogue between actors. 
Third, it is important to note that different understandings are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. As the case of efficiency shows, often actors believe the prioritisation of a specific 
discursive variation will enable them to achieve other objectives and reform goals such as 
independence. However, the evidence presented here suggests that actors struggle to 
reconcile multiple reform narratives. Furthermore, they fail to successfully draw links 
between contesting reform concepts and reconcile them. Consequently, this proliferates 
myopic thinking as actors tend to prioritise a specific discourse. This is subsequently reflected 
in their implementation of reform programmes that may at times include the language of 
other discursive variations, while in practice, reinforcing only one variation. This suggests that 
the sheer scope of the EU’s reform agenda makes complete implementation a challenging 
and long-drawn process. 
Finally, the presented data demonstrates how rule of law reforms intersect with domestic 
and supranational politics. For example, the idea of efficiency reflects a neoliberal discourse 
and is promoted by actors that explicitly adhere to a neoliberal project of state-building. 
Independence tended to be prioritised by domestic actors that feared a return of Serbia’s 
illiberal past and sought to safeguard its fledgling democracy. Finally, actors that emphasised 
ownership tended to not have a political project in mind but rather, expressed their desire to 
formulate their own reform strategy, regardless of what that might entail. These insights 
demonstrate the value of ascertaining how actors organise their experiences. Not only do 
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actors’ understandings tell us something about judicial reform in Serbia, they also tell us 
about the character of European integration and the type of polity being constructed in Serbia. 
These bottom-up insights can complement the existing literature on state-building by 
demonstrating how actors tasked with state-building understand political projects and 
construct new governance structures in practice.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter applied a CPE framework to explore how actors understand judicial reform. In 
doing so, it opened the ‘black box’ of a key EU accession reform related to the rule of law.  By 
focussing on how actors understand and make sense of judicial reforms, it was shown that 
reforms are organised in Serbia in different ways. This differentiated organisation among 
actors is important because it shapes how reforms evolve within Serbia. Organisation also 
flows outwards as different understandings shape the way domestic actors engage with 
outside actors. This demonstrates that far from being a process of linear diffusion or rule 
transfer, EU accession reforms occur dialectically. They are shaped not only by the EU’s 
accession strategy but, perhaps most crucially, by the way domestic actors understand and 
selectively implement different understandings in practice. 
This finding is important as it has implications for the thesis’ second research question. 
Analysis suggests that the effectiveness of the EU’s new approach is contingent on the 
domestic environment through which EU reforms are mediated. This suggests that 
successfully constructing the rule of law and robust democratic institutions in Serbia is not 
only a question of ‘good’ EU strategy.  It is also a question of ensuring reforms are coherently 
interpreted and accepted by domestic actors.  
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This chapter also suggested that if the EU is to be successful in constructing robust rule of law 
institutions, it must produce more localised forms of state-building. It must seek to avoid 
simply imposing external logics and understandings into the domestic context of Serbia and 
instead engage with the domestic dimension and support the co-construction of new 
institutions.  The evidence presented here suggests that external reform actors need to pay 
closer attention to the organisational contexts, institutional limits and differences of opinion 
which need to be resolved within Serbia. 
The findings of this chapter further echo the findings of chapter 6, where it was argued the 
EU’s current approach remains exclusionary and has favoured the empowerment of complicit 
actors, at the expense of other contesting actors. While understandings of efficiency have 
found much external support, understandings of independence and ownership were less 
enthusiastically supported. This was visible in the prioritisation of the efficiency discourse 
among external actors. This was shown to be problematic in this chapter, as it reinforced 
blinkered reform processes and failed to generate broader support and legitimacy for reforms 
within the judicial sector. This reinforces the claim made earlier in this thesis that open 
dialogue between actors is important for generating legitimate and inclusive reform 
processes that do not exacerbate existing power imbalances between actors. It also shows 
that reforms need to support the construction of shared understandings that can enable the 
wider institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice. 
The next chapter applies a CPE approach to anti-corruption policy in Serbia. It demonstrates 
how some of the general characteristics of semiosis highlighted in this chapter are also 
applicable in explaining the emergence of actors’ understandings in a different policy area. 
For example, existing beliefs, organisational objectives and biases all play an important role 
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Chapter 8: Understandings of (anti) corruption 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses anti-corruption reforms in Serbia. It is the second of three chapters 
forming a comparative analysis of three key rule of law policy areas. This chapter addresses 
several specific questions: How do key actors construct an understanding of anti-corruption 
policy through semiosis and what informs these understandings? To what extent do the 
understandings of different actors converge, diverge or conflict and why?  What do these 
understandings tell us about rule of law reforms in Serbia and European integration more 
generally? These questions help this chapter contribute to an understanding of the thesis’ 
second research question by ascertaining whether the EU’s new approach allows for multiple 
understandings of anti-corruption reforms to be reconciled and institutionalised. This 
chapter’s analysis unfolds as follows.  
First, drawing from the analytical framework already established, this chapter identifies 
instances of variation, selection and retention, which leads to the emergence of a dominant 
understanding. Its discursive variation of anti-corruption reforms emphasised the importance 
of administrative and institutional culture. In focussing on this type of culture, this discourse 
suggested that the target of anti-corruption policy should be individual officials whose actions 
and behaviour contribute to the creation of deviant institutional culture. The ideas of ‘good 
governance’ permeate the discourse. This variation was selected in relation to actors’ 
objectives, identity, function and the feasibility of being able to address corruption by 
changing the behaviour and practices of individuals. Its retention occurred through 
socialisation processes, work routines and the construction of reform agendas that 
emphasised that corruption could be rectified by changing institutional routines and the 
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individual behaviour of public officials. It further emphasised the need for Serbia to improve 
the integrity of its public administration through the construction of ‘good governance’. This 
understanding was prevalent among newly established domestic institutions in Serbia and a 
range of key external actors.  
Second a number of divergent understandings, which contest this dominant understanding, 
are presented. These understandings all contest the idea that corruption can be reduced to 
an issue of culture and subsequently emphasise an alternative perspective of how anti-
corruption policy can be constructed.  In terms of variation, contesting perspectives 
emphasised the role of the economy, history and political elites as significant causes of 
corruption. The selection of these contesting discourses was shaped by the objectives, 
identity and organisation where an interviewee is based. Organisational routine, work 
procedures and processes of dialogue led to the retention of these understandings.  
Third, some inferences are made about the state of anti-corruption policy in Serbia, the EU’s 
attempts to combat corruption and the transformative impact of EU rule of law reforms. This 
section highlights how the presence of multiple understandings challenges the ability of the 
EU and allied actors to implement a cohesive reform programme in Serbia. This multiplicity 
of understandings is argued to reflect different visions of state-building in Serbia. While the 
dominant understanding —with its focus on good governance— reflects the EU’s current 
neoliberal state-building paradigm, contrasting understandings suggest some actors seek a 
more radical change in politics to combat corruption.  
This chapter concludes by reflecting on the degree of fit or contestation between the 
understandings of different actors and what this tells us about the effectiveness of the EU’s 
approach for ensuring the institutionalisation of the rule of law in Serbia. In reflecting on this, 
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the conclusion substantiates an argument made throughout the thesis; that the EU has 
successfully secured the support of key domestic actors for its rule of law agenda in Serbia. 
This has successfully institutionalised key rule of law criteria, as reflected in the 
understandings of key actors. However, in prioritising a narrow understanding of the issue, 
the EU and government actors have not integrated legitimate divergent and contesting 
understandings that reflect a concern about the role that elites play in politics into their 
reform agenda. In Serbia, this has resulted in the construction of competing understandings 
and related political projects. Contesting actors can block the wider institutionalisation of the 
rule of law in practice and a process of dialogue is not initiated to overcome and resolve 
contestation. 
8.1 Corruption, institutional culture and ‘good governance’ 
The fight against corruption is an integral part of Serbia’s rule of law reforms. The European 
Commission defines corruption generally as the abuse of power for private gain (EUR-Lex, 2011).  
In the context of EU accession, corruption is spoken about in relation to democratic institutions 
and the need for reliable institutions ‘to underpin a coherent policy of prevention and 
deterrence of corruption’ (European Commission, 2015b). This means the type of corruption 
of concern to the EU is instances of state-level corruption and the use of public office for private 
gain. This concern has led to the establishment of several new anti-corruption institutions in EU 
Candidate States. In Serbia, the key institution in this area is the Serbian Anti-Corruption Agency 
(ACA) (Republic of Serbia Anti-Corruption Agency, 2017). A large part of ACA’s work is focused 
on trying to change Serbia’s administrative culture. It seeks to educate public officials, monitor 
their conduct and identify institutional gaps in the public administration that may enable 
corrupt practice. ACA’s strategy for fighting corruption is informed by a perspective that 
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corruption is a consequence of institutional culture. This perspective focuses on an 
individualistic understanding of corruption heavily associated with a neoliberal characterisation 
of corruption, which emphasises that competent public servants manage their affairs well; the 
implication being corruption stems from the incompetence of public officials (Hilgers, 2012, 
p.86). This characterisation represents corruption as an individual phenomenon that occurs in 
institutions which lack clear boundaries, adequate training processes and appropriate 
institutional norms. Strategies to fight corruption are subsequently focussed on changing 
individual conduct and instilling principles of integrity within institutions. As Ashforth et al. 
(2008b) note, this ‘micro view assumes that bad apples make bad barrels’ (2008b, p.678).  
This understanding emerged in ACA’s organisational setting through socialisation and was 
shared by several external actors that interacted closely with ACA. External CoE bodies, OECD, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and EU actors, were some of the most 
notable and central network actors that shared this perspective.83 These actors in their official 
discourse advocated this individualist, institutionally bound and neoliberal perspective of 
corruption. For example, in its 2014 Anti-corruption report relating to corruption within the EU, 
the European Commission emphasised the importance of good governance and how 
‘improving the efficiency of public administration, especially if combined with greater 
transparency, can help mitigate corruption-related risks’ (European Commission, 2014, p.3). 
In the first instance, external actors agreed that institutional culture is a significant cause of 
corruption.  In the second instance, this understanding emerged in domestic institutions 
through interaction and socialisation with external actors. ACA’s own views of corruption and 
                                                             
83 The close relationship between ACA and these organisations was captured in the network diagrams in 
chapter 6 and was also communicated directly by an interviewee at ACA. Interview with official from the 
Serbian Anti-corruption Agency, Belgrade. Interview conducted 2 March 2016.   
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its procedures were heavily shaped through EU TAIEX and Twinning programmes, as well as 
interaction with other external actors.84 
In terms of variation, ACA argued that at the beginning of its work, corruption was not taboo in 
the public administration and that a sense of ‘appropriateness’ did not exist among individuals 
about the potential for practices to lead to corruption. They believed there was not enough 
discussion about the inherent ‘wrongness’ of engaging in corruption within public institutions 
(Abbott & Snidal, 2002, pp.s146–s148): 
In the beginning of the agency, public officials were not aware of their obligation. It was 
much more a case or there were more cases when they were in delay of submitting the 
reports. They didn’t understand their obligations. Now, the majority of them, they’re 
submitting their reports within the timelines. They know that they have a duty. 85 
 
The selection of this discourse occurred for two reasons. First, its selection made sense to ACA 
in terms of its organisational remit. Most of ACA’s work is focused on changing mentalities and 
behaviour within the public administration. Unlike other justice sector bodies, ACA does not 
have the capacity to enforce compliance with an anti-corruption agenda through prosecutions.  
The idea that corruption within the government was a product of institutional conduct and 
individual behaviours, allowed ACA to make use of the tools it had at its disposal. It also gave 
new impetus to its mission to improve the integrity of public sector administration through the 
development of integrity plans (Republic of Serbia Anti-Corruption Agency, 2017). By focussing 
                                                             
84 The impact of TAIEX and Twinning on was communicated by the interviewee: ‘We are going to ask for EU 
experts and they will come. There are going to be some experts like peer reviews and workshops.’ Interview 
with official from the Serbian Anti-corruption Agency, Belgrade. Interview conducted 2 March 2016.   
85 Interview with official from the Serbian Anti-corruption Agency, Belgrade. Interview conducted 2 March 




on the administrative culture components of corruption, ACA could make best use of its tools 
such as public education schemes and ‘soft’ methods of auditing. This was visible in interview 
responses where ACA staff spoke about the importance of constructing robust legal 
frameworks that prevented deviant behaviour and educational programmes that stigmatised 
corruption. Making sense of corruption as an outcome of administrative culture reinforced 
the view of the interviewee that ACA’s existing focus on changing the mentalities and 
behaviour of officials would subsequently change collective administrative culture and 
therefore reduce corruption: 
That means the agency has competencies to monitor the implementation of the national 
anti-corruption strategy, dealing with conflict of interest cases, detection and resolving 
cases of conflict of interest, controlling the asset and declaration operations of public 
officials, dealing with different educational issues and with the prevention of sector 
corruption, this includes also analysis of draft laws and laws, integrity plans, monitoring 
of implementation of integrity plans, training and education of public officials, primarily 
designing the programmes and tailor made trainings, mostly related to ethics and 
integrity.86 
 
Selection also occurred because ACA understood reforms sequentially. It was argued that 
tackling the culture of corruption would hopefully reduce the number of cases sent to the 
State Prosecutor and other enforcement bodies, thereby reducing their workload and 
increasing their efficiency. ACA believed that if they could change the administrative culture 
and the behaviour of public officials, corruption would become less widespread. In this sense, 




a focus on culture allowed ACA to make the most of its institutional tools and support other 
justice sector bodies in their fight against corruption.  
The fight against corruption is a strategic priority of the government and the whole 
country. We all are working together, we are all on the same page. Judiciary, 
Prosecutors Office, national assembly, NGOs- who we cooperate with in the prevention 
sector, a very important part of our work. 87 
 
Another reason for ACA’s selection of ‘corruption as institutional culture’ lied in its extensive 
socialisation with external actors. In terms of the socialisation dynamics that were explored in 
chapter 6, ACA had close ties with several actors. Domestically, this included the Serbian State 
Prosecutor, Misdemeanour Courts and the Ministry of Justice. In addition to these actors, ACA 
socialised extensively with external actors that included the OSCE, CoE anti-corruption bodies 
and the UNODC. The socialisation of ACA with other actors appeared to shape its 
understanding of corruption issues.  ACA saw itself as part of a coalition of international actors 
engaged in the fight against corruption. ACA noted that it was a member of various anti-
corruption networks and was keen to emphasise its extensive interaction with international 
bodies in the fight against corruption. The concept of corruption as culture resonated with 
objectives set by external actors and its selection allowed ACA to meet the expectations of 
external actors, construct a dialogue with these actors and allowed ACA to be viewed positively 
by these actors. It also helped reinforce the identity of ACA as an emerging institution that could 
play an important role both nationally and internationally in the fight against corruption. This 
socialising effect and the consequences of European integration on the identity formation and 




learning processes of domestic actors is well documented by social constructivists (Checkel, 
1999, pp.548–551). For all these reasons, the cultural variation was selected: 
I believe you are aware of GRECO. So, in that sense we are participating in all kinds of 
professional reports and of course regulations… We are cooperating and members of 
Serbian delegation in GRECO [CoE], in the working group for prevention, we are also 
participating and are national coordinator for the OECD anti-corruption network… we 
all want to see the system is functional.88 
 
Retention occurred through the construction of anti-corruption programmes that focussed on 
the proposed cultural roots of corruption. ACA’s evaluation procedures and work processes 
were influential in reinforcing the notion that corruption was largely an issue of institutional 
culture among ACA staff. By making sure public officials become familiar with the practice of 
openly declaring assets and conflicts of interest, ACA hoped that new procedures would change 
institutional conduct and disincentivise public officials from engaging in corrupt practice. ACA 
hoped that the administrative culture could be changed by attaching penalties to corrupt 
practice and creating taboos that discouraged appropriating public office for private gain. These 
fixes and recommendations reflect the belief that corruption is a product of institutional culture 
and can be rectified by changing the practice of individuals within institutions. This is an 
individualist as opposed to structural perspective of corruption, associated with a neoliberal or 
even libertarian view of the state (Bedirhanoğlu, 2007, p.1241; Hogdson & Jiang, 2007, p.1047):  
According to the new strategy, there will be changes in our law and the methodology 
will be obligatory meaning that each proposer of the law is to be obliged to apply our 
methodology when drafting the law. Then, they will send to us such a report on risk of 
                                                             
88 Interview with official from the Serbian Anti-corruption Agency, Belgrade. Interview conducted 2 March 
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corruptions and then we are going to check that… so this is a self-estimation of 
institutions, so each institution has to fulfil questionnaires and detailed models, there 
are several areas like public procurement area, HR area, integrity area. We are also 
teaching in a governmental institution tasked with training civil servants.89 
 
The understanding of corruption as a product of culture emphasised the importance of 
institutional culture. This perspective understood corruption to arise when institutions lack a 
sense of appropriateness and individuals within institutions make a conscious choice to 
engage in corruption. This perspective was also reflected in the way that several other actors, 
primarily external actors, understood corruption and constructed an anti-corruption paradigm 
in Serbia. These actors emphasised ‘good governance’. Good governance is commonly 
associated with neoliberal concepts of the state and its associated managerial issues (Joseph, 
2013, p.44; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Analysing how actors construct understandings of 
corruption demonstrates the underlying political project that informs an imaginary of this key 
rule of law issue.  
The organisational setting of these actors and the identification of the ideas informing their 
perspective on corruption, explains why their work to tackle corruption focused on the 
relationship between culture and corruption in Serbia. The promotion of good governance 
has traditionally been associated with a neoliberal discourse of state efficiency and 
restructuring the state in line with ‘entrepreneurial’ values (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, pp.10–12).  
In this case, good governance advocates emphasised the need to change the conduct of public 
sector officials to better reflect values of integrity and accountability. 




The OECD is one important actor that articulated good governance principles through its public 
administration reforms in Serbia. These good governance principles reinforced the importance 
of integrity and asserted the cultural origins of corruption. In terms of variation, this was clearly 
visible in the way the OECD structures its public administration and anti-corruption 
programmes. Programmes such as OECD SIGMA aim to combine strategies for reducing 
corruption with efforts to improve public administration practice and efficiency in accession 
countries like Serbia. This was visible in the way the OECD understood current administrative 
deficiencies in accession countries like Serbia to be a consequence of culture and the mindset 
of individuals within institutions: 
When we say to them that appointments have to be objective, they look at you and say 
I have to get my son a job. It’s my duty as a father to make sure that my family is looked 
after. If I don’t do that [get my son a job], I get no respect from my family or my peers. 
People look at me and say, who is this weird man who won’t look after his family? That’s 
the cultural thing. Again, it won’t be broken down over night.90 
 
This variation also hints that the interviewee in question believed that individual attitudes to 
corruption were almost shaped by national specificities. This ethnocentric perspective would 
constitute a significant cultural bias and its validity has been dismissed in the academic 
literature (Gupta, 1995, p.397; Harrison, 1999, pp.211–212). The interviewee’s response 
however hinted that it may be a factor informing their judgement and if this were the case, it 
should be considered a significant cognitive bias.  
                                                             




The selection of good governance as a fix for corruption occurred because good governance 
concepts underpinned much of the OECD’s existing work. Framing corruption in these terms 
was useful as it appealed to existing understandings among OECD employees and allowed new 
anti-corruption initiatives to be integrated within existing OECD programmes. Selection also 
occurred because it helped support wider OECD objectives in Serbia, as well as internationally 
where the OECD has been promoting good governance in tandem with globalisation since the 
early 1990s (Patomäki, 1999). Addressing individual conduct and mismanagement that 
contributed to cultures of bad governance was perceived to help ‘improve the governance 
and management’ in accession countries like Serbia (OECD, 2017). Changing administrative 
culture and discouraging corruption was further perceived to improve the efficiency and 
integrity of public administrations and support EU institution building in Serbia. As in the other 
cases of selection examined thus far, we find further support for the notion that 
organisational function, including constructed objectives and interests, determine the 
selection of variations that plausibly correspond with existing ways of working, interests and 
beliefs:  
SIGMA was set up about 20 years ago. The guy who came up with the idea felt that at 
the time they knew there was a movement for countries to accede to the EU, the opening 
up of the late 1980s of the CEE. They knew that the administrative systems were 
completely incapable of coping with the challenges of accession. And from what I 
understand, as I wasn’t involved at the start, the EU Commission was struggling as it 
wanted to bring the countries in but they weren’t at a stage where they could be brought 
in... We knew there had to be ownership, so we had to create the change and 
partnership with these people.91 
 




In terms of retention, the OECD sought to construct good governance through its various 
reform programmes. These were designed to change the administrative procedure and 
practice of public officials, while reinforcing the importance of good governance principles 
among OECD staff. One interviewee gave an example of how reform programmes could help 
reinforce the notion of good governance both externally and internally within the OECD. They 
argued that working in partnership with domestic actors towards good governance principles 
not only disseminated them and embedded them locally; it also reinforced the good 
governance agenda among OECD staff:  
But what you hope is that sometime in the future those people will be in a position of power 
again and secondly, if you have a local champion for a number of years, they can do far more 
in terms of persuading colleagues than you can as an outsider. So that’s why we focus on key 
individuals. Some have become local experts for us after.92 
 
Another key external actor that emphasised the cultural determinants of corruption and 
emphasised good governance in its anti-corruption strategy was the CoE. The CoE has two 
primary anti-corruption bodies, the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) and the 
Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the 
Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). The perspective of MONEYVAL will be explored in 
section 8.2.3 as its understanding of corruption differed from GRECO.   
GRECO’s discursive variation had two components. First, it acknowledged that effective legal 
frameworks and government structures must allow law enforcement bodies to pursue and 
prevent corruption. However, this interviewee spent more time communicating the 
importance of the second component, institutional culture. The interviewee emphasised the 




importance of GRECO’s principles and the importance of embedding these principles within 
public institutions: 
And the key thing is that more and more, is not only legislation and implementation but 
location and culture. I would say that is key and maybe we need to be working a bit more 
and I think about anti-corruption institutions in a number of countries that have been 
put together recently and are starting to integrate anti-corruption programmes in the 
framework of civic and ethical education, to integrate this kind of approach because 
what I see in many Balkan or Mediterranean countries is a different [changing] culture.93 
 
This discourse was selected based on GRECO’s previous experiences of fighting corruption. 
Specifically, GRECO sought to address deficiencies in the CoE’s anti-corruption approach, 
which the interviewee argued had overlooked the importance of culture in the past. In 
overlooking culture, they argued that the CoE had placed too much focus on robust legal 
frameworks and formal institutional changes. This, they argued, had led to the construction 
of institutions that had the capacity to fight corruption, but in practice were not underpinned 
by corresponding institutional norms. Lesson learning is a well-documented and significant 
factor informing organisational action (Levitt & March, 1988). Lesson learning was visible in 
this case and had reshaped the way GRECO approached the problem of corruption. The 
interviewee gave an example of how lessons had been learned from previous enlargement 
cases: 
[Things changed] Probably 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania joined and they had the 
verification mechanisms. There was a document after that which said enlargement is 
not only about peace and democracy in Europe but also about making it workable and 
                                                             
93 Interview with official from GRECO, Strasbourg. Interview conducted 3 June 2016. 
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our capacity to accept certain practices and grow in a positive way rather than decrease 
our standards by taking more on board. 94 
 
This selection demonstrates that actors actively draw lessons from previous experiences and 
apply these lessons to try and best achieve current objectives. 
Retention of this variation occurred through changes in GRECO’s work practice. These changes 
better reflected its focus on culture. This is visible in the new dialogue, consultation and 
evaluation procedures it holds with accession countries like Serbia. These procedures are 
increasingly designed to communicate at the country level the importance of reforming 
administrative culture. In carrying out evaluation processes that emphasise administrative 
culture, the notion that culture matters is reinforced among CoE staff: 
I think our evaluation process is key [for preventing corruption]. Our cooperation with 
institutions is key as we carry out visits to see compliance so whilst we use statistical 
data, we need sources of information from site visits and that’s what we, the EU and 
OSCE have with the local offices. 95 
 
The final actor that reinforced the corruption as culture paradigm was the EU. The EU is taken 
as an aggregated actor, meaning that several EU actors communicated this understanding. 
These actors were EU Commission officials, the EU Delegation in Serbia and MEPs. Despite 
working for different institutions within the EU, these actors shared the same perspective on 
corruption. This is because all actors were working towards a common objective: the successful 
establishment of the EU’s rule of law agenda in Serbia and its successful European integration. 





This demonstrated the important role that ‘dominant coalitions’ within organisations play in 
setting shared objectives and shaping understandings (W. R. Scott & Davis, 2015, pp.186–188). 
For example, the EU delegation in Serbia spoke about how a ‘culture’ of corruption permeated 
politics in Serbia: 
Politics in Serbia is quite corrupt, there needs to be a new political order from the top 
down. Civil society can only assist, it cannot make the changes occur at the top of the 
political structure. This is important because rule of law must come from the top down. 
The culture among political elites needs changing. There needs to be a proper cleaning 
of the administration.96 
 
Selection of this variation was reinforced by a sense of group-think within the different EU 
bodies engaged with Serbia and other accession countries. Different actors within the EU 
reiterated the idea that corruption had cultural roots. This led to the establishment of a coalition 
of actors who shared a common understanding. This understanding was further reinforced by 
socialisation between these actors (Sabatier, 1988, pp.147–148). A second cause of selection 
was the compatibility of this corruption understanding with the EU’s broader state-building 
agenda in Serbia. Addressing the cultural causes of corruption was seen to meet the EU’s long-
term objectives of constructing liberal democracy in Serbia. Selection was thus objective 
orientated. This was reflected in the multiple responses of EU actors that linked cultures of 
corruption to accession reforms and state-building more generally. All these responses 
demonstrated a clear reference to the idea that corruption was a product of institutional culture 
and as such, anti-corruption strategy should address these cultural deficiencies within the 
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Serbian public administration by changing the behaviour of individual public officials that 
helped construct this culture: 
The fight against organised crime and corruption, it’s everywhere and it’s really 
necessary to change everything, and to even change the mind-set and it is a very difficult 
issue to achieve this in these negations.97 
 
Corruption and organised crime are widespread in the region… [there is a] need to build 
a track record on investigations… and the need to coordinate and monitor the full 
implementation of the anti-corruption strategy in all key institutions98  
 
Retention occurred through the modification of the EU’s accession approach. This modification 
concerned a change in procedure and practice. These changes increasingly sensitised EU 
officials to the importance of administrative culture and enlargement evaluations were 
increasingly focussed on whether EU officials had observed a change in Serbia’s administrative 
culture. DGNEAR has prioritised the need for Candidate States to construct a track record of 
change to prove that the desired change in practice had occurred: 
That there is ownership of the reforms that are being driven through and that [among] 
Serbian judges and citizens there is an actual interest for them to see what is going on 
and the third pillar is we need to see track record. Where there are investigations, where 
there are cases of high level corruption, here again it helps us in entrenching these 
reforms.99 
                                                             
97 Interviewee with MEP, EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC), Brussels.  
Interview conducted 14 June 2016. 
98 European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the 2015 report on Serbia (2015/2892(RSP)). 
Transcript provided by the office of David McAlister as representing his views on rule of law reforms in Serbia. 




In sum, a dominant understanding implied that corruption is derived from poor administrative 
culture. This understanding linked culture, institutions and individual conduct together to 
explain the causes of corruption. It can thus be characterised as a distinctly neoliberal 
understanding of corruption. This is reflected in the construction of anti-corruption strategies 
that reinforce this focus on the individual level conduct of officials, who are the directors of 
administrative culture. For this reason, focus is placed on changing their behaviour and 
practice by introducing principles of good governance. In the Serbian context, the dominant 
understanding of corruption, much like the dominant understanding of judicial reforms, is 
permeated by a neoliberal discourse and promoted by actors who hold similar views and 
objectives. While Serbia retains its own specificities, the actors promoting this dominant 
understanding, such as the OECD and EU, have an international agenda that seeks to promote 
neoliberal governance globally (Jessop, 2002, pp.457–459). This has also seen these actors 
pursue similar forms of state-building across South East Europe where good governance has 
played a central role in reinforcing the EU enlargement process (Chandler, 2007, pp. 606–607). 
The following sections outlines how divergent and resistant strategies contest this dominant 
understanding. These contrasting understandings subsequently inform a different anti-
corruption perspective that focuses on the economic causes of corruption, the role historical 
legacies play in reproducing corruption and the role that Serbian politics plays in proliferating 
corruption.  
8.2.1 Contestation I: The absence of a systemic approach to corruption 
Actors that emphasised a relationship between culture, institutions, public officials and 
corruption in the previous section, did show an awareness of the political economy of Serbia 
235 
  
and the role it plays in producing corruption. However, they emphasised it far less than 
contesting actors, who saw it as the key factor explaining corruption. Furthermore, the previous 
actors emphasised the need for an anti-corruption strategy to change cultures of governance 
and reflect good governance. Unlike the actors in this section, they emphasised less the need 
to address both the economic and political causes of corruption. The following section explores 
these alternative understandings and their construction.  
In terms of economic causes, a variation emerged that emphasised the role economic 
inequalities and underdevelopment played in proliferating corruption. This perspective 
corresponds with a structural view of corruption. Such a view focusses on the material 
circumstances, relationship between the formal and informal aspects of the economy and social 
relations that produce systemic forms of corruption. Such perspectives are well articulated in 
the literature concerning transitioning economies and their tendency to construct informal 
rules and practices to overcome resource limitations and access issues (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012; 
Wallace & Latcheva, 2006). 
 An interviewee from a key public institution argued that external actors often failed to 
understand the economic factors that allowed corruption to proliferate. Consequently, anti-
corruption strategy and efforts to fight corruption failed to address the underlying causes of 
corruption. This interviewee further took issue with corruption being reduced to dimensions of 
culture, as they argued this overlooked the actual economic causes of corruption:   
Corruption is not a ‘Serbian value’. It emerges in an environment of limited resources 
and institutional inefficiency.  This is even visible in the salaries of officials and doctors. 
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As pay is low, it creates parallel work and parallel financial systems to compensate for 
poor wages.100 
 
By disputing the idea that corruption was a ‘Serbian value’ and placing emphasis on the 
economic conditions and social structures that allowed corruption to persist in transitioning 
contexts, this interviewee sought to challenge the notion that corruption had cultural causes.  
Instead, they focussed on how compensation for poor wages and resource limitations in the 
public sector encouraged informal work practices and corruption to proliferate. These causes 
of corruption have been documented in other transitioning contexts and suggest that Serbia 
is not unique (Graf Lambsdorff, 2005; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). Transitioning countries 
like Serbia often struggle to erase the embedded norms that sustain economic structures and 
the interviewee communicated their support for this perspective. This understanding 
contrasted with the view that anti-corruption policy should target a change in administrative 
culture. It demonstrated resistance to the institutionalisation of anti-corruption policy that 
emphasised administrative culture and advocated an understanding that considered the 
contextual specificities and material impediments to reforms in Serbia.  
The selection of this divergent understanding was reinforced by the interaction of this 
interviewee’s institution with the EU and other external actors in Serbia. Past experiences had 
reinforced the belief that the EU does not have the tools in its rule of law evaluation process 
to properly account for the economic causes of corruption identified by the interviewee. The 
interviewee criticised the entire enlargement reporting process and argued that the type of 
evaluations favoured by the EU and other international actors did not take enough time to 
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understand how issues of corruption are inexorably linked to broader economic structures in 
Serbia, nor how these shape the actions of public officials. Past experiences and ongoing 
engagement with the EU accession process had at times been negative for this actor and this 
made them sceptical of externally derived strategies of addressing corruption. Retrospection 
is thus crucial in this case of selection (K. Weber & Glynn, 2006, p.1646). 
It is difficult for the EU to understand the complexity of factors that lead to issues like 
corruption. It relies on the screening reports and sends experts here to submit progress 
reports. These reports are often foggy and vague and do not say much about the issues. 
It is literally a sentence on our institution in the progress report and when discussing 
specific issues like corruption, maybe a paragraph or so. How can you summarise 
everything in such little space? 101  
 
Retention occurred through the construction of work processes and reform agendas that tried 
to prioritise within-institutional knowledge and their organisation’s subsystem over the 
recommendations of external actors (Barzelay & Gallego, 2006, pp.547–548). These work 
processes involved the formulation of internal institutional practices that while remaining 
complicit with accession reforms, tried to acknowledge and engage with the causes of 
corruption identified by the interviewee. In constructing its own reform agenda, this actor 
still engaged with the EU and other external actors. However, as they believed external actors 
did not adequately understand how corruption affected their organisation’s work, they did 
not substantively integrate external recommendations into their work practice. This resulted 
in the partial institutionalisation of the EU’s agenda but primarily resulted in the 
internalisation of the Ombudsman’s own agenda. The actor sought to respond to the 




challenges of corruption by addressing what they perceived to be the root causes of 
corruption. This meant that their own anti-corruption practice focussed on improving the 
capacities of their institution and where possible, tried to put forward their own plans for 
addressing corruption and other rule of law issues in Serbia. This was further visible in the 
interviewee’s call for the ‘de-expertisation’ of their own institution from external actors.  
There is also an argument for the de-politicisation and de-expertisation as a means to 
save Serbia. OECD SIGMA, OSCE, UNDP, there are too many projects and institutions are 
often overwhelmed with too much information that is sometimes conflicting.102  
 
The perspective of this actor highlights a recurring tension in the EU’s rule of law agenda. The 
presence of different understandings demonstrates the difficulty in ensuring the cohesion of 
domestic reforms in Serbia. Despite extensive socialisation which has constructed a dominant 
reform paradigm on many issues, some actors still take issue with the EU’s state-building 
approach and the perceived lack of ownership or input provided to domestic actors. This is 
an important point as it has been argued that ‘institutions of governance can only be effective 
and legitimate if people have a sense of ownership’ (Clements et al., p.51). As the EU’s own 
reforms do not resonate with the way in which some actors experience corruption in Serbia, 
their compliance with the EU’s reform agenda is less likely and the possibility for mediating 
contestations and constructing shared understandings reduced. Consequently, the 
institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice is partial.  




8.2.2 Contestation II: Underestimating the challenge 
A second alternative understanding emerged that emphasised how the current anti-
corruption strategy in Serbia did not fully address the historical legacies that had contributed 
to corruption. This perspective put forward the view that the historical legacies of conflict had 
made corruption worse. Consequently, anti-corruption strategy should consider these issues 
and seek to address the institutional structures that had emerged in the post-conflict era. 
While this perspective does emphasise the importance of culture, it can be considered a 
contesting understanding because its advocates felt that current anti-corruption strategy did 
not consider the persistence or gravitas of historical legacies in domestic institutions. Such 
perspectives put forward by the interviewees in this section resonate with a body of literature 
highlighting the difficulty of constructing democratic institutions and fighting corruption vis-
a-vis the post-conflict legacies in the Western Balkans (Groß & Grimm, 2014, p.916; Le Billon, 
2008).  
This discursive variation emphasised how historical legacies had set in place specific path-
dependencies that inhibited the fight against corruption. The interviewee emphasised how 
the conflict of the 1990s had two consequences. First, it had disastrous economic 
consequences. The years of sanctions, slow economic growth and depletion of the public 
sector had in their view, significantly reduced the capacity of Serbia’s public sector to fight 
corruption. Second, the conflict and its consequences had affected the mentality of Serbian 
public officials and had made them less inclined to challenge existing organisational routines 
that could allow corruption to proliferate: 
I think very often when they [the international community] analyse things, it’s like a 
switch. The war is over, you press the switch and everything is nice and shiny. Well it’s 
not. I think the turbulence that conflict and 10 years of sanctions have caused in this 
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region are underestimated by the international community in general… It’s created 
resistance [to change], bad business practices, it’s created corruption, it’s created all 
the negative things that any war in any country will create by default.103 
 
While this discourse highlights the plausible relationship between culture and corruption, its 
emphasis on historical legacies was notably absent from the discourse of those actors profiled 
in section 8.1. Conflict in the Western Balkans had produced corruption in many ways, not 
least through the path dependency of power relations that favour political elites and allow 
them to construct sophisticated patronage networks (Belloni & Strazzari, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 
2005, p.6) The interviewee’s communication of this perspective suggests that among 
domestic actors, the consequences of conflict are still influential in shaping how they organise 
their experiences. 
Selection of this variation occurred because it reinforced the interviewee’s existing 
experiences, prior-held beliefs and internal narrative about the reform process. The 
interviewee in question had worked within a major international organisation before taking 
up their current position in the Serbian public administration. Their experience of how 
international organisations worked, coupled with their view of the historical legacies affecting 
the Serbian public administration, reinforced their belief that current anti-corruption reforms 
would fail if they did not sufficiently address post-war legacies. For the interviewee, a long-
term perspective and strategy was needed. The fight against corruption to them was part of 
a long-term state-building process that needed to focus not only on institutional reform but 
also on economic growth and social change.  While they believed EU accession could support 
                                                             
103 Interviewee A, Serbian Ministry of Interior, Belgrade. Interview conducted 7 March 2016. 
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this transformation, they emphasised the process would take far longer than the EU and other 
pro-reform actors had anticipated:  
And I think this is something where I blame the international community and I think 
blame is possibly too strong a word, but I certainly think the international community 
thinks things can be fixed in a click and they just cannot. You can counter that argument 
and say but the war stopped in 2000 so we’ve been waiting for it for 15 years. To which 
the government will then say well yes, but we haven’t had any real change up till 2014. 
There’s been lots of talk but no real change. 104 
 
Retention of this perspective was reinforced through engagement between colleagues within 
the interviewee’s institution. By increasing the amount of horizontal cooperation between 
ministerial staff, the interviewee hoped their organisation would be able to contextualise the 
EU accession process in a way that also considered the difficult historical legacies inherited 
by their institution. This process of retention required translating EU expectations into 
achievable objectives and relating general reforms to specific institutional challenges. By 
relating reforms to challenges perceived from within their institution, the interviewee sought 
to ensure that reforms engaged with historical legacies. The interviewee argued that 
constructing a dialogue with colleagues around these historical legacies helped challenge the 
more enduring patterns of administrative practice that caused corruption: 
You’ve had 10 plus years of nothing basically happening. The degradation almost of a 
system. And now we’re trying to build it up but you’re not building it up from scratch. 
Which would be much easier. You are rebuilding it with lots of [historical] weight and 
that’s more difficult. You have an embedded culture and practices, practices that people 
are not changing. Viewpoints, culture loosely defined, it includes all of these things. So, 
in order to change all of that I think it will be a process of new legislation enforcement, 
                                                             
104 Ibid.  
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a process of education, communication, awareness raising and I think the biggest 
change factor will be the EU negotiating process because it will enforce change.105 
 
For this interviewee, internal experiences and institutional legacies shape how their 
organisation understood the issue of corruption. Serbia’s status as a transitioning country had 
for them constructed networks of patronage and informal norms that allowed corruption to 
persist, despite the country undertaking substantive reforms to address corruption (Kleibrink, 
2015). The limited impact socialisation had on changing this understanding is interesting 
considering the Ministry of the Interior has been cooperating extensively with a range of 
international organisations since 2002. In this case, the embedded institutional logics and 
historical practices of the institution remained persistent. This implies that socialisation has 
clear limits for diffusing new ideas in a highly historicised environment and in this case has 
struggled to change core policy beliefs (Sabatier, 1998, pp.104–105). The salience of this 
contesting understanding and its grounding in historical legacies are issues that the EU’s 
current approach need to consider. By emphasising an individualistic understanding of culture, 
the dominant understanding resonates poorly with contesting actors. This results in 
resistance to reforms, the construction of alternative understandings and limits the 
institutionalisation of anti-corruption reforms in practice.  
8.2.3 Contestation III: Superficial compliance 
A third notable contesting variation of anti-corruption discourse concerned the relationship 
between political elites and corruption. This discourse was particularly prevalent among civil 
society actors who considered the government’s engagement with anti-corruption reforms 




and EU reforms generally as a superficial process. Part of the reason these actors took issue 
with the current anti-corruption agenda in Serbia was because they defined corruption 
differently. MONEYVAL for example is an institution whose remit is focussed on addressing 
organised crime, money laundering and the relationship between organised crime and 
corruption (Council of Europe, 2017). This means that the focus on administrative culture 
embodied by the EU’s understanding of corruption and subject to the programmes of other 
organisations like the OECD, is not the focus of their work. Similarly, civil society actors were 
focussed on salient cases of political corruption, which the EU may be less eager to address 
in its definition of corruption for fear of politicising the issue. This demonstrates how some 
conceptualisations and social constructions are difficult to reconcile through learning and 
socialisation (May, 1992, p.334). The actors in this section emphasised their feelings of 
exclusion from the current reform process and that their recommendations were frequently 
ignored. This context of exclusion reinforced their contesting perspectives.  
This variation emphasised that political networks of patronage were a significant cause of 
corruption. Interviewees emphasised how corruption would continue if existing political elites 
continued to monopolise politics. While one interviewee did concede that public institutions 
should strive to fight corruption and that culture within these institutions played a role, they 
emphasised the need to address issues such as covert privatisations and political patronage 
networks. In their view, these were not being considered or significantly addressed by the 
government or the EU through current reforms: 
Anti-corruption measures are only adopted as some sort of declaration that’s nice to 
present to the public or the EU but, it is not seriously treated by politicians when making 
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concrete decisions and that’s why a huge number of strategies from the measures aren’t 
implemented.106 
 
Selection of this view was reinforced by the interviewee’s interaction with government actors 
and their frustrated attempts to tackle the issue of corruption in Serbia over many years. 
Current events reinforced their pre-existing beliefs about Serbian political elites and the 
ineffectiveness of the EU to push these elites to reform. They believed that current anti-
corruption reforms would not push political elites to tackle high-profile cases of corruption.107 
Having identified the socially systemic nature of corruption and its facilitation through 
enduring networks of political patronage, this interviewee argued that the focus of current 
reforms on institutional reform and the prosecution of small-scale corruption cases did not 
go far enough: 
But still, they [the EU] are failing to spot problematic issues like dubious privatisations, 
which are really a problematic thing in Serbia. They are not addressing that issue as it is 
not part of the acquis.108 
 
Relating contemporary reforms to previous experiences further demonstrates how actor 
semiosis is inclined to construct understandings that reinforce their existing internal 
narratives of policy reforms (Mumby, 1987, p.118). This demonstrates how existing biases, 
which are shaped by previous experiences, determine the way that actors engage with 
contemporary reforms.  
                                                             
106 Interview with head of office, Transparency International, Belgrade. Interview conducted 5 May 2016. 
107 For evidence on the difficulties of establishing anti-corruption agencies and policy in poorly governed 
states, see Meagher (2005). 
108 Interview with head of office, Transparency International, Belgrade. Interview conducted 5 May 2016 
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Retention was visible in the way this actor’s organisation sought to construct their own 
external evaluations of corruption in Serbia. This actor’s organisation did still liaise with EU 
experts. However, they also contributed to the construction of independent reports. These 
reports encouraged the retention and reinforcement of an alternative anti-corruption 
strategy focussed on challenging political elites and identifying their role in corruption cases. 
This codified their understanding and helped increase the salience of an alternative narrative 
in political and public discourse. This narrative emphasised the need to prevent political 
corruption and large-scale corruption: 
For example, if you look at action plan on Chapter 23, it is not very ambitious, we criticise 
it a lot. Even if fully implemented it wouldn’t resolve some big problems. It would help 
things improve but some big problems would not be tackled. Furthermore, politicians 
quite often abuse EU accession. 109 
 
Another civil society actor put forward a similar understanding of corruption as the previous 
actor. This demonstrates the emergence and presence of a substantive bloc in Serbia that 
continues to understand corruption in relation to the country’s political elites. These actors 
are hostile to the EU’s engagement with elites and instead argue that corruption will not be 
eradicated unless a profound political change occurs. This is visible in the variation of this 
interviewee. Like the previous interviewee, they focussed heavily on the role political elites 
had played in proliferating corruption, particularly in terms of their misuse and abuse of the 
country’s privatisation process. 110  Their anti-corruption perspective subsequently 
                                                             
109 Ibid. 
110 On the relationship between illiberalism, corruption and privatisation in Serbia, see: Hadžić (2002); Gould 
and Sickner (2008). 
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emphasised the need to prosecute political elites and better regulate the privatisation of 
public assets: 
These 24 privatisations were large and had a huge effect on the Serbian economy. They 
went wrong because of the systemic corruption, which is much harder to battle than 
small time corruption. There was a firm promise and the PM was adamant it would be 
resolved. And not even one was resolved…. I think the corrupt system just changed the 
actors. The new guys took the places of the old guys that were conducting corruption. 
The new guys basically figured out more discreet ways of hiding what they did, that’s 
basically it. 111  
 
The selection of this variation occurred because it reinforced the actor’s previous experience 
of politics in Serbia and their own interaction with politicians. The actor’s own understanding 
of anti-corruption was thus selected and integrated into their existing narrative about the 
state of Serbian politics. The interviewee referred to how previous politicians and current 
politicians had engaged in corrupt practice. They also outlined how their own organisation 
had been demonised and attacked by successive government for trying to uncover and report 
on cases of corruption (Spaic, 2016). Previous experiences and pre-conceived notions of the 
political landscape in Serbia thus played a significant role. Anti-corruption strategy promoted 
by the government was thus seen as ineffective given that the politicians promoting anti-
corruption measures were perceived to be corrupt: 
I’m not idealistic about that, I’ve been a journalist here since the beginning of Milošević’s 
rule. I’m very pragmatic about these things. The corruption is so systemic that business 
people in this country are put in a position where they can’t make money if they don’t 
                                                             
111 Interview with a journalist from the Centre for Investigative Journalism (CINS), Belgrade. Interview 
conducted 22 March 2016. 
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engage in some form of corruption. And then the economy is so weak, that the only 
major and only sources of money is the state and you run on state contracts. And small 
businesses are dependent on state contracts. And then the political parties in the weak 
economic system need money and where can they get it from?... It’s a clientelistic system 
now, not a normal economy.112 
 
Retention occurred through this interviewee’s wider work as an advocate for greater 
transparency in Serbian politics and work as an investigative journalist. The integration of an 
anti-corruption agenda into these existing work practices allowed them to further link their 
understanding of corruption with their ideas about politics. The subsequent promotion and 
articulation of an alternative political agenda helped reinforce their belief that the fight 
against corruption required challenging the current political system, rebuilding the economy 
and undertaking a deeper process of democratisation:  
The pre-requisite for everything here is for the country to economically prosper. The 
other thing is the judiciary, but I don’t know how it will be fixed. One of the major issues 
for being a Member State is a stable economy. It makes sense with democracy. Some 
rich countries aren’t democracies, but no poor countries are a democracy.  You need a 
lot of money to be a democracy… if you don’t have a population prepared to engage 
collectively and confront corruption and things like that, it’s hard to expect a decisive 
and significant change in society. It’s a problem, that’s what I’m working on and we try 
and do in this little centre. We try to bring important hidden facts to citizens.113  
 
 
A final interviewee supported this perspective that the interests of political elites sustained 
corruption. As per the other actors, they also called for an anti-corruption strategy that 





focussed on preventing politicians from abusing office for private gain. Interestingly, 
MONEYVAL as an international organisation, held a rather different view than the other 
international organisations. This is a result of their focus on the relationship between 
organised crime and corruption, which is less emphasised by other actors. It is also a result of 
the interviewee’s own perspective and the personal connections they had with the Western 
Balkans region. This demonstrates that organisational contexts are fluid and dynamic. Whilst 
an interviewee might not speak for all their colleagues, their perspective suggests that at the 
very least, organisations are not monolithic structures and that individual experiences shape 
the work of organisations and help construct collective understandings.  
In discussing the EU’s current anti-corruption strategy and Serbia’s compliance with it, they 
highlighted how the EU’s current approach overlooked the systemic nature of corruption and 
did not address the issues they perceived to be important: 
In my opinion, the EU has become so concerned with stability in the region that it just 
wants things to go ok and things to look good on paper. So, you can trade these rule of 
law issues for other political issues, normalise relations with Kosovo etc.… you aren’t 
encouraging the people who control the system to fundamentally change their attitude 
towards the system and because of that you are really going to struggle to change the 
system level.114 
 
Selection in this case occurred due to the interviewee’s own personal experience being from 
and working in the Western Balkans region. This demonstrates how the identity of an 
                                                             
114 Interview with MONEYVAL official, Strasbourg. Interview conducted 3 June 2016 
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individual, both personally and professionally, can shape their susceptibility to specific 
discursive variations of EU reform narratives: 
I’m not far from the common cultural or legal or any other heritage we share there [the 
Western Balkans]. It smells the same if I may use the term. It was challenging as I came 
from the CoE to the region to work in the field and implement technical assistance in the 
field. I must say I have mixed feelings in the end there are some positives and 
negatives.115  
 
Another factor which determined their selection was the experience they had working to 
implement reform programmes in Serbia and elsewhere in the Western Balkans region. They 
had seen the limited impact anti-corruption reforms have without appropriate political 
support or without a focus on changing the systemic nature of political corruption. This 
reinforced their perspective that reforms would only be effective once they were systemic in 
nature and moved beyond a focus on public administration culture to address issues of 
clientelism: 
We had a good experience with some technical assistance, which involved some 
institutions that I can’t say are underdeveloped, but still the system overall, there you 
may identify issues which are system wide in general. Not at the level at the system 
functions itself. But of course, this is apparently the situation with more or less the whole 
region and when I say region I include Croatia, which is an EU Member State, so I don’t 
think it’s much difference in that sense. 116 
 





Retention of this understanding was limited due to the remit of the interviewee’s organisation. 
An alternative anti-corruption strategy to that of the EU was not implanted in practice by the 
interviewee’s organisation. Consequently, wider retention was limited and this discourse 
remained largely selected at the individual level. However, certain technical assistance 
programmes run by the interviewee had resulted in the variation being reinforced by their 
colleagues and with partners in Serbia. They believed because of this, Serbian actors were 
increasingly prepared to address the systemic causes of corruption. This shows how technical 
assistance and organisational learning between actors can lead to wider retention. It is also 
important to note that the interviewee contrasted these positive experiences with more 
negative experiences. This negative lesson learning further reinforced their belief that 
systemic change was needed (James & Lodge, 2003, p.181): 
Extremely good experience I had with the disciplinary prosecutors of the judicial 
councils... On the other hand, you have these ruling bodies like the High Judicial Council, 
High Prosecutorial Council, Ministry of Justice which are, and of course this is my 
personal opinion, are still, I can’t call it communist heritage but are still somehow still 
have a notion of listening or echoing what is going on at the political level, they have to 
be loyal. 117  
 
In sum, whilst a dominant understanding of anti-corruption reforms is identifiable, multiple 
understandings exist. The limited dialogue between actors with different understandings fails 
to overcome contestation. This limits anti-corruption reforms as their wider 
institutionalisation is contested in their current form. The following section ascertains what 
the different understandings tell us about the state of European integration in Serbia.  




8.3 What do these understandings tell us about the state of European integration? 
Several important points about the nature of anti-corruption reforms and European 
integration in Serbia can be inferred from the responses of interviewees.  First, as was the 
case with judicial reforms, there are multiple ways in which anti-corruption reforms are 
understood, supported and resisted. In the case of anti-corruption, similar cleavages emerged 
to those identified in chapter 7. There is a relative contrast between the perspectives of 
external actors and domestic actors, particularly civil society actors. External actors tended to 
emphasise that anti-corruption policy should work to change the culture of Serbian public 
administration. They subsequently promoted a reform narrative that emphasised the need to 
change administrative culture. While many domestic actors did concede this was a factor, 
they argued that this did not represent the full picture. Contesting actors emphasised the role 
that economic realities and enduring political structures played in proliferating corruption. 
Lived experiences and the way in which interviewees understood Serbia’s post-conflict history 
reinforced the selection and retention of this discursive variation. The presence of these 
different understandings suggests that like judicial reform, anti-corruption strategy has its 
dissidents. The lack of consensus between actors likely undermines the effective 
implementation of anti-corruption policy more widely and the ability to construct a coherent 
policy regime (O’Toole, 2000, pp.276–279). 
Second, in terms of why certain variations were selected and retained by different actors, 
organisational setting played a decisive role. Of those actors that promoted the perspective 
that administrative culture was a significant cause of corruption, many tended to either be 
external actors or new institutions set up specifically at the behest of the EU to combat 
corruption. Among contesting actors, many were domestic institutions or civil society actors 
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who had an intimate experience of how corruption had affected Serbia’s democratic 
development. These actors tended to relate current reforms to previous experiences and 
concluded that anti-corruption efforts did not tackle the root causes of corruption. 
Third, the difficulty the EU and its supporters have in reconciling multiple reform narratives 
are indicative of more fundamental tensions in the EU’s reform agenda. With its focus on 
administrative culture, the EU and allied actors do not explicitly or at least formally, focus on 
the role current political elites are alleged to play in (re)producing corruption in Serbia 
(Vachudova, 2009, p.46). Some actors argued that this was unsurprising, given that EU 
supported privatisation programmes had exacerbated the situation (Elbasani & Šabić, 2017, 
p.8). Resistant domestic actors saw the EU’s agenda as complicity reinforcing domestic elites 
and their political hegemony. This demonstrates the difficulty the EU has in striking a balance 
between engagement and alienation. This raises questions about the feasibility of a truly 
consensual reform agenda emerging in Serbia given the historical roots of corruption. In sum, 
there is a belief that EU integration has potentially exacerbated corruption by prioritising 
short-term political and market gains over long-term development and democratisation. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter engaged with the thesis’ second key research question concerning the 
effectiveness of the EU’s new rule of law approach for ensuring the institutionalisation of the 
rule of law in practice. It also engaged with a set of sub-research questions outlined in the 
introduction. It showed how several important actors, including the EU, understood the fight 
against corruption in relation to culture. In terms of contestation, several actors challenged 
this position and understood the fight against corruption differently. These understandings 
tell us that anti-corruption reforms in Serbia are widely accepted as important. However, 
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disagreement about whether reforms are tackling the correct causes of corruption leads to 
contestation. The insights of interviewees showed that the EU’s rule of law agenda and 
European integration in general, is increasingly shaping the understanding of actors. However, 
it is also generating substantial discontent which is not addressed. These findings were related 
to the wider literature on policy learning, state-building and EU enlargement to demonstrate 
the wider significance of these findings for how we understand policy changes and politics in 
transitioning contexts vis-à-vis EU accession. It demonstrated that European integration is not 
necessarily perceived positively when it is seen to exacerbate corruption, fails to tackle its 
root causes and sacrifices long-term transformation for short-term gains and cooperation 
with elites. The evidence presented here also supports two key points raised elsewhere in this 
thesis.  
First, despite the presence of contestation, the emergence of a shared understanding among 
external actors and some domestics institutions suggests that the EU’s new approach has had 
some effect in terms of changing the way actors understand rule of law issues and the way 
these actors implement these understandings in practice. This suggests that the EU’s new 
approach, whilst not having a systemic impact, can change the way in which domestic actors 
understand and practice the rule of law.  
Second, despite increased coordination and socialisation between the EU, international 
organisations and governmental actors, substantial disagreement persists about the right 
policy approach needed to boost the rule of law in Serbia. This disagreement is more common 
among peripheral policy actors. Often these actors do not reject the need for rule of law. They 
do however reject the current mode through which rule of law is pursued. A common criticism 
of the EU’s approach was the lack of dialogue between the EU and contesting actors. 
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Furthermore, contesting actors perceived the EU to favour the governmental angle of reforms 
and believed the EU neglected the wider participation of other actors in the reform process. 
As this has produced substantial contestation, an approach focussed on wider inclusion would 
appear necessary to resolve contestation. However, as the findings of this chapter suggest, 
dialogue alone may not be able to fix the problematic relations between different actors. This 
means the EU may have to accept that engaging more with some actors will alienate others.  
The next chapter will look at the policy area of fundamental rights, a sub-component of the 













Chapter 9: Understandings of fundamental rights 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses fundamental rights reform in Serbia. It is the final chapter forming a 
comparative analysis of three rule of law policy areas.  As with the previous two chapters, the 
key questions answered in this chapter are: How do key actors construct an understanding of 
fundamental rights through semiosis and what informs these understandings? What 
convergences, contestations and divergences in understandings exist and why? What do 
these understandings tell us about the EU’s rule of law reform agenda in Serbia and European 
integration more generally? 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, drawing from the CPE framework, this chapter 
identifies a dominant understanding of fundamental rights. Its variation emphasised the 
relationship between fundamental rights and relations of power between citizens and the 
state. It also emphasised the relationship between citizen-state relations and socio-economic 
development in Serbia and suggested that fundamental rights should focus on improving the 
rights of citizens and their ability to access the state. Interlocutors advocating this discourse 
argued that the rolling back of state power aided socio-economic development by improving 
social inclusion. Like other cases of semiosis examined in chapters 7 and 8, variation is 
selected in relation to actors’ objectives, identity, function and the need to bring disparate 
policies together under a common theme of ‘access’. Its retention occurred through 
socialisation processes, work routines, the need to find common ground across a range of 
fundamental rights issues and the desire to ensure fundamental rights supported political and 
economic liberalisation. This understanding was prevalent among new governmental actors 
256 
  
and was pushed by a range of actors who promote the parallel democratisation and 
liberalisation of the state in Serbia.   
Second, relevant points of contestation are presented. These contestations centre on the 
perceived lack of debate about the normative content of fundamental rights. Issues of media 
freedom are demonstrated to be a particularly contentious source of opposition, which 
reinforces calls for accession-related reforms to ensure freedom of expression and other 
fundamental rights are supported in practice.  The selection of these contesting discourses 
was favoured by ‘outsider’ actors, such as civil society groups and more critical external actors. 
Selection was heavily shaped by organisational experiences. Retention successfully occurred 
through the construction of collaborative networks. These networks helped promote an 
alternative reform paradigm that seeks to avoid the instrumental use of fundamental rights 
and generate debate about the normative content of accession-related reforms.  
Third, some inferences are made about fundamental rights reforms and what they tell us 
about EU integration and Member State-building in Serbia. This section highlights the 
fragmented nature of fundamental rights policy and, due to the many policy issues it covers, 
the difficulty the EU and reform actors have in constructing an overarching narrative that 
appeals to all actors. To rectify this, the EU frames fundamental rights in a functional way, 
emphasising how it can improve the rights of all citizens and contribute to social inclusion. 
However, contesting actors perceive this framing to reinforce the strategic dimension of the 
EU accession process. Subsequently, an ‘implementation gap’ is considered to exist among 
contesting actors because reforms lack a strong normative foundation. 
This chapter concludes by reflecting on these findings. It further emphasises the perceived 
strategic element of reforms, the permeation of reform discourse with neoliberal vocabulary 
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and the contestation reforms generate. It also offers some reflections on the EU’s overall 
reform strategy and its effectiveness.  
9.1 Fundamental rights as an everyday issue 
Fundamental rights policy is broadly defined and covers many issues ranging from Roma 
inclusion to LGBT rights. The EU defines fundamental rights in relation to its Fundamental 
Rights Charter (European Commission, 2015b). This means it expects Candidate States to 
secure the rights of citizens by supporting dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens 
rights and justice (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000). This leads to an 
overarching focus on ensuring that citizens are protected from the arbitrary actions of the 
state and other individuals and have access to equal opportunities in all areas of life. 
Despite the broad scope of fundamental rights, a salient understanding of fundamental rights 
did emerge in Serbia. This understanding emphasised how a range of minority issues could be 
addressed through readjusting the relationship between citizens and the state. This 
understanding emphasised the importance of increasing social inclusion. Social inclusion is 
typically characterised by attempts to reduce poverty and increase employment (Atkinson, et 
al., 2002, p.3). In Serbia, understanding fundamental rights through social inclusion policy has 
allowed actors to draw together dispersed rights issues, substantiate more abstract human 
rights activities and ensure that fundamental rights also support a liberalising economic 
agenda. 118   Second, fundamental rights and social inclusion activities emphasised the 
importance of empowering the citizen vis-à-vis the state. Interviewees outlined how together, 
                                                             
118 While social inclusion has traditionally been presented as a counterweight to policies that empower the 
market, critical political economy perspectives outline its role in supporting embedded neoliberalism and other 
varieties of capitalism (Apeldoorn, 2009; Palier, 2010; Porter & Craig, 2004). For example, in the context of EU 
enlargement, see Bohle and Greskovits (2007, pp.447–450) and Adam et al. (2009). 
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fundamental rights and social inclusion promoted new legal structures. These were argued to 
secure citizens’ access to the state and make the state more responsive. The relationship 
between social inclusion and fundamental rights outlined in the understandings of actors 
varied slightly, but all actors in this section did make a connection or form an association 
between the two concepts. The first three interviews presented in this section show actors 
emphasising the importance of protecting citizens from the arbitrary power of the state and 
preventing the state from excluding citizens. The final two interviews presented in this section 
show how some actors argue that the protection of citizens from arbitrary powers is best 
achieved through the empowerment of market forces. The narratives of this second group of 
actors reflected more clearly a neoliberal discourse.  These differences are an outcome of 
actor type, with the first three being domestic actors and the final two being external actors. 
The slight differences in their understanding further suggested that fundamental rights and 
social inclusion can support different ‘varieties’ of state-building outcomes, as noted in 
previous accession cases in CEE (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007, p.456). 
The first key actor that communicated an understanding of fundamental rights that focussed 
on the relationship between citizens and the state was an interviewee representing the state 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman was established in 2005 with the Law on the Protector of 
Citizens (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 79/2005 and 54/2007) (OSCE, 2005). Since its 
establishment, one of its key roles has been to protect citizens from cases of exclusion or 
discrimination instigated by state authorities and other bodies exercising public authority 
(Ombudsman of Serbia, 2012). A discursive variation was communicated that articulated the 
role fundamental rights could play in advancing the rights of citizens in relation to the state:  
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Human rights in relation to EU integration is mostly political. When you have human 
rights indicators from the EU perspective, they can be a part of the political game. 
National minorities have never been an issue in post- Milošević Serbia, to the extent as 
before… The legal provisions for protecting minorities are in place in Serbia. We receive 
more complaints as an institution when official documents aren’t written in Cyrillic than 
we do of violations of minority rights. 119 
 
 
In terms of selection, the Ombudsman’s own experience of trying to respond to citizens’ 
complaints influenced the interviewee’s selection. Having to respond to the complaints of 
citizens on a day-to-day basis, of which most complaints concerned administrative procedure, 
led to the Ombudsman understanding fundamental rights in relation to maladministration 
issues. This demonstrates how organisational experiences and objectives (the need to 
respond to citizens) shape understandings. This confirms the importance of experiences and 
objectives in determining selection (Sum & Jessop, 2013, pp.64–65):  
 In summary, most of the complaints we get are not gross violations of human rights but 
maladministration issues which are a question of efficiency in the public 
administration...There is a lack of staff and bad procedures in certain public institutions. 
There are also laws in place that are far from perfect.120 
 
Retention occurred in this case through the organisation’s construction of institutional 
principles. These were designed as a point of reference for Ombudsman staff and established 
an internal institutional logic (Thornton et al., 2012). These principles provided an overarching 
                                                             




objective and helped ensure that human rights provisions were implemented in Serbia. They 
also ensured that public administration officials understood these provisions. These principles 
constituted what the interviewee termed the ‘spirit’ of public administration. For the 
interviewee, these principles helped enshrine a focus on promoting citizens’ rights as part of 
Serbia’s EU accession process: 
The staff here [at the Ombudsman] are generally very good and understand the ‘spirit’ 
of public administration. The ombudsman plays a key role in the EU process by 
ensuring that the human rights provisions Serbia are enacted. 121 
 
This focus on ensuring that fundamental rights provisions served a ‘practical’ function for 
citizens is visible in the discourse of other actors. These actors made explicit reference to the 
role that social inclusion policy could play in upholding fundamental rights on an everyday 
basis. They also believed social inclusion could support Serbia’s broader socio-economic 
transformation in the context of EU accession. One such actor was the Serbian Government’s 
Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Unit (SIPRU). Their variation emphasised that 
embedding fundamental rights required the construction of necessary social provisions and 
increased social inclusion in Serbia. They emphasised the need to have social inclusion as a 
pre-condition for fundamental rights so that citizens’ rights could be reinforced on an 
everyday basis:  
It’s a constant struggle, to strengthen the social dimension of EU accession process. This 
is our mission… you have ever present crisis like refugee crisis, floods, everything. Public 
policies are simply becoming too weak to deal with the enormous scope of challenges. 
We believe that if you want to eradicate terrorism for example, social inclusion is a pre-




condition to eradicate these challenges… it’s also soft measures like dealing with people 
that really make a difference at the end of the day.122 
 
The selection of this variation was a product of SIPRU’s function and the objectives the 
organisation prioritised. As well as fundamental rights issues, the work of SIPRU is focussed 
explicitly on improving social inclusion conditions and boosting employment in Serbia.  The 
interviewee’s selection was further determined by their awareness that EU accession was 
important for Serbia’s development and that their institution was established to improve 
Serbia’s accession prospects by tackling poverty and social inclusion. They subsequently 
talked about how SIPRU’s reforms ‘mirrored’ the EU and responded to the EU’s interest of 
Serbia by constructing a new social and economic model through EU accession. This suggests 
the need to meet the positive appraisal of the EU is also influenced selection:  
Our reforms are mirroring European thoughts and policy developments. There is a 
direct link. Even more so speaking about the social dimension. Even a small step at the 
EU level could be a major step at level of Serbia or other acceding countries so that is 
defiantly so because we react.123 
 
Retention occurred through the production of social inclusion policy that reflected SIPRU’s 
own beliefs about how social inclusion could boost fundamental rights and economic 
development in a complementary manner. Their organisational work was focussed on 
drafting social inclusion and employment strategies for the Government of Serbia. This 
enshrined their beliefs in work practice and procedures.  For example, the process of 
                                                             




producing written documents reinforced the relationship between fundamental rights and 
social inclusion among SIPRU staff. It also created a formal point of reference for other policy 
actors and contributed to the policy debate on fundamental rights and social inclusion: 
At the operational level, we are formal members of six negotiating groups ranging from 
statistics to fundamental rights so we are there and are trying to influence and 
follow…we managed to produce a very good economic reform programme, the ERP, so 
it was adopted by the government. It’s not the first document of that kind but it’s the 
first document we influenced so it has clear measures related to social development. 124 
 
Retention was also possible through the extensive engagement SIPRU had with other actors 
and the strategic links it drew between different policy areas to enact change in fundamental 
rights. The interviewee gave an example of how the rights of the Roma had been improved 
through Roma inclusion programmes. The success of these programmes in reinforcing 
fundamental rights was argued to hinge on the way SIPRU connected them to accession 
reforms and used the prospect of EU integration to reinforce the relationship between 
different policy areas among other actors. This helped them reinforce reforms and link 
fundamental rights, social inclusion and economic development, with the EU accession 
process:  
Roma inclusion is a good example of EU accession being a trigger… [accession prospect] 
was a useful tool for influencing decision makers because they would be exposed to 
political pressure.125 
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This intertwining of fundamental rights and economic reforms by SIPRU demonstrates how 
rule of law issues can be understood in relation to Serbia’s political economy. Like judicial 
reform, which sought to increase the ‘efficiency’ of the state, or anti-corruption reforms, 
which focussed on the relationship between corruption and administrative culture, the 
discourse of fundamental rights is closely associated with economistic discourses (Türkes & 
Gökgöz, 2006, pp.659–660). While the discourse on fundamental rights and social inclusion 
could support a variety of political projects due to its focus on inclusivity, its focus on 
unfettering citizens from the state conveys a view that fundamental rights reforms not only 
require adjusting the mentality of governmental actors, but also reducing the state’s capacity 
to restrict the individual freedoms of its citizens.  
Addressing fundamental rights through social inclusion and appropriate economic reforms 
was also communicated by another interviewee. This interviewee’s narrative was close to 
SIPRU’s. This is a consequence of the close personal relationship the interviewee had with 
officials working in SIPRU. A variation that emphasised the relationship between fundamental 
rights, social inclusion and human rights, was visible when the interviewee discussed the role 
fundamental rights played in supporting development and social change in Serbia: 
The most logical thing you can do if you are an LGBT person, Roma person, is to move 
somewhere where there is more normal life… Despite the fact that social inclusion and 
social protection are part of the soft acquis. Despite that we need to find a way to control 
this aspect of social development.126 
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The interviewee’s subsequent mention of the EU Commission suggested that their 
organisation’s own work was set up to respond to the EU’s approach of blending fundamental 
rights, human rights and social rights together. This demonstrated that the EU’s approach 
changed the way this actor understood rule of law reforms and had shaped their actions. This 
resulted in the selection of a discourse that intertwines the organisation’s work objectives 
with the EU’s objectives: 
Now there are specific benchmarks in Chapter 23 dealing with Roma inclusion. But not 
only for Roma inclusion, it’s about the LGBT person, there are also some measures Serbia 
needs to undertake there…we have seen that European Commission has been looking at 
more and more and more into those issues of social rights and also human rights I have 
to say. 127 
 
Cooperation with the EU and the engagement of the interviewee’s organisation with other 
international organisations and civil society led to retention. This was because other 
organisations supported the view that fundamental rights can be interlinked with economic 
development. This gave the understanding wider social legitimation as it was perceived as 
‘expert’ knowledge within the policy community (Boswell, 2008, p. 472). The interviewee 
outlined how their organisation contributed to policy coalitions on social inclusion issues and 
highlighted their involvement in wider policy networks. The codification of these beliefs in 
draft strategies and policy documents further contributed to the retention of this 
understanding:  
Serbia has developed a poverty reduction strategy in 2003 that was evaluated as an 
excellent document by World Bank and other international organisations. As well as by 




civil society in Serbia which strongly participated in its development. So, it was kind of 
the first document we had developed after Milošević era… It mobilised a lot of resources 
from different parts of society for its implementation and I would assess the nature of 
the poverty reduction strategy as giving importance to social policy development. 128 
 
The linkages made between fundamental rights and social inclusion were also visible in the 
understandings of key international actors active in Serbia. These understandings are 
particularly interesting as these actors further expanded the discourse to highlight the 
positive role market mechanisms could play in enhancing social inclusion and by extension, 
fundamental rights. The Swiss Development Agency (SDC) was particularly proactive in 
promoting this understanding and establishing programmes in Serbia built upon this 
understanding. Its discourse was close to the previous actors but more explicitly deployed a 
neoliberal vocabulary to communicate its perspective. For example, through references to 
accountability and good governance: 
Guaranteeing the accessibility of public services [for citizens], which means social 
inclusion paths, access to education, inclusion of vulnerable groups into everyday life 
and society and reforms of the judicial system to make them more accountable. But if 
you ask me what the main issue would be, it would be good governance and the 
accountability of local government towards the citizen.129 
 
This interviewee also emphasised the good governance component of fundamental rights 
when the importance of accountability was discussed. Their explicit reference to good 
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governance demonstrated the permeation of the social inclusion discourse with a neoliberal 
vocabulary. This is similar to the way neoliberal vocabulary permeated dominant 
understandings in chapters 7 and 8, and reflected calls for a ‘rational’ government (Hilgers, 
2012, pp.85–86).  
Selection occurred because the interviewee’s organisation understood reforms in relation to 
their broader objectives. While previous actors highlighted the importance of using social 
inclusion to support fundamental rights in the context of accession, this interviewee drew a 
direct link between European integration, democracy and social inclusion. For them, 
promoting good social inclusion policy — which reinforced the rights of citizens and provided 
citizens with access to the state — was seen to bolster liberal democracy in Serbia: 
What we are actually doing is promoting these European paths of reforms which will 
help Serbia join the EU. From the standards, to the values, to the different skills. To 
democracy to processes, and we define in this part of the world of shared values, so 
this is exactly what we are doing.130 
 
Retention occurred through the implementation of development portfolios that emphasised 
the importance of key fundamental rights issues in relation to European integration. Devising 
development portfolios resulted in the formulation of new organisational strategy and work 
practices that emphasised the importance of social inclusion for economic prosperity. The 
implementation of these portfolios through engagement with domestic stakeholders 
provided staff with the opportunity to put ideas into practice. This reified key fundamental 
rights concepts and reinforced understandings: 
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We have been here since 1992. In 2001/2002 we started working within the 
development portfolio…We are contributing to that portfolio with specific funds for 
specific topics. Which is good governance and includes gender, as well as Roma 
inclusion.131 
 
The intertwining of fundamental rights with a social inclusion agenda showed that external 
actors aligned with the EU made a clear link between economic prosperity and fundamental 
rights. For example, interviewees representing the European Commission and EU Delegation 
in Serbia were keen to emphasise that fundamental rights helped support liberal democracy. 
Their intertwining of fundamental rights with ideas of inclusive growth reflected a belief that 
fundamental rights can be used to empower citizens, roll back the state and improve 
economic development: 
These values include democracy and human rights but since the economic crisis, 
economic reform is more of an important part of the process too. The new Commission 
under Junker has put these fundamentals, that means Chapters 23 and 24, at the fore 
of the enlargement process.132 
 
Selection occurred because of the way EU actors made sense of European society and how 
they understood the EU’s enlargement process. A pre-existing belief among EU interviewees 
was that it was necessary to reorganise societies in the Western Balkans, if they hoped to join 
the EU and adopt EU norms (Singh, 2015, pp.465–466). Selection was thus influenced by 
existing environmental cues, which elicited a focus on using fundamental rights to restructure 
all aspects of society:  
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Chapters 23 and 24 are very important as they contain key values like fundamental 
rights and the independence of judiciary, which are at the basis of how European 
societies are organised.133 
 
Retention occurred by ensuring work practices made the link between fundamental rights, 
social development and economic growth. The strategic coordination of different instruments 
was argued to put this thinking into practice by providing economic uplift, civil society support 
and fundamental rights support in tandem. This helped EU actors increasingly understand 
these different concepts and instruments in relation to one another. The use of these 
instruments was perceived to help construct a rational state, based on strong principles of 
individual and market freedom (Singh, 2015, p.466): 
IPA, Civil Society Forum and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
are three ‘blended’ and interlinked elements despite constituting separate instruments.134 
 
The association of fundamental rights with other EU objectives demonstrates that the EU’s 
new approach, while focused on specific rule of law criteria, represents a more fundamental 
overhaul. Insights from interviewees suggest the EU is increasingly thinking about how it can 
transform its enlargement agenda by drawing links between different instruments and topics 
to ensure a more thorough transformation of Candidate States into ideal type Member States. 
This further supports the notion that the EU’s engagement with the Candidate States of the 
Western Balkans is distinct from previous enlargements, in that it emphasises a more 
complete transformation and substantive process of Member State-building (Keil, 2013, 
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pp.346–350). However, the presence of contestation suggests that such an approach 
struggles to consider and incorporate contrasting understandings about key issues.  This is 
reflected in the outlined division between actors in the policy network analysed in chapter 6. 
While the contestations that emerged need not be irreconcilable, the lack of dialogue 
between actors and limited attempts to construct shared understandings through mediation 
between contesting actors is problematic. It is problematic because it does not address raised 
concerns and results in a reform process where the understandings and actions of a dominant 
group steer rule of law reform within Serbia. This further implies that while key rule of law 
issues are partly institutionalised, they are differentially understood. The EU’s approach 
results in the institutionalisation of a dominant understanding but does not adequately 
address points of contestation and does not encourage reconciliation between different 
understandings of the key issues associated with fundamental rights reform. This prevents 
effective wider institutionalisation. Greater dialogue between actors to construct shared 
understandings is not enabled due to limited socialisation and the presence of contestation. 
This is further confounded by the presence of hierarchies between actors, which was 
discussed in chapter 6. These hierarchies limit the inclusivity of none-elite actors to help co-
construct rule of law understandings. This dynamic was articulated and acknowledged by the 
EU: 
Civil society continues to do its job but it is often blocked by the administration… The 
deputies will do as the party says hence you need to change the perspective of those 
politicians at the top. People in Serbia like strong leaders in Serbia and this is the same 
with civil society. This often results in certain dominant NGOs unduly influencing the 
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agenda. If you are a small grassroots NGO you can forget about it in terms of providing 
input. 135 
 
9.2.1 Contestation I: What are fundamental rights? 
The first dimension of contestation concerned the perceived politicisation of fundamental 
rights issues. Civil society actors — who were peripheral within the policy network analysed 
in chapter 6 — argued that fundamental rights were increasingly used instrumentally to 
leverage policy change in some areas, whereas less focus was placed on thinking about what 
a corresponding normative fundamental rights framework would look like. These actors did 
not socialise extensively with governmental or external actors and consequently, adopted a 
contesting discourse.  Their understanding can be seen to primarily reflect the concerns of 
civil society actors who argued authentic change had not occurred, despite the immense focus 
placed on fundamental rights reforms.  
A consultant for a major international organisation articulated a variation of fundamental 
rights reforms that emphasised changing the way minorities are treated in practice. They used 
the example of the Roma minority to make this point about how legislative change was often 
decoupled from a change in practice (Zucker, 1987, p.445). Consequently, they argued that 
the normative framework on fundamental rights was weak: 
That [Roma education] is your policy objective and then you say how do we do that and 
then maybe you test some things and then you go to legal change and all the way you 
have resources going through. That doesn’t happen here. What happens here is that 
someone says the law has to change, lets change the law and hope its gets better…It’s 




just an exercise in changing the law so the ministries are really stuck. They don’t have 
the mechanisms to translate and think about the policy.136 
 
Selection was reinforced by the interviewee’s own experience of working on the issue of Roma 
inclusion for over a decade. They concluded retrospectively that little progress had been 
made in addressing fundamental rights in practice. Personal experiences affected their 
current engagement with Serbian authorities and produced contestation towards the 
government’s current approach. To make this point, the interviewee gave an illustration of a 
typical EU-funded assistance programme, outlined its unrealistic expectations and argued 
that it did not produce the necessary normative change. Sharp criticism was further directed 
towards the failure of reforms to achieve evolutionary policy change: 
You can’t get institutional change in two years. The teaching assistant programme I 
spoke of is a good way you can get change but that change took 15 years. I think if you 
talk to the SDC they’ll tell you how it happened as they were engaged in it for 12 years 
and the Swiss have a much longer-term approach to these things and have a rather 
better understanding of how institutional change happens. The EU doesn’t. They’ll fund 
a two or three-year project and then will ask the question: why aren’t they 
sustainable?137 
 
This case of selection demonstrates the importance of experience, retrospection and existing 
beliefs in shaping the adoption of different policy narratives and the construction of 
contesting policy paradigms by dissident actors.  
                                                             




Retention of this perspective occurred through the interviewee’s everyday engagement with 
government actors and the EU. They argued that these interactions reinforced his belief that 
fundamental rights reforms were used instrumentally to achieve other objectives, primarily 
further European integration. The interviewee believed this eroded a focus on the normative 
change that should accompany fundamental rights. He further reflected on his engagement 
with the EU and government officials, and pointed to alternative reforms strategies he 
believed could lead to more effective policy change:  
One [alternative reform strategy] is the development aid model, which is the long-term 
engagement, outside-in type of engagement. Where you are an external actor with 
money and you want to make a long-term engagement. The EU delegations here are 
established to mirror future EU funding. And future EU funding is predicated on 
governments knowing what they want to do. And governments applying and getting the 
resources to make those changes. The problem here is that you don’t have within 
government any understanding of institutional change or how that takes place. Partly 
because the institutional change has been, over a number of years, externally driven by 
projects and so there hasn’t been any learning or the learning has been negative.138 
 
This discursive variation was reiterated by other civil society actors located at the periphery 
of Serbia’s reform process. They argued that the government of Serbia’s current reform 
agenda did not construct an appropriate normative or legal framework that demonstrated its 
commitment to addressing post-war legacies. One actor argued these issues should be 
addressed not only because they ‘unlocked’ the prospect of European integration, but also 
because facing the crimes of the past could help build a more open and tolerant society. This 
interviewee further emphasised how fundamental rights should be detached from the 




European integration process. For them, fundamental rights were about building a 
progressive society based on clear values and were not simply about achieving EU 
membership: 
I think we lost a lot and, in a year, we won’t join the EU. But because of political things 
and the political approach of the EU, maybe some things will happen which will make 
the process faster. But also, I think that it doesn’t mean it will be a quality process.… [In 
Croatia] I see because they are members of the EU some strong questions on the 
heritage of the war is just a topic they don’t want to participate in any more since joining 
the EU and nobody is pushing them to face that heritage.139 
 
Selection was aided by the interviewee’s own experience working for an outsider NGO 
(Tarrow, 2005, p.45). Their exclusion from the consultation processes being held between 
NGOs and governmental actors enabled them to adopt a critical position without fearing 
exclusion from important decision-making processes. Their perspective thus formed a 
contrasting public discourse, which was designed to put pressure on the government to 
include a wider range of civil society actors in discussion and change the way fundamental 
rights were viewed in Serbia:  
[There is a] weak civil society. And somehow that’s the tradition in Serbia. Politicians see 
civil society as something that can jeopardise their success in the election and don’t see 
what they could get from cooperating with civil society, both in EU negotiations and 
other domestic aspects. I don’t think civil society is recognised as a partner by the state 
of Serbia.140 
 
                                                             




The interviewee outlined how he constructed different internal understandings of 
fundamental rights through the construction of new concepts. Instead of accepting 
fundamental rights as a ‘European value’, the interviewee argued that ‘civic values’ were a 
more appropriate concept. The conscious reconceptualization of fundamental rights as a civic 
value allowed the interviewee and their organisation to contextualise fundamental rights. 
This reinforced their resistance to the current association of fundamental rights with EU 
accession and led to the retention of this contesting perspective: 
I have a personal issue with European values. We have interesting discussions in the 
office about the term, so we use the term citizens values instead or something like that. 
I think authorities in Serbia understand the need for improving in some areas, but they 
are aware of the fact it’s better for them if they don’t do anything there or just pretend 
to do something.141 
 
In sum, one type of contestation outlined the problematic conceptualisation of fundamental 
rights as an instrumental, as opposed to normative issue. Contesting actors believed that 
superficial compliance with the EU’s fundamental rights agenda had occurred and that this is 
reflective of the government’s strategic alignment with the EU, as opposed to normative 
alignment. The following section outlines a contesting perspective that also takes issue with 
the perceived superficial nature of the reform process.  
9.2.2 Contestation II: Simulating change? 
When reflecting on fundamental freedoms, some contesting actors argued that reforms were 
designed to present Serbia as a rehabilitated state within the international community. They 




argued that deep democratisation had not occurred in Serbia and progressive change was 
limited. They reflected on how the current reforms were a simulation, designed to 
communicate that Serbia was becoming a progressive and liberal society. This concept of 
simulation was articulated by other interviewees who were keen to highlight the continuity 
between the MIlošević government and current government, particularly in the way the 
current government sought to attack its detractors through government-friendly tabloid 
newspapers: 
But what I see as a big issue here is that we have an authoritarian state that is 
pretending not to be one. They are simulating all the processes and you are required to 
participate in this simulation. We all kind of know it is a simulation but no one is saying 
it is.142 
 
Selection in this case was an outcome of the interviewee’s previous experiences. The 
interviewees who emphasised Serbia’s ongoing decline in fundamental freedoms and who 
used the example of media freedom to make this point, felt excluded from government 
decision-making and had been targeted and attacked as ‘Western agents’ by government-
friendly newspapers. They also noted how critical media outlets had been attacked by the 
government-friendly tabloid newspapers (Freedom House, 2017). These attacks reminded an 
interviewee of the MIlošević era where freedom of expression was considerably curtailed. 
The inaction of the EU to address allegations that media freedoms were being curtailed also 
reinforced a view that reforms were a simulation. This demonstrates that contemporary 
understandings are also constructed in relation to past and current events:  
                                                             




We have reports from the local media that similar things are happening and an 
increased number of attacks on journalists not in Belgrade but in the south of Serbia and 
central Serbia… I think Brussels isn’t reacting is because as long as you are a really good 
partner to them and as long as you are nodding your head and doing what they are 
saying, of course they are going to ignore censorship as they don’t really care about 
it….143 
 
Retention was aided through different types of engagement. The first form of engagement 
with government actors in meetings reinforced the belief that the government was not 
sincere about reforms: 
I find them [meetings with the government] demeaning and meaningless and you 
basically feel like a puppet of the state over there as they are going to put in their 
report that they have had consultations with the NGOs with this and that. 144 
 
Alternative collaboration with similarly disenfranchised NGO actors also aided the 
interviewee’s organisation in constructing a parallel reform agenda, enabling retention. The 
interviewee outlined how their organisation had worked together with other NGOs to try and 
enact policy change and influence media reforms (Cullen, 2010). While they felt the EU was 
still unresponsive to their complaints, the reinforcement of their understanding through 
collaboration and socialisation with other NGOs, reaffirmed their belief that media freedom 
was being restricted and that this should be addressed: 





From the civil society point of view, we always think we can make some changes whilst 
applying pressure to the state and taking the issue to the EU. The EU does take some of 
those issues into consideration, but only when they are politically comfortable with it.145 
 
Another interviewee also pointed to the role the regional networks could play in helping to 
raise the profile of their concerns regarding the state of fundamental rights. These networks 
involved regional collaboration with other NGOs and provided the opportunity to feedback 
concerns to the EU and other international organisations. These external actors were keen to 
sponsor these networks. Despite praising the discussions that took place in these networks 
and acknowledging the role of the international community in facilitating these networks, the 
interviewee believed that the EU could do more to reflect the concerns raised in these 
networks back towards government actors: 
Some of our projects were financed by EU so that’s one way of cooperating with them 
and we have good contacts with the EU delegation and we always contribute with our 
comments to progress reports which is a very important way to express our advocacy... 
but I really don’t think [the] government understand these [fundamental rights] 
issues.146  
 
Another interviewee, an investigative journalist, also communicated a similar discursive 
variation. They argued Serbia’s current reforms do not represent a fundamental change in 
politics and reflected on the limited progress that had been made in advancing fundamental 
rights and freedoms. They communicated how they would differentiate between the current 
state of democracy in Serbia and a ‘functioning’ democracy. They argued that the current 
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model of democracy in Serbia lacked media freedom, which for them was an important 
fundamental right. They argued that reforms should better account for media freedom and 
contribute to the construction of a more substantive form of democracy: 
Freedom of media and professionalisation of media is an integral part of functional 
democracy. It doesn’t happen outside of functional democracy. Functional democracy 
is incredibly expensive, and it doesn’t really happen without significant economic 
power of a country.147 
 
Selection in this case was reinforced by the interviewee’s personal experience. In particular, 
their experience of being attacked by government supporting tabloids. This had hardened 
their resolve to strengthen the media environment in Serbia and improve its fundamental 
rights dimension. For the interviewee, this required going beyond formal compliance with the 
EU accession process and the passing of legislation which enshrines fundamental rights only 
on paper. It required ensuring that political changes were made to allow respect for social 
freedoms to be instantiated in practice. The interviewee also drew parallels between the 
current media environment and their experiences under MIlošević’s rule. These past 
experiences helped the interviewee evaluate current reforms and conclude that in over two 
decades of working as a journalist, media freedom had not been significantly improved.  Their 
perspective and advocacy position was thus an outcome of their ongoing experience of trying 
to improve media freedom and advance a more pluralistic and accountable form of 
democracy in Serbia. It was also an outcome of the way in which they made sense of the past: 
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I’m not idealistic about that, I’ve been a journalist here since the beginning of MIlošević’s 
rule. I’m very pragmatic about these things…. our other investigative journalist 
colleagues are accused very often that we work for the EU against our own government. 
I was on the front line of a tabloid as a foreign mercenary. For Christ sake, I’m just the 
editor in this very shabby office. If I’m your enemy you’re very weak. If I can get to you, 
that’s ridiculous. 148 
 
Retention occurred through the interviewee’s collaboration with NGOs and governmental 
actors in civil society Konvents. Konvents are a form of working group. They bring together 
civil society actors and government actors to discuss the issues covered under the chapters 
of the EU acquis. Although the previous interviewee outlined their negative experience with 
the Konvents, the experiences of this interviewee were more positive and appeared to 
improve retention. While these Konvents played a role in the accession of Slovakia, they have 
been increasingly utilised by civil society actors in Serbia to shape accession negotiations, 
reinforce their own understandings and help convince governmental actors to adopt their 
perspective (National convention on the EU, 2014). The interviewee gave an example of how 
instances of socialisation during Konvent meetings had focussed governmental actors on 
improving fundamental rights in practice, by persuading them that these issues were 
important. The interviewee further argued that this substantive change could take place 
when governmental actors were able to interact with NGOs away from the watch of ministry 
officials and political elites:  
We made a conscious effort not to be critical of them when we started meeting these 
people. Some in the working group persuaded the others the people we were meeting 
weren’t independent and work under strict hierarchies. After establishing that they 




started working with that and implementing things we suggested. They changed their 
understanding of certain problems in their organisational scheme because we showed 
them the statistical data they had never seen before. 149 
 
A final actor also supported the perspective that fundamental rights reforms resembled a 
simulation and did not support deep rule of law reform. This actor was also important in the 
field of judicial reform. They argued that media freedom was an important issue because a 
politicised media harmed the independent exercise of justice.  The interviewee believed that 
judicial reforms could not be separated from fundamental rights. They further argued that 
the structuring of EU accession around the combination of judicial reform, anti-corruption 
and fundamental rights, meant that all three should be interlinked to support a functional 
democracy. The interviewee’s variation however indicated that this perspective on 
enlargement reforms was not shared by government actors who saw compliance with 
reforms as necessary only to secure accession: 
Media freedom is also a priority area. Democratic deficit is a factor effecting rule of law 
and there remains a need to depoliticise rule of law. In our view, the media should be a 
cornerstone of government alongside, democracy, rule of law and respect for 
minorities.150 
 
Selection in this case was influenced by the interviewee’s experience working in the region. 
The interviewee argued that the way in which government actors approached reforms was 
common across the region. As the interviewee had spent more time working to promote the 
rule of law regionally, this belief had been reinforced through their interaction with political 
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elites and through observed political outcomes. Previous experiences appeared to be the key 
factor determining selection in this case: 
In Serbia and the region more generally, there is too much trial by media. Reporting on 
issues like corruption tends to be pervasive and assumes guilt in a way that can influence 
judicial outcomes. There is a lack of accountability in the media and it lacks a true 
investigative tradition.151 
 
Retention was influenced by their engagement with alternative indicators to measure things 
like media freedom, fundamental rights and the rule of law more generally. They argued that 
the EU relied too much on its benchmarking procedure and that benchmarking exercises 
often overlooked the importance of perceptions and change in practice. The interviewee 
argued that more focus could be placed on what fundamental rights and other rule of law 
outcomes mean in practice for citizens. This reinforced their belief that a change in practice 
would only occur once the EU and other actors recognised the importance of engaging with 
peoples’ perceptions of issues and not only measuring formal change in terms of legal 
transposition of the EU acquis: 
The EU focuses too much on benchmarking. It needs to back these benchmarks up with 
further and deeper evidence. Laws do take time but there is also a desire in Candidate 
States to move forward quickly. I also think perception indexes matter. They are helpful 
as indicators and can be part of this bottom-up change.152 
 
In sum, the perspective of contesting actors emphasised how fundamental rights reforms do 
not consider the current media environment in Serbia. They argued that this is a product of 





the reform process being superficial and enacting formal change in the absence of more 
normative and practical change. For contesting actors, fundamental rights reforms should not 
be used to advance socio-economic development or support other state-building processes. 
Instead, they should be about ensuring a change in practice occurs and that fundamental 
rights support an open society. Media freedom was used as one example to demonstrate how 
this contention arises in the policy area of fundamental rights. The contesting perspectives 
once more pointed to a lack of engagement between the EU, Serbian government and 
contesting actors who were usually civil society actors. This further supports the findings of 
the previous chapters that the EU’s approach struggles to initiate dialogue between actors 
that could reconcile contestations and produce shared understandings. Consequently, it is 
only partly effective in institutionalising the rule of law. 
9.3 What do these understandings tell us about the state of European integration? 
To summarise the findings of section 9.1 and 9.2, two clear perspectives exist. The first 
engages more proactively with the current fundamental rights reform agenda in Serbia. 
Broadly speaking, the actors’ perspectives outlined in section 9.1 saw fundamental rights 
reforms as an opportunity to advance rule of law and restructure relations between citizens 
and the state. These actors outlined the importance of using fundamental rights to improve 
the access of citizens to the state and to support economic growth through social inclusion. 
In comparison to the other policy areas, the vocabulary of neoliberalism is less present in this 
policy area. However, the emphasis placed on the individual, economistic notions of access 
and accountability, and the occasional reference to good governance, suggest neoliberal 
ideas do play a role in structuring fundamental rights reforms. 
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 The second perspective outlined in section 9.2 demonstrated that contesting actors diverged 
from this understanding on the basis that they did not consider the current approach to lead 
to a change in practice. Contesting actors expressed concern that fundamental rights were 
only advanced as part of the accession process. This raised important questions about the 
possible erosion of fundamental rights as a key norm after accession and the ‘superficial’ 
nature of the reform process. Another perspective used the example of media freedom to 
articulate how freedom of expression, a key fundamental right, was not respected in practice. 
From these understandings, several key observations can be made about the nature of EU 
integration in Serbia. 
First, of the policy areas examined that correspond with Chapter 23 of the EU acquis, 
fundamental rights appeared to be the most fragmented in terms of discourse and 
understanding. This was communicated by actors, who recognised the broad topics which fall 
under fundamental rights, ranging from LGBT rights to post-conflict reconciliation. To make 
sense of such a range of policy issues, many actors focussed on how fundamental could be 
advanced by restructuring relations between citizens and the state. This explains why actors 
focussed on improving access to the state and improving social inclusion. It also demonstrated 
how fundamental rights were made sense of by individuals in relation to broader socio-
economic reforms. This further demonstrates the power economistic ideas have in shaping 
understandings of the reform process.  
Second, while the dominant reform paradigm allowed actors to link fundamental rights 
reforms to a broader reform agenda, this undermined an explicit focus on the normative 
content of fundamental rights. The contesting perspectives of actors highlighted how current 
reform approaches reduced the focus placed on the normative content of fundamental rights. 
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These actors argued this has resulted in an implementation gap, whereby new laws designed 
to protect fundamental rights are not matched by a change in practice. The ‘functional’ use 
of fundamental rights reinforced a superficial reform agenda. Other scholars have highlighted 
the problems of this and how superficial compliance leads to the reproduction of political 
elites in new quasi-liberal or neoliberal state forms (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Pawelec 
& Grimm, 2014). Contesting actors provided evidence to support the argument that Serbia’s 
reforms lack an authentic commitment to progressive social transformation. There is clearly 
a strategic dimension to the government of Serbia’s reform agenda and its strategic selectivity 
favours a managed reform approach. It favours enacting reforms to secure support from the 
EU and consents to surrendering some power to other social forces in new configurations of 
government. However, it is eager to ensure that its political power is not completely eroded 
and is maintained throughout the accession process. 
Third, the scope of topics covered under fundamental rights and the increased framing of 
fundamental rights in relation to other reforms designed to empower citizens and enhance 
social inclusion make it difficult for external actors to monitor the policy area effectively. In 
seeking to ensure that EU integration remains general enough to be tangible without 
becoming overwhelming, small scale transgressions on fundamental rights are often 
overlooked. The freedom of expression cases concerning media freedom are a good example 
of this. By focussing too much on the big picture, the EU and allied actors overlook the role 
attacks through pro-government tabloids play in undermining fundamental rights. 
Interviewees associated the current media climate with the MIlošević era. For these actors, 
this association reduced their affection for EU accession reforms and supported their belief 
that the EU is only interested in working with the government of Serbia and not broader civil 
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society. It also supported claims of an implementation gap and raised important questions 
about the sincerity of the Serbian leadership in their commitment to the normative content 
of fundamental rights, as opposed to the more ‘functional’ role fundamental rights can play 
in changing citizen-state relations and enabling socio-economic development. This suggests 
that European integration is a contested venture in Serbia. It also suggests that European 
integration remains an elite driven, governmental process. By failing to facilitate social 
dialogue between contesting actors, European integration in Serbia fails to result in the type 
of ‘complete’ political transformation and change in political culture that proponents of 
liberal democracy advocate. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined fundamental rights, a key rule of law policy area. It first outlined how 
key actors understand fundamental rights. It demonstrated how a dominant understanding 
of fundamental rights is constructed in relation to empowering citizens vis-à-vis the state, and 
in relation to socio-economic reforms centred upon inclusion. It also demonstrated how this 
construction of reforms generated contestation and divergence between actors. This was 
because some actors believed that the current reform paradigm did not adequately focus on 
the implementation of fundamental rights in practice. This raised concerns about how 
substantive fundamental rights reforms are and was reflected in section 9.3, which explored 
what these differences in understandings tell us about European integration in Serbia. This 
section further emphasised how a lack of dialogue between actors to resolve points of 
contestation results in rule of law reforms and EU accession being a highly contested venture, 
which is predominantly driven by the interactions between external actors and government 
elites. This is visible in the emergence of shared understandings between domestic elites and 
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external actors. Their understandings however lack broader resonance. This was 
demonstrated through an analysis of actor semiosis. 
The findings of this chapter also highlight the inevitable challenge of the EU’s ambitious 
reform agenda in Serbia. While the EU’s new approach is far more thorough and results in a 
more attentive accession process (in comparison to previous enlargements), it also struggles 
to consider the complexity of reforms and the myriad understandings held by different actors. 
To overcome contestation and construct a more harmonious and consensual process, 
increased communication, collaboration and localised solutions to key rule of law issues 
should be promoted.  
This thesis now moves to its conclusion. It reflects on its key findings, summarises the answers 
to its key research questions, acknowledges the limits of this research and suggests some 











Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 Core argument and achievements 
This thesis offered comprehensive new insights into rule of law reforms in Serbia.  Detailed 
empirical analysis showed that the way in which rule of law reforms unfold through EU 
enlargement policy is more nuanced than the existing literature suggests. This thesis showed 
how understandings of the rule of law and EU enlargement shaped how different actors 
engaged with rule of law reforms. These understandings were shaped by a range of factors 
including relationships between actors, previous experiences, organisational culture and 
salient discourses. Overall, this thesis showed that a focus on actors and the factors which 
shape their interpretations, is crucial for understanding how effective current rule of law 
reforms are in institutionalising the rule of law in practice.   
The application of a CPE approach demonstrated that successful rule of law reforms will 
require more than the promotion of narrowly defined rule of law concepts from EU actors to 
governmental actors in Candidate States. It showed how the contestations articulated by a 
range of external, dissident governmental and civil society actors, resulted in everyday 
resistance to current reforms. These contesting actors raised legitimate concerns about the 
limited impact rule of law reforms had when they were delivered primarily through 
partnerships with existing governmental elites. This thesis showed that more substantive rule 
of law reforms should embrace a broader range of concepts and issues to enact further 
change. This could help facilitate dialogue between a range of actors and resolve existing 
contestations. 
The application of an alternative approach to examining rule of law reforms advances the 
study of EU enlargement and European integration more broadly. Cases of contestation and 
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exclusion from EU reform processes can be missed through analytical approaches that take 
formal compliance with EU rules and norms to be the key measure of success. Such 
approaches overlook how different actors construct an understanding of EU reforms and how 
these understandings inform engagement with the EU accession process, as well as how 
interpretations shape European integration more generally. More broadly, the successful 
application of a CPE approach showed how the application of new methodologies in European 
Studies can provide novel insight. 
The following section presents a breakdown of the key findings of this thesis in more detail. 
It addresses directly the research questions posed in section 1.3 and summarises the findings 
of this thesis. Following this, the significance of these findings is elaborated, including its 
policy and political implications. Section 10.3 highlights the distinctive contribution this thesis 
makes as a focussed piece of empirical research on rule of law reforms in Serbia. It also 
highlights how this thesis advances our understanding of European integration and provides 
a case for the wider use of CPE approaches in the study of politics. Finally, the thesis addresses 









10.2 A breakdown of the key findings 
Table 10.1: Research questions. Source: Author generated. 
RQ1: What are the key logics, imaginaries and interactions driving the delivery of rule of 
law reforms in Serbia?  
SQ1: What are the key logics and imaginaries driving the EU’s regional engagement?  
SQ2: Who are the key actors involved in the delivery of rule of law reforms in Serbia and how do they 
interact? 
 
RQ2: How effective is the EU’s approach for ensuring the institutionalisation of the rule of 
law in practice? 
SQ3: How do actors construct an understanding of rule of law reforms through semiosis and what informs 
these understandings? 
SQ4: To what extent do we find convergence, divergence and contestation between different 
understandings and why? 
SQ5: What do the different understandings of actors tell us about rule of law reforms in Serbia and 
European integration more generally?  
 
The first research question — and its sub-research questions — focussed on the logics, 
imaginaries and interactions driving the delivery of rule of law reforms in Serbia. In answering 
the first sub-research question, this thesis demonstrated how EU actors constructed a 
political imaginary of the Western Balkans region as a place of perpetual instability. A process 
of structuration, whereby actors’ relationships with institutions; their broader social 
environment; their interpretation of previous events; and interpretation of contemporary 
problems, informed the construction of this imaginary. This imaginary informed the 
prioritisation of a socially constructed strategic logic, which drove the EU’s engagement with 
Serbia and its regional engagement with the Western Balkans. In this context, enlargement 
policy is designed to reinforce stability and reduce the risk the region poses to EU security. In 
this process of imaginary construction, a core group of key Member States played an integral 
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role in reinforcing the EU’s contemporary approach and reproducing the constructed political 
imaginary. This resulted in the application of an enlargement strategy designed to reinforce 
the EU’s strategic interests and address the perceived shortcomings of previous enlargements. 
This finding is significant as it demonstrates that EU-Western Balkans relations cannot be 
reduced to a question of interests or ideas. Instead, a complex interplay between the two 
characterises EU enlargement policy and informs the EU’s delivery of rule of law reforms 
through the accession process. 
Answering the second sub-research question required analysing the interactions between key 
actors in Serbia who promoted rule of law reforms within a policy network. This was done 
through social network analysis. First, a typology of socialisation was outlined. In applying this 
typology, it was demonstrated how a strategic mode of socialisation supported actors in their 
attempts to advance perceived interests and objectives. This process of strategic socialisation 
was argued to result in a procedural form of interaction and produced important network 
divisions. In the network, key groups of international organisations, external state actors and 
domestic governmental actors tended to interact within one another more than with civil 
society actors. This reinforced the intergovernmental dynamics of the accession process and 
made it difficult for civil society actors to raise legitimate concerns about the state of rule of 
law reforms in Serbia. This strategic interaction between actors did not facilitate an authentic 
process of social learning and consigned civil society actors to a peripheral position in the 
policy network.  
The second research question addressed the effectiveness of the EU’s approach for 
institutionalising the rule of law in practice. In answering this question, this thesis focused on 
the capacity of the EU’s new approach to shape understandings among key rule of law actors 
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within Serbia. It explored three important sub-research questions across three rule of law 
policy areas.  First, in answering the third sub-research question in the case of judicial reform, 
a dominant understanding anchored around the concept of efficiency was identified. This was 
constructed through a process of semiosis, which focussed on the relationship between 
judicial reform, liberalisation and efficiency. Regarding the fourth sub-research question, this 
understanding was contested by actors who argued it did not adequately consider judicial 
independence or consider the need for greater domestic ownership of rule of law reforms. In 
each case, initial discourses where selected and retained in relation to context, previous 
experiences and the role performed by actors. In terms of the fifth sub-research question, 
which asked what this tells us about European integration more generally, the emergence of 
contestation in this policy area demonstrated the multifaceted nature of reforms. The lack of 
reconciliation between different understandings suggested that rule of law reforms would 
benefit from dialogue that resolves contestation and facilitates the construction of shared 
understandings.  
Anti-corruption policy in Serbia demonstrated a similar dynamic. A dominant anti-corruption 
understanding conceptualised corruption to be a product of administrative culture. This 
conceptualisation occurred through a process of semiosis that linked corruption to individual 
behaviours and a lack of good governance. In terms of contesting perspectives, the first 
perspective took issue with the dominant approach for lacking a systemic understanding of 
corruption. The second contesting perspective argued that the current approach 
underestimated the challenge of eradicating corruption and did not reach beyond the issue 
of administrative culture. The final contesting perspective focussed on the issue of superficial 
compliance by government actors. The case of anti-corruption policy demonstrated the lack 
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of consensus between the government and the EU on one side, and civil society on the other. 
It again pointed to the need for dialogue between actors if rule of law reforms and EU 
integration are to support the bottom-up development of democracy, which is anchored in 
the rule of law. 
Regarding fundamental rights, these were primarily conceptualised as an everyday issue.  
Through semiosis, actors related the issue to social inclusion and framed fundamental rights 
as an issue of citizens’ access to the state. In contrast to this understanding, contesting actors 
argued that fundamental rights were being used instrumentally and the current rhetoric did 
not match the implementation of fundamental rights in practice. Another group of contesting 
actors argued that this resulted in the ‘simulation’ of change. The issue of fundamental rights 
demonstrated that EU integration has tended to lack an open dialogue about what important 
foundational values mean in different contexts and their practical benefit. Again, this chapter 
showed that in regards to EU integration in Serbia, dialogue is an underused but important 
tool for creating shared understandings. This suggests that EU integration in Serbia lacks a 
meaningful process of dialogue beyond the governmental level.  
Reflecting on the second research question, it is evident that the EU’s approach is partly 
effective. However, it fails to encourage the widespread institutionalisation of the rule of law 
in practice. While the EU’s new approach does place rule of law at the heart of the accession 
process, it does not equally include all actors in the reform process. The central role played 
by governmental actors and the peripheral role occupied by civil society and other contesting 
actors, resulted in the formation of parallel understandings. This created divergent 
expectations about what rule of law reforms should achieve. This process allowed domestic 
elites to institutionalise some reforms, while avoiding the implementation of deep-rooted 
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reforms that challenged their interests. The EU appeared to accept this dynamic as it is reliant 
on these actors to deliver its reforms.  
10.3 Significance  
In chapter 1, it was anticipated that the effective institutionalisation of the rule of law 
required both formal rule of law institutions and the construction of shared understandings 
to underpin these institutions. The analysis presented in this thesis supports this assumption 
by demonstrating how the construction of an approach grounded in perceived interests and 
delivered through partnership between external actors and governmental actors, resulted in 
the emergence of legitimate contestations that are not adequately addressed through rule of 
law reforms. By adopting a novel analytical approach, this thesis has opened the black box of 
EU accession-related rule of law reforms and demonstrated that despite some success, they 
fail to fully support the institutionalisation of the rule of law in practice.  
It has been demonstrated how rule of law reforms privilege dominant understandings of 
judicial reform, anti-corruption policy and fundamental rights respectively. These 
understandings emerged as an outcome of the interaction between some international actors 
and governmental actors within the examined policy network. The imaginary driving the 
reform process prioritised a socially constructed strategic logic that was perceived to secure 
the interests of EU actors and address the shortcomings of previous enlargements. However, 
the emergence of contesting understandings suggests that this approach failed to focus on 
the substance of rule of law reforms, prioritised certain understandings over others and 
contributed to a belief amongst contesting actors that rule of law reforms only partly address 
the rule of law deficit in Serbia.  
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The limited effectiveness of the EU’s new approach to promote rule of law has important 
policy implications. The contestations raised by actors about the current reform process are 
grounded in legitimate concerns about whether rule of law reforms will really hold domestic 
elites to account and address the important issues that currently undermine democracy and 
development within Serbia. The voices of judges, public institutions and humanitarian NGOs 
to name a few, must be heard if rule of law reforms are to address the concerns of Serbian 
society. If the current dynamics of the enlargement process do not change and no significant 
attention is paid to ensuring that rule of law reforms address the issues raised by different 
actors, the rule of law will remain weakly embedded in Serbia. This would result in democracy 
remaining fragile and exposed to actors who might wish to advance their own interests 
through political office.  
The findings of this thesis raise important political questions. The EU faces a challenge in 
ensuring its rule of law reforms resonate beyond a narrow governmental level. The EU faces 
a significant dilemma. It needs to guarantee rule of law reforms promote important 
specificities, while also resonating more broadly. Can the EU plausibly amalgamate contesting 
understandings of the rule of law and facilitate dialogue between actors without undermining 
the coherence or integrity of its rule of law promotion efforts? This thesis suggests that any 
effort to resolve this dilemma requires a new strategy of engagement that is anchored in 
greater dialogue between a broad cross-section of actors. The imperative that the rule of law 
survives and thrives in an enlarged EU is clear. If the regimes in Hungary and Poland find 
willing allies to help them transform the EU in their image, liberal democracy could be further 
discredited and superseded by the proliferation of illiberal democracies.  
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10.4 Limitations and avenues for future research  
It is important to acknowledge several limitations of this research. While the application of a 
CPE approach was novel in that it provided much needed data on the way in which key actors 
make sense of rule of law reforms, it is characterised by its highly qualitative focus. This makes 
it difficult to replicate and reproduce interviewee responses, which may be shaped by 
relationships between the interviewee and interviewer. This is a general limitation of 
interview methods. Cases of none-response, while partially mitigated through the research 
design outlined in chapter 3, do ultimately leave some perspectives unaccounted for. This is 
significant given the centrality of actor perspectives for explaining cases of convergence and 
divergence in relation to understandings of rule of law policy. While this thesis has sought to 
capture, categorise and analyse the key perspectives, it’s important to acknowledge that 
other voices may be have been omitted. Future research could address this by conducting an 
even broader examination of the narratives surrounding rule of law reforms in Serbia and 
what these tell us about EU integration and politics more broadly.  
Analysing rule of law reforms in Serbia had heuristic value and the insights generated from 
this case help advance a theory of sensemaking in EU politics. Future research that is well-
resourced could deploy a similar CPE methodology to further analyse the EU’s promotion of 
the rule of law externally. Such an approach could retain the processual focus of this thesis 
while widening its scope to focus on rule of law reforms in other countries in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. This would help test the core hypothesis that rule of law reforms are only 
successfully institutionalised when they resonate widely and allow for a convergence of 
different understandings through dialogue. Similar applications of the CPE approach could 
help refine a theory of sensemaking and the role it plays in EU politics. 
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This thesis deployed a more qualitative form of social network analysis. This type of network 
analysis does not allow for the type of statistical analysis that can be achieved by large scale 
network analysis. However, the use of a more qualitative form of network analysis allowed 
this thesis to not just capture actor interaction, but also ascertain why interactions occurred 
and their significance. This was a labour-intensive approach that would be challenging to 
replicate in a larger network. A similar study across multiple Candidate States would again 
require significant time and resources but would be beneficial and advance our understanding 
of the role that socialisation plays in policy networks by identifying, analysing and comparing 
multiple networks. It is also important to note that in this thesis, the analysed network may 
remain partial and incomplete, even if the key actors have been captured. However, the 
primary purpose of the SNA was to ascertain how processes of socialisation shape 
understandings and subsequently reform outcomes. Consequently, the network analysis was 
useful and highlighted the role social relations between key actors played in shaping rule of 
law reform outcomes.  
In terms of future research on EU enlargement, the insights provided by a CPE approach show 
there is value in moving beyond current methodological approaches. While political science 
and IR scholarship has increasingly sought to expand its repertoire of methodologies and 
theories, the EU enlargement literature has remained focussed on applying the same 
methodologies and presenting the same theories of change. A CPE approach has shown that 
unorthodox approaches can complement and expand our existing understandings of the 
enlargement process. Future research on EU enlargement should consider the value added 




More generally, studies of European integration continue to favour established theories, 
which have achieved a dominant position in the field. The approach adopted in this thesis, 
however, shows that new light can be shed on European integration by moving beyond these 
established theories. Across a whole range of other European integration issues, novel 
contributions could be made to the field through an application CPE. The most obvious place 
for its future application would be European political economy. However, the role 
sensemaking plays in shaping a host of other policy areas such as migration or its role in 
informing diplomatic action, remains underexplored. There is value in scholars who are 
interested in European integration and EU politics adopting CPE approaches and other 
underutilised methodologies, which might provide an alternative perspective and new 
evidence on established research topics.  
Beyond European integration, there is also scope for the CPE approach applied here to be 
used in other research projects. Cultural approaches, including interpretivism and CPE, 
remain underutilised in political science research. Increased focus on the way in which actor 
interpretations shape outcomes can advance our understanding of politics and policy. By 
focussing on the drivers of policy, identifying the relationships which sustain policy reforms 
and outlining how policy is reconstituted through interpretation, CPE and similar approaches 
can provider alternative explanations and access important but often overlooked empirical 
detail. There is scope to apply CPE approaches to a whole range of other political or policy 
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